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the wargame.  The model accurately represented the experimental data, confirming our 
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A. THESIS STATEMENT 
Research exploring the effectiveness of joint military teams lacks the empirical 
robustness found in similar multicultural team research from the business domain.     For 
more than thirty-five years the business community has focused on overcoming factors 
that limit or degrade effective team processes by evaluating and developing methods to 
integrate team members with diverse cultural orientations and personalities. The 
examination of identical challenges in the military environment is rare. We believe 
evaluating and developing methods to improve joint military team effectiveness utilizing 
the business community methodology will directly influence the survivability of the 
personnel and equipment deployed during Effects Based Operations (EBO). This 
outcome is even more important than a business in the global economy increasing its 
profit line. Due to the paucity of research within the military and to present a 
methodology for improving military team effectiveness, our goal is to explore the effect 
of cultural differences between the four military services on joint team effectiveness.  
Specifically, we examine the applicability of the business model for improved team 
information  sharing in a joint team environment.  In doing so we demonstrate these 
methods will advance joint team interoperability and enhance information sharing.    
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Operations in Iraq during April and May of 2004 illustrate the catastrophic 
consequences of poor information sharing between joint service units.  Team members 
from one service detected the existence of an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) weapons 
systems in early April.  The initial classification of that weapons system was a ZPU 4 
after Battlefield Damage Assessments (BDA) from engagements on fixed and rotary 
wing aircraft revealed damage from this type of system.  A team composed of several 
military services became responsible for the classification, location and destruction of 
that system and began a detailed search for possible hiding places.  Fixed wing 
reconnaissance missions identified a possible hide location.  Analysis determined the 
location to be in an adjacent service’s area of operation (AO). The ZPU 4 was relocating 
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across this boundary, after engaging targets, then moving back to the other side of that 
boundary in Northern Iraq.  Several attempts to locate and destroy the ZPU 4 while it was 
operational were unsuccessful.   The team initiated contact with the adjacent service who 
had operational control of the area containing the hide position of the ZPU 4. The 
communications protocols required this information to be processed through established 
channels. The service responsible for the area of operations where the ZPU 4 hide 
location was located took no action to locate and destroy the ZPU 4 because that system 
was not engaging targets in their AO.  Despite the identification and lethality of that 
system, it remained operational under the same movement conditions for another week.  
The failure to destroy this enemy asset resulted in the suspect ZPU 4 engaging and 
downing an MI-8 HIP transport rotary wing aircraft and killing all aboard.  In total, three 
different services were involved in this incident and little action was taken to prevent the 
loss of life and equipment despite knowing the location and capability of the ZPU 4.  The 
team who identified and attempted to coordinate the destruction of that system say that 
this incident still haunts them.  As one member of the team put it,  “It will haunt me 
knowing that I had put the clues together but still couldn’t stop it from happening.” 
Operation boundaries between joint units are identifiable and exploited by our 
enemies.  The above incident was preventable in two ways: first, by denying our enemies 
the ability to exploit our boundary, and second, by improving communications across 
service boundaries by members working in joint operation centers or on joint teams. It 
should be noted that many current research efforts attempt to examine and resolve 
problems identified at the multinational, interagency level. We contend that the above 
incident indicates the necessity to investigate the conditions that allow such an event to 
occur at the joint level prior to attempting to improve even more diverse multicultural 
teams.   
Operational conditions often limit our ability to share information between similar 
units causing even greater challenges where physical and psycho-social boundaries exist 
due to service structure.  These boundaries should permit good information sharing and 
coordination between the joint services occupying adjacent sides, while denying the 
enemy ready identification and exploitation of that same boundary.   The explanation for 
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this lack of permeability between the joint services, while allowing operational access by 
our enemy, is a problem that requires analysis.  
This research examines the possible factors that influence this lack of boundary 
permeability.  We draw on the business and psychological domains where similar 
problems have been overcome successfully.  Specifically, we examine several key 
elements of poor team effectiveness identified by the business community, namely 
cultural differences and personality stereotypes among team members.  The focus of our 
research is joint team effectiveness during operations, where the battlefield or area of 
operation, is asymmetric.  We hypothesize that applying solutions already developed in 
the business and psychological domains will result in comparable improvement to team 
processes in a military domain.  To address this problem, our research strives to answer 
five research questions.   
1.  Can profiles of the military services indicate differences using the macro-
cognitive factors of cultural orientation and personality as quantitative measures? 
2.  Do the service differences in cultural orientation and personality significantly 
impact team effectiveness during Effects Based Operations? 
3.  Can the business model for improving team effectiveness be applied to the 
military to improve information sharing and thereby affect joint team effectiveness? 
4.  Can computer simulations using agent-based models replicate human behavior 
experimentation results? 
5.  Can the reliability and validity standards of the social and behavioral sciences 
be incorporated into the simulation science Verification, Validation and Accreditation 
(VV&A) standards resulting in a model for Human Behavior Representation (HBR). 
C. APPROACH 
This research proposed to answer the above questions in an unusual manner.  The 
investigation began with a review of the literature focused on several domains.  The 
review included documentation on the current transformation of the military.  This was 
followed by a description of warfare symmetry specifically looking at asymmetric Effects 
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Based Operation (EBO) within a Network Centric Warfare (NCW) framework.  The 
domains of cultural orientation and personality were reviewed thoroughly along with a 
review of team effectiveness, team cognition and team member stereotype.  Finally, we 
explored computer simulations using agent-based modeling methods, combined with 
behavioral science, to develop models that identify problematic and systemic symptoms 
that negate our military force’s ability to shape the battlespace.  
The approach for this research involved three specific studies.  Study One 
consisted of developing profiles of the four services using two reliable and valid surveys 
commonly used in the business community.  These surveys were the Matsumoto Cultural 
Styles Questionnaire and the Neuroticism, Extraversion Openness to Experience Five 
Factor Inventory (NEO FFI).  The surveys were placed in an online format for Study One 
participants and exact replications handed out to participants in Study Two.  Additionally, 
to evaluate any potential stereotypes between joint service members, participants 
evaluated their service using the NEO FFI and evaluated the other three services using 
the same instrument. The use of standard culture and personality inventories is a common 
method for determining whether a group sees another group the same way the evaluated 
group sees themselves (McCrae, R., 2005).  Differences may indicate a potential 
stereotype. 
Study Two evaluated team effectiveness in homogeneous and heterogeneous team 
compositions during an actual wargame exercise with participants representing all four 
military services.  Two conditions were established:  a control condition and an 
experimental condition.  Teams composed of military participants took part in a wargame 
requiring the sharing of information between team members to develop plausible courses 
of action.  Team effectiveness was based on information sharing, number of courses of 
action developed, linguistic analysis, and behavioral analysis.  
Study Three incorporated the cognitive and behavioral data generated from Study 
One and Study Two into an agent-based model.  The NetLogo software model was coded 
to replicate the wargame and then implemented in a simulation to explore human 
behavior representation.  We compared the data output from the simulation with the 
actual wargame results for performance to determine the accuracy of the model output.  
  
 5
The resulting data output was used to complete a complex team design matrix to include 
teams that were not part of the wargame experiment. The results from all three studies are 
detailed and documented for purposes of replication in future endeavors.  
D. CONTRIBUTION 
Integration of the four military services is the initial component of the State 
Department strategy to improve cooperation and communications between the military, 
multinational, interagency and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).  Outlined 
during a briefing to the Military Operations Research Symposium (MORS) conference in 








Figure 1.   State Department Integration Strategy 
  
Reading from left to right, the strategy suggested by the State Department begins 
by deconflicting the potential barriers that exist between the four service components. By 
deconflicting this area, enhanced coordination is possible and this is represented by the 
black blocks connecting the four military services.  Enhanced Coordination leads to 
Integration of the four services and the Special Operations community, which results in 
Coherently Integrating all State Department organizations.  The leadership from the 
Department of Defense (DoD), including the individual service components, documents 
in detail that the transformation process involves a cultural change. We review these 
documents in the literature review that follows.  Our work advances research that 
contributes to both the State Department and DoD requirements.   
Results from Study One revealed service profiles that distinguish the diversity 
between each service’s cultural orientation and personality disposition.  These differences 
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may unintentionally increase communication barriers between the services. This finding 
supports the State Department focus of deconflicting the services. 
Study Two determined that the adaptability of business domain solutions in team 
effectiveness problems to military environments is possible.  Our finding contributes to 
DoD desires to develop quantifiable means to determine the progress of transformation of 
the military.   
Study Three resulted in the development of several agent-based models revealing 
that human behavior representation could be accurately simulated in models populated 
with data from human experimentation.  Further, we discovered complex experimental 
design matrixes could be completed that added robustness to research results.    This 
effort contributed to the advancement of simulations that employ actual human behavior 
data as the input variables, instead of the current use of notional variables. Additionally, a 
model is presented as a possible method to evaluate simulation output by merging 
behavioral science reliability and validity techniques with simulation science VV&A 
methods.  This combined approach contributes to more accurate evaluation of model 
output based on referent human behavior data sets.    
Finally, our research is a unique first attempt to demonstrate how cultural 
orientation and personality differences can negatively affect joint team processes.  Only 
military members were allowed to participate.  Integrating multiple methods was an 
enormous undertaking but resulted in demonstrating that human experimentation can be 
coupled with simulations to make a significant contribution to joint integration. 
E. DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I introduces the foundation of the work and summarizes the reason the 
research is important, relevant, and unique along with a statement of the objectives and 
goals for the research. Chapter II reviews the relevant literature on transformation, 
effects-based operations, network centric warfare, macro-cognition, team effectiveness, 
and simulations.  A summary of the literature establishes the empirical foundation for the 
research.  Chapter III defines the methods and experimental design.  The empirical 
measures for all studies are explained.  Chapter IV provides the statistical analysis for the 
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studies.  Chapter V details and explains the results of the research.  This chapter contains 
conclusions reached from the experimentation process and describes research concepts 
and implementation details that the author was unable to accomplish due to time and/or 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section reviews the pertinent literature for each domain relevant to this 
research.  A top to bottom review is undertaken to structure a logical case describing how 
the State Department’s goal of coherent integration of all Department of Defense (DoD) 
assets may encounter systemic problems that have, and will continue, to disrupt that 
process.  We begin with a description of the states of warfare where the lack of 
integration negatively influences the effectiveness of our military, followed by a narrative 
on transformation as the framework that will support the idea of an integrated military.  
The application of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) theory to warfare is discussed, 
focusing on the social and cognitive domains as methods to shape the battlespace.  The 
cognitive and social domains of NCW are based on human behavior, so we provide a 
substantial review of the cognitive and social processes that influence behavior, and 
ultimately, team effectiveness.   
We drew on the extensive literature available from the business and psychology 
domains on methodologies to improve team effectiveness within teams composed of 
members from multicultural or diverse backgrounds.  Finally, we conclude with a review 
of agent-based simulations and application of these models in providing added 
description, understanding, prediction, and control of multicultural team development.   
On May 2, 2003, President Bush announced that major combat operations were 
over in the battle of Iraq (Fox News Report, 2003).  Typically, when the warfighting 
stops, the peacekeeping operations begin.  This is true in the framework of a symmetric, 
attrition-based operation associated with large scale wars resembling World War I, World 
War II and Desert Storm.  Unfortunately, the transition to peacekeeping in Iraq and 
Afghanistan was interrupted by resistance forces.  These operations are described in 
various ways.   
The United Nations uses the term “Chapter VI ½, Peace Building” (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2006, p. 3).  Gen. Krulak (1999) refers to this as “the three block war;” other 
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military professionals refer to this midpoint between war-fighting and peacekeeping as 
“peace enabling.”  Current studies at the United States Joint Force Command 
(USJFCOM) use the term “Irregular Warfare” (Joint Warfighting Center, 2006).   
These operations are characteristic of asymmetric Effects Based Operations    
(EBO) where resistance forces are not detoured by precision weapons and advanced 
technologies.  In fact, the resistance forces used archaic methods and devices to erode the 
peace established earlier during the symmetric warfare period.  How was this 
accomplished?  Was this evolving aspect of the peace enabling operation predictable, and 
do methods exist that can counteract this type of insurgent resistance?  Our research 
indicates that the answers to these questions require a study across several domains and 
begins with a description of warfare symmetry. 
B. WARFARE 
This research is not an attempt to expand knowledge of an already rich body of 
work on warfare.  We focus more on the symmetry rather than the function of warfare.  
For our purposes, symmetric warfare is associated with attrition-based operations, and 
asymmetric warfare is associated with effects-based operations.  Smith (2002) provides 
an excellent summary of the symmetry of warfare in his book Effects Based Operations .  
A point worth making at this time is that there is a potential conflict of terms and 
meanings that could surface, biasing this research . 
The basis for using asymmetric effects-based operations rather than peace 
enabling, irregular warfare, or three block war developed from the review of the 
literature. Another source of documentation outlining similar operations is DoD Directive 
300.05 (2005) describing Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
operations.  The documents supporting use of terms other than effects-based operations 
all have valid and similar constructs, despite their different definitions.  Effects-based 
operations coupled with Network Centric Warfare provide a framework for research, a 
definition, and a means of measurement that other constructs had not developed at the 
time our research began.  We do not make the argument that this is right or wrong. 
Analyst and military professions will determine the utility as transformation continues. 
The results from our research do establish a methodology that is transferable to any 
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construct regardless of term, definition, or meaning. Based on this construct, the 
remainder of our review focuses on effects-based Network Centric Theory. 
Our work establishes the foundation for examining how transformation can be a 
force multiplier.  Our focus will be more on asymmetric rather than symmetric warfare.  
We contend that the US military’s ability and capability to conduct attrition-based 
operations will benefit from transformation, however, not to the order of magnitude that 
can be realized in effects-based operations.    
Attrition-based operation involves forces with great means and great will to wage 
war (Smith, 2002, p. 16).  “Great means” refers to the ability to bring a technological 
capability to the battlefield and “great will” describes the national desire to wage war and 
defeat an enemy by all political, economic, societal, and military means.  Smith (2002) 
suggests that both of the World Wars, Desert Storm, and the US Civil war are examples 
of symmetric, attrition-based conflicts.  Asymmetric effects-based operations differ from 
symmetric warfare in both means and will.   
Asymmetric effects-based operations involve forces with differing means and 
wills.  One force is described as having great means but limited will, while the opponent 
is described as having limited means but unlimited will.  These asymmetric operations 
adequately depict operations where insurgent, terrorist or tyrannical elements are 
involved against a government or nation.  Smith (2004) provides examples of an 
asymmetric environment: the United Soviet States of Russia (USSR) conflict with 
Afghanistan, the French and United States (US) conflict with Vietnam, the US 
involvement in Somalia, and the current operation in Iraq (p. 18-23).  In each of these 
examples, a nation’s technological advantage had little impact on the enemy. The 
national desire of the “great means” country eroded over a prolonged conflict and the 
“unlimited will” adversary demonstrated amazing ability to adapt and evolve the longer 
the conflict lasted.   
In the attrition-based operation, technology is a combat and force multiplier.  In 
the effects-based operation, there are few examples where adding technology to the 
battlefield lessened the enemy’s desire to wage war, although the lives of the young men 
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and women carrying on the day-to-day operations were better protected.  What the 
technological advances fail to accomplish is to decrease the resistance forces’ will to 
continue the fight. There may be a lull in attacks on the technologically superior force, 
but only until the enemy adapts and overcomes the technological advantage.  To 
illustrate, helicopters in Somalia were a combat multiplier until the enemy developed a 
means to simply engage those rotary wing assets with modified rocket-propelled 
grenades (RPG’s). Effective, new techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP’s) had to be 
developed to improve the survivability of the equipment and personnel.  The enemy 
simply kept shooting at them, which requires little adaptability.   Another example is the 
evolution of sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in Iraq.  Technological 
advances stimulate IED improvements, which inspire further technological improvements  
with little impact on the resistance force’s desire to wage conflict. The unintended 
characteristic of these back-and-forth technological stalemates is the impact of the desire 
to wage war on the part of the “great means” nation. 
Examining the asymmetric battlefield reveals possible causes for a nation’s will to 
erode.  The desire of a nation to wage war crosses political, economic, societal, and 
military boundaries.  Anytime an enemy degrades a nation’s will to wage war, the 
effectiveness of ongoing operations suffers.  This is a fact from history that is undisputed.  
 Brigadier General (BG) Huba de Czege (2006) describes this as “global 
transparency evolving over the past 40 years” and says that  “human suffering on the 
battlefield is recognizable to all” (deCzege, 2006).  With newscasts from Vietnam 
showing the impact of the brutality of war on that nation’s citizenry, a national desire to 
support the fight ebbed in the United States.  The enemy “gets into the heads” of their 
opponent in a manner that creates a decreased desire to continue the fight.  There are 
those who believe it is possible to overcome an enemy’s ability to accomplish the decay 
in a national will. 
Nye (2004) writes that a nation’s ability to shape the preferences of others is that 
nation’s soft power.    Employing soft power can be an effective means to win the hearts 
and minds of another nation’s citizenry as well as its own.  However, winning hearts and 
minds in the information age requires the reshaping of the thinking of technologically 
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advanced societies (deCzege, 2006).  Sharansky and Dermer (2004) establishes several 
critical features for successful shaping of thinking, and ultimately, of behavior. 
Democracies do not go to war with democracies (Sharansky & Dermer, 2004, p. 
72).  Given the opportunity, Sharansky claims, a nation’s citizens respond to democracy 
over tyranny when afforded the opportunity to choose, and an environment conducive to 
choice.  The soft power resources that create this environment are imbedded in a nation’s 
values, cultural orientation, and policies, rather than by force or hard power (Nye, 2004, 
p. 45).   
Hard power is the use of a nation’s military or economic resources to induce a 
change in the behavior of another nation.  Soft power attempts to shape the preferences of 
a nation thus altering its behavior. We contend that capitalizing on the soft power 
resources, in cooperation with hard power technology, is a combat multiplier in the 
asymmetric warfare environment.  The result of combining hard and soft power 
dynamically alters a resistance force’s ability to erode a nation’s will unabated.  The 
framework for this systematic integration lies in the concept of the State Department’s 
coherent integration strategy for DoD and the process of transformation within the 
military.  
Integration of the four military services is the initial component of the State 
Department strategy to improve cooperation and communications among military, multi-
national, interagency, and Non-Governmental Organizations.  Outlined during a briefing 
at the Military Operations Research Symposium (MORS) conference in November of 
















Figure 2.   State Department Integration Strategy 
 
The deconflicting of the military began with the initiative termed 
“transformation.”  The process of transforming the military into an interoperable joint 
force goes beyond the acquisition of new technology or the development of sophisticated 
information platforms.  The focus of transformation centers on shaping behavior. It is in 
this arena that transformation of the military will have the greatest impact.  Using the 
fundamental principles offered by Smith (2002), Alberts and Hayes (2001), Cebrowski 
(1999) and Alberts and Garstka (2000), a foundation can be established to demonstrate 
the power of transformation to shape the behavior within a battlespace. 
Shaping behavior, as a military principle, has not been well documented or 
investigated.  This section established the significance of exploring the application of soft 
science to warfare on a broader scale.  The next section reveals that the designers of 
transformation, as well as the four military services, all agree in principle, that shaping 
behavior is fundamental to transformation.   
C. TRANSFORMATION  
The organization of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) began in 1947 with the 
establishment of the United States Air Force and the designation of European Command 
(EUCOM).  Despite more than a sixty year process to advance joint operations, the 
military is still developing strategies to achieve integrated joint cooperation. 





integration (New, 2004, p. 2).  Retired General Tommy Franks summed up the problem 
as “historical differences between the services cause change to happen slowly” (New, 
2004).   
This resistance affects efficiency and impedes success during both symmetric and 
asymmetric warfare.  Transformation of the defense community from platform-centric to 
network-centric orientation is an evolving process affecting many facets of the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  President Bush (2005) stated that transformation is about 
changing values, attitudes, and beliefs, which ultimately changes behavior.  Donald 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (2004) has determined that the most reliable barometer 
for gauging transformation success in the defense community is the way in which the 
culture is changing. The former Director for Force Transformation, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Mr. A. K. Cebrowski, identifies a three part strategy to achieve 
success: “transforming culture, transforming processes and transforming capabilities 
through force and military transformation” (Cebrowski, 2005). The key principles of 
transformation, referenced by the leadership, focus on a change in behavior and a change 
in culture within the military.   
Transformation is not just about technology and advanced weapons systems.  In a 
statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April of 2002 Cebrowski 
made the following comments:  
Rather, it is more about culture, behavior and the creation and exploitation 
of promising concepts to provide new sources of military power. A 
military bureaucracy does not squelch innovation by modernizing its 
forces; innovation is undermined when experimentation and prototyping 
of new ideas is prevented, and when newly developed and fielded systems 
are subordinated to outdated operational concepts. (Roqin, 2006) 
After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush (2002) explained that a “sense of urgency” 
now exists to accomplish the cultural shift from a conventional warfare doctrine to a 
doctrine that encompasses symmetric and asymmetric operations.  The adaptation of  the 
innovative ideas referred to by Cebrowski (2005) mandates the services to shift an 
individual service component-based philosophy to a joint integration-based philosophy.  
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The documentation from DoD provides some insight into the current state of that shift 
based on the concept of a cultural change. 
The Annual Report to the President of the United States and Congress  provides 
an analysis of the current state of the Department of Defense (DoD) and progress towards 
meeting established goals (Rumsfeld, 2004).  This document includes three appendixes 
written by the service chiefs from the Army, Air Force and Navy.  Reviewing the chiefs’ 
cultural concepts indicates differences between the services’ concepts of culture.  For 
example, the Army views culture in terms of the “Warrior”, the Air Force in terms of 
“Technology” and the Navy in terms of “Readiness” (Brownlee & Schoomaker, 2004; 
England, Clark, & Hagee, 2003; Roche & Jumper, 2004; Rumsfeld, 2004).  Reviewing 
each of the service secretary’s transformation roadmaps provides evidence that cultural 
barriers between the services do exist.  Lacking a method to measure and evaluate these 
differences, boundary permeability between the services is difficult to determine. 
Secretary of the Army, Honorable Mr. Brownlee, and the Army Chief of Staff, 
General Schoomaker, repeatedly indicate that joint interdependency is a primary goal for 
Army Transformation Roadmap (Brownlee & Schoomaker, 2004).  Secretary of the 
Navy, Honorable Mr. England, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Clark, 
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Hagee, refer only to Navy and 
Marine culture in their Transformation Roadmap (2003) and in their testimony before the 
Senate Appropriations Committee – Defense (2005).  The Secretary of the Air Force, 
Honorable Mr. Roche, and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Jumper, indicate that 
cultural transformation is a goal, but focus primarily on internal Air Force processes in 
the Air Force Flight Plan (Roche & Jumper, 2004).  The former Director for the Office of 
Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OFT, OSD), Mr. Cebrowski, 
surpasses all the services in emphasis on the need for cultural transformation.  He states: 
 Military transformation is about changing the culture of the U.S. 
Armed Forces.  Therefore, transformational activity must facilitate a 
culture of change and innovation in order to maintain competitive 
advantage in the information age.  That culture must foster leadership, 
education, processes, organizations, values, and attitudes that encourage 
and reward meaningful innovation.  Individually and institutionally, 
holding on to the past is a result of the natural need to define order in the 
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midst of instability.  Individuals and institutions tend to follow  what they 
know and do best because past success  becomes the safest predictor of 
survival in the face of the future. (Cebrowski, 2005, p. 48) 
The transformation literature further points out differences with the method that 
the services plan to achieve the DoD goals.  However, the Office of Force 
Transformation (OFT)  and the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and 
Information Integration (OSD, NII) are collaborating to correct this, using the theory of 
Network Centric Warfare (Garstka & Alberts, 2004). A method under development to 
achieve successful transformation is explained in Network Centric Operations 
Conceptual Framework, Version 2.0 (NCOCF). The NCOCF highlights that 
transformation of military culture is a very complex problem due to the services’ own 
interpretation of their organizational culture, resulting in problematic development of 
research parameters (Garstka & Alberts, 2004, p. 38).  The framework is based on 
Network Centric Warfare. 
1. Network Centric Warfare 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the emerging theory of war and is the 
primary process facilitating  transformation (Alberts & Garstka, 2001; Alberts, Garstka, 
& Stein, 2003; Cebrowski, 2003; Garstka & Alberts, 2004; Wilson, 2004).  The 
Department of Defense was platform-centric during the industrial age, but with the 
development of the information age, is now focused on network-centric operations.  
Figure 3 indicates that NCW supports the national security strategy through the 






Figure 3.   Military Transformation – Strategy to Concepts to Capabilities 
                                         (Cebrowski, 2003, p. 7) 
Note. DOTMLPF is an acronym for Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and  
Facilities.   
 
Transformation strategy involves the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) and their 
subordinate Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) reflecting the vision of a network-centric 
joint force.  The required capabilities of this force are expressed in terms of four key 
domains of warfare: physical, information, social, and cognitive.  Figure 4 displays the 
relationships of the four domains. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Network Centric Operation Domains  




Network Centric Operations resides in the area of intersection of the three circular 
domains.  The physical domain is where strike, protect, and maneuver occur in the 
operational battlespace, incorporating land, air, sea, and space together as one 
infrastructure (Garstka & Alberts, 2004).  The information domain includes the creation, 
manipulation, and sharing of all types of information, and is considered the cyberspace 
for military operations.  The cognitive domain is where perceptions, awareness, 
understanding, decisions, beliefs, and values of the individual members of the differing 
organizations are located (Garstka & Alberts, 2004). One of the foundation principles of 
NCW makes the distinction that no single service operates without other service support 
along with contractor, inter-agency, or multi-national interactions.  It is the intangibles of 
the cognitive domain that Garstka and Alberts (2004) claim are the essential elements of 
NCO.  The last domain, social, is an innovation of the NCO conceptual framework.   
Cebrowski (2005) and Alberts (2004) describe the social domain as the domain of 
culture.  Further, they define culture as the set of values, attitudes, and beliefs held and 
conveyed by leaders to society.  This definition is similar to that developed within the 
cultural and cross-cultural research communities (Delobbe, Haccoun, & Vandenberghe, 
1996; Ford, Kotze, & Marcus, 2005; Helmreich & Davies, 2004; Murray, 1999; Schein, 
1990; Zakour, 2003).  The importance of cultural understanding and integration, by the 
military, is highlighted in other sources. 
The Department of Defense annual report to congress, outlining the parameters 
for evaluating change, often refer to a cultural change as one means of determining the 
success of transformation (Rumsfeld, 2004).  Cebrowski (2002), in a statement to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, expressed that transformation starts with culture first 
and that some tools are available to accomplish this culture transformation.   
To maintain competitive advantage in the information age, transformation 
must achieve a cultural change. Researchers note that culture is the last 
thing to change in an organization. Consequently, the work on cultural 
change must begin first. There are some tools for that. The schoolhouse is 
one starting place, but that tends to take a very long time. However, 
education is a long-term investment we will make. There are other 
examples that go much faster. Experimental articles provide military 
personnel the opportunity to work directly with new physical prototypes 
while developing new concepts. The key advantage in the use 
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experimental articles is that they help people see the range of possibilities 
for performing operations in new ways that abstract discourses on 
innovative ideas cannot.  This is crucial if the culture of change is to be 
widely adopted. (Cebrowski, 2002, p.5)   
Note the emphasis on experimental articles as a key for cultural change.  The 
transformation literature from DoD, and the four different services, discuss the 
significance that culture will play in the successful transformation from an industrial- 
based to an information-based joint military, but there is no clear definition of culture 
identified.  Additionally, no clear metric is offered to measure success based on a change 
in culture.  Garstka and Alberts (2004) offer the Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework as the first documentation to define and measure culture, but this document 
lacks empirical validation.  Others indicate that a cultural barrier may exist between the 
services. 
2. Military Culture 
Carl Builder (1989), in his book The Masks of War, identified this problem 
fifteen years ago.  His focus on the Air Force, Army and Navy systems indicated that 
each service has a personality and different traditions or values. In so doing, he actually 
identifies that each service has a culture intermixed with the service personality.  This 
work was expounded upon by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  
The CSIS study indicated that cultural differences between the services impede 
successful joint integration (Dorn & Graves, 2000).  There are research studies that assess 
and analyze culture where the military is the population of interest (Garamone, 2004; 
Hillen, 1999; Johannsen, 2004; Klein, Pongonis, & Klein, 2000; Neyer, Puck, & 
Koelling, 2004; Pierce, J. G., 2004; Ratner & Hui, 2003; Rubinstein, 2003; Simon, 2001; 
Tucker, 1995; Zakour, 2003).  These studies conclude that differences in culture and 
personality exist, but fail to describe research where these differences could be overcome.  
Interestingly, a comparison of the literature between military and business indicates a 
staggering difference.  The business community has undertaken enormous measures to 
limit the impact of cultural differences and personality stereotypes to insure success of 
organizations in the global economy.  The importance that culture may play in successful 
transformation has not gone unnoticed. 
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Cultural differences matter. In a summary of the Institute for Defense Analyses 
workshop, sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation in 2003, three 
recommendations emerged. 
1.  Cultural changes that enable/facilitate transformation—critical changes in DoD 
culture that could lead, enhance, and accelerate the DoD transformation from an 
Industrial Age culture to an Information Age culture. 
2. Obstacles to be overcome—effects and cultural traits that impede 
transformation and innovation. 
3. Means to achieve the desired outcomes—ways in which cultural transformation 
can be influenced, positively or negatively.  (Johnson, 2004, p. ES1) 
The workshop participants agreed that cultural dimensions exist, and if not 
understood, can be a barrier to change.  These barriers will impede the transformation  
effort if not understood at the mid-level leadership, which would result in failure to 
enable the target behaviors needed to develop joint innovation and risk taking (Johnson, 
2004).   
The panel recommended five actions, two of which relate to this proposed 
research.  They are: 
• Empower action by reducing cultural barriers and increasing behaviors 
related to joint innovation and risk taking.  
• Assess the status of transformation.  (Johnson, 2004, p. ES3).   
Both actions emphasize the team process as the military transforms.  The impact 
of culture on transformation has been a theme contained in the transformation literature 
since the beginning of the process, and provides support that this is an important area to 
research.  Unfortunately, there is a lack of cultural research with the military as the target 
population.  
The significant impact that culture plays in military team relationships is not well 
documented nor empirically examined.  Although there is a large body of research 
investigating the impact of culture in the psychology and business literature, there is 
limited empirical study where the military is the principle population of investigation.  
Business and psychology’s interest in culture evolved from the need to expand globally 
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in the market place in order to understand the most effective method to market and serve 
customers.  Companies’ organizational teams changed structurally, incorporating 
members from other cultures to facilitate success as an organization merges into the 
global marketplace.  This resulted in group dynamics changes.  It is no different for the 
military.   
The decreasing size of the US military requires members from different services 
to work closer in joint teams.  There is increasing emphasis on multinational cooperation 
and formation of coalition teams.  Current empirical research analyzing or measuring the 
cultural dimensions of the services, the impact of these dimensions across the force 
structure, or the interrelationship of military culture and personality effect on operational 
efficiency is critical.  It does not seem wise to begin an investigation into teams 
composed of multinational members before an understanding of the joint team is begun.  
There is anecdotal evidence that a cultural difference does exist between the services and 
that these differences may have an impact on effective communication and decision-
making.  What is lacking are empirical results focused on  methodologies or assessment 
packages that provide the leadership with a basic understanding of the potential  impact 
that cultural differences and personality stereotypes have on a joint team’s operational 
effectiveness.  Research efforts still focus on the coalition team or the cultural profile of 
an opposing force.  There are examples where the boundaries between the services 
hampered operational efficiency. 
In the summer of 2003, assigned as the junior Forward Area Science and 
Technology (FAST) advisor of a team sent forward by the Army Material Command 
(AMC), I was afforded the opportunity to witness first hand joint and multinational 
combat and support operations.  The research as the FAST team member resulted in 
traveling over 17,000 miles in Iraq, visiting every deployed Army division, contact with 
all four services, and interviews with more than 800 military, civilian, and other 
nationality personnel.   
It was disappointing for the science team to observe that as resources such as 
power, conditioned air, water purification, and bandwidth improved, a transition from 
interdependence on each other between the joint force to autonomous operations 
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occurred.  Several examples illustrate this point.  At Tallil Air Base outside of Ah 
Nasiriyah in July 2003, during an interview with the soldiers from the Quartermaster unit, 
it was revealed that the U.S. Air Force units occupying the airfield were told to deny 
access to anyone not Air Force to the phones, internet, and conditioned air areas.  Upon 
investigation, this was found to be true and it had serious implications to the 
interdependent relationships on that installation, which includes all service components, 
the Italian military force, and the Korean military component working in neighboring Ah 
Nasiriyah.  This incident was not limited to the airfield.  The Air Force, Marines and 
Army had fuel points designated strictly for their service’s transportation vehicles, all 
within one-quarter mile of each other on Tallil Air Base, and each providing the same 
type of fuel.  In June, when first visited by the FAST team, fuel could be obtained at any 
of the fuel points regardless of service, but by July, strict rules were in place at each fuel 
point restricting use of a service’s fuel point by a different service. 
Culture was not the primary factor of investigation during early research efforts.    
The focus, at the time, was to try to get the U.S. and multinational partners to be more 
culturally sensitive to the Iraqi culture, not to each other.  The actual transformation of 
culture from separate services to an effective joint culture is unknown.  Shrinking 
budgets, reduced manpower, and expanding missions require interdependence between 
the services.  As this interdependence creates the establishment of diverse groups to 
perform in teams composed of members from joint services, the exploration, evaluation, 
and measures of team effectiveness is mandatory.   
Researchers must develop quantitative as well as qualitative assessment and 
analysis methods that insure that the ongoing change within  the military is occurring  as 
the leadership envisioned, and is not just a hope (Cooke, Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 2004). A 
former battalion commander once asked a battery commander “What are the soldiers 
doing?”  The battery commander replied, “I hope they are in the motor pool.”  The 
battalion commander then let the battery commander know that he wanted to “get out of 
the hoping mode and get into the knowing mode” (Klein, 1994).  The same is true for 
transformation.  Appling quantitative methods to measure the success of transformation is 
basic to understanding change.  By doing so, the leadership can get away from hoping 
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transformation is occurring, into knowing transformation is occurring, by quantifiable 
means.  How to develop methods to experiment, gather real time data, evaluate, and 
intervene where necessary, is a complex problem (Builder, 1989; Cooke, 2005).   
Cultural differences affect planning, problem detection, situation awareness, 
uncertainty management, and decision making in teams (Klein, Pongonis, & Klein, 2000, 
p. 2). In particular, the differences between the services, given historically different 
information processes that separate the various armed services and functions, may require 
a "forcing function" to implement change, according to Retired General Tommy Franks 
(New, 2004). Maj. Gen. Marilyn Quagliotti, Vice Director of the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA) indicates that the process of transformation  may take over ten 
years to accomplish and will be culturally painful (New, 2004).   
Examining the successful methods from other domains indicates that simple and 
effective methods do exist.  These methods are applicable to the military environment.  A 
review of culture, personality, and team effectiveness follows. 
D. CULTURAL RESEARCH 
1. Overview 
The word “culture” comes from the Latin root colere (to inhabit, to cultivate, or to 
honor). Webster’s dictionary (2005) refers to culture  as the shared attitudes, values, goals 
and practices.  Sir Edward B. Tylor wrote in 1871 that "culture or civilization, taken in its 
wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, 
morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member 
of society.” Culture has been distinguished from the other elements of action by the fact 
that it is intrinsically transmissible from one action system to another, from personality to 
personality, by learning, and from social system to social system, by diffusion (Merriam-
Webster, 2005). Most research studies identify culture as the values, norms, and goals 
that distinguish one group or category of people from another (Wikipedia, 2005). 
Psychologists, at one time, believed it was possible to measure human attitudes in 
order to predict behavior.  Sophisticated testing indicated that attitude was more complex 
than originally believed (Hills, 2002).  They discovered that defining and measuring an 
attitude was difficult and began to break the idea of attitude into parts such as values, 
norms, and beliefs. 
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Psychology examined these parts by trying to classify them, however, the 
evolution of different research domains resulted in corresponding differences in 
definition.  The evolved domains are: cross-cultural psychology, cultural psychology, 
psychological anthropology and indigenous psychology (Adamopoulos & Lonner, 2000).  
This project focuses on cultural and cross-cultural psychology. 
Cultural psychology views culture as the scientific study of the relationship 
between human culture and human psyche.  It is about how culture and psyche make each 
other up.  Cross-cultural psychology is the study of similarities and differences in the 
psychological functioning among various cultures and ethnic groups by evaluation and 
assessment of change in those functions (Adamopoulos & Lonner, 2000).  These 
functions focus on the effect culture has on the thinking and behavior of the individual.  
One other source for defining culture does relate to the military and is contained in the 
Human Systems Integration literature. 
Culture is defined as a group’s way of thinking (beliefs, values, and other 
assumptions about the world) and doing (common patterns of behavior, including 
language and other forms of interaction (Harris, Hart, & Shields, 2003).  Harris, Hart and 
Shields (2003) point out that culture serves as a lens by which the world is viewed.  
Successful cultural alignment requires a shared mindset which is a fundamental 
assumption for this research (Harris, Hart, & Shields, 2003).  Unfortunately, the diversity 
of definition for culture is not easily overcome.  The next section summarizes the cultural 
literature. 
2. Early Research 
Cattell (1905) conducted the first empirical research examining culture (Hofstede 
& McCrae, 2004).  Cattell reported that his research indicated twelve different dynamic 
and general principles of culture (Cattell, 1950). Cattell, Graham and Woliver (1979) 
summarize the approach used in the cultural research as similar to Cattell’s earlier 
approach to defining the factors of personality dimensions. Cattell (1950) termed the 
cultural principles as dimensions that included: magnitude of population, cultural 
pressure, affluence, conservative patriarchalism, order and control, cultural integration 
and morale. Hofstede and McCrae (2004) cite that the Cattell dimensions were difficult to 
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interpret and focused too much on economic development.  Researchers interested in 
culture advanced cultural research past the economic view by focusing on a values 
approach.   
The concept that emerged from the values approach was to examine the beliefs 
and attitudes a person holds.  Viewing culture based on a values schema developed in 
Kluckhohn (1949).  The schema suggested that human social groups have a limited 
number of universal problems to respond and answer to (Hills, 2002).  The solutions to 
these problems are restricted in number and collectively known. He theorized that 
humans share biological traits and characteristics.  These form the basis for the 
development of culture and the fact that people typically believe that their own cultural 
beliefs and practices are normal and natural, and those of others are strange, or even 
inferior or abnormal (Hills, 2002). Kluckhohn defined a value as: "a conception, explicit 
or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which 
influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action" (Kluckhohn, 
1951, p 395).  
This work was expanded upon by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck 
(1961) whose Value Orientation Theory is referenced in the culture literature as the 
groundwork for today’s culture research (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992; 
Cattell, Graham, & Woliver, 1979; Cooke, 2005; Delobbe, Haccoun, & Vandenberghe, 
1996; England, 2001; Ford, Kotze, & Marcus, 2005; Helmreich & Davies, 2004; Hillen, 
1999; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004; Klein, Pongonis, & Klein, 2000; Marcus & Gould, 
2000; Murray, 1999; New, 2004; Pierce, J. G., 2004; Pierce, L. & Bowman, 2004; 
Rubinstein, 2003; Salas, E., Dickerson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992; Schein, 1990; 
Simon, 2001; Soeters, 1998; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998; Zakour, 2003). 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) theory is based on three assumptions:  
• There is a limited number of common human problems for which all 
peoples must at all times find some solution.  
• While there is variability in solutions of all the problems, it is neither 




• All alternatives of all solutions are present in all societies at all times but 
are differentially preferred. (Hills, 2002; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) 
They believed that a society is most influenced and recognizable by the method 
by which problems are solved.  They suggested that a society develops methods to solve 
problems that are reflective of the society's values. Consequently, measurement of the 
preferred solutions would indicate the values advocated by that society. Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck (1961) suggested five basic types of problem to be solved by every society: 
• On what aspect of time should we primarily focus ― past, present or 
future?   
• What is the relationship between humanity and its natural environment ― 
mastery, submission or harmony?  
• How should individuals relate with others ― hierarchically (which they 
called "lineal"), as equals ("collateral"), or according to their individual 
merit?  
• What is the prime motivation for behavior ― to express one's self 
("being"), to grow ("being-in-becoming"), or to achieve?  
• What is the nature of human nature ― good, bad ("evil") or a mixture? 
(Hills, 2002; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) 
It is from the five basic types of problems that the idea of cultural dimensions is 
derived.  These dimensions include mastery and harmony, good and bad, being and 
becoming.  Other researchers have developed their own concepts, but stay focused on the 
idea that culture is identifiable by a limited number of constructs. 
Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy and Sutton (1950) identified nine functional 
prerequisites of a society.  These prerequisites included factors such as: communication, 
role differentiation, developing a shared cognitive orientation with common goals, 
developing norms for attempting to reach these goals, and regulation of expression of 
needs and feelings  
Despite these researchers’ efforts, only recently have cultural and cross cultural 
researchers begun to define and measure quantitatively these dimensions. There are many 
ways to classify the thinking and the behavior associated with culture and to examine 
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culture across differing ethnic groups and societies.  The lack of an agreed-upon 
definition complicated the development of measures of culture, but this is not uncommon 
in social psychology research. Cultural researchers face the same problems social 
psychology researchers struggle with: objective quantification of research results that 
explain human thinking and behavior. Dr. Geert Hofstede is one researcher whose efforts 
are the most influential in the attempt to develop definable and measurable domains 
describing culture.  
Many projects reference the cultural work of Dr. Hofstede (Balaziuk, 
Roszkowski, & Yeager, 2003; Costa, P. T. J. & McCrae, 2005; Delobbe, Haccoun, & 
Vandenberghe, 1996; Erickson & Peick, 2004; Ford, Kotze, & Marcus, 2005; Helmreich 
& Davies, 2004; ITIM, 2003; Johannsen, 2004; Klein, Pongonis, & Klein, 2000; Licht, 
Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2004; Marcus & Gould, 2000; Matsumoto, 2004; Matsumoto 
et al., 2002; Matsumoto & LeRoux, 2003; Matsumoto, Weissman, Preston, Brown, & 
Kupperbusch, 1997; Matsumoto, Yoo, & LeRoux, 2005; McCrae, R. R., Zonderman, 
Costa, Bond, & Paunonen, 1996; Mohammed & Angell, 2003; O’Mara, Heacox, 
Gwynne, & Smillie, 1996; Peabody, 1985; Pierce, J. G., 2004; Pierce, L. & Bowman, 
2004; Pierce, L. G., Bowman, & Sutton, 2001; Ratner & Hui, 2003; Rubinstein, 2003; 
Schein, 1990; Simon, 2001; Soeters, 1998; Soeters & Boer, 2000; Triandis, 2001; 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998; Zakour, 2003).  Hofstede’s research is reviewed 
next. 
3. National Dimensions -Hofstede 
Hofstede began his research investigating national cultural differences using a 
data base he created.  His data collection effort involved one company, IBM, which has 
been an ongoing source of research debate for some time (Ratner & Hui, 2003).  The data 
was collected from seventy-one different countries, subsidiaries of IBM  with an initial 
sample of 117,000 company employees (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992; 
Delobbe, Haccoun, & Vandenberghe, 1996; Erickson & Peick, 2004; Helmreich & 
Davies, 2004; Hills, 2002; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004; Johannsen, 2004; 
Klein, Pongonis, & Klein, 2000; Marcus & Gould, 2000; Neyer, Puck, & Koelling, 2004; 
Pierce, J. G., 2004; Pierce, L. & Bowman, 2004; Ratner & Hui, 2003; Rubinstein, 2003; 
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Schein, 1990; Simon, 2001; Soeters, 1998; Soeters & Boer, 2000; Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998; Wikipedia, 2005; Zakour, 2003).  The data came from survey 
responses specifically aimed at identifying basic employee values and the accompanying 
situational attitudes.  Hofstede (2005) explained that IBM had a strong corporate culture 
in those days, with a singular product line.  Hofstede pointed out the tightness of the 
organizational structure was such that the samples of employees from around the world 
were very similar except for nationality (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).  Additionally, the  
survey was linguistically available in twenty different languages with only local idiom 
adaptations.  After receiving the data, Hofstede conducted a statistical analysis of the 
data.   
The factor analysis resulted in three orthogonal factors, which were expanded to 
four dimensions after national wealth was incorporated into the analysis.  Hofstede 
labeled the four emerging dimensions: power distance (PD), uncertainty avoidance (UA), 
individualism/collectivism (IC), and masculinity/femininity (Hofstede, 2001).  Further 
research by Hofstede (2005)  expanded the application of these dimensions to include an  
organizational context, however, Hofstede’s primary focus is still national dimensions.  
The following explanations of the dimensions do include Hofstede’s interpretations at 
both a national and organizational level.    
a. Power Distance 
Power distance focuses on the degree of equality, or inequality, between 
people in the country's society. Hofstede (2001) says power distance is the extent to 
which the less powerful in a society accept and expect power to be unequally distributed.  
High Power Distance indicates inequalities of power, wealth, or status are predominate in 
the society. These societies are likely to follow a caste system, not allowing citizens of 
lower status or position the privileges available to those in higher status.  Low Power 
Distance indicates that the society de-emphasizes the differences between its citizens’ 
power and wealth. In these societies, equality and opportunity for everyone is stressed 
(Erickson & Peick, 2004; Ford, Kotze, & Marcus, 2005; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & 
McCrae, 2004; Klein, Pongonis, & Klein, 2000; Marcus & Gould, 2000; Pierce, J. G., 
2004; Pierce, L. & Bowman, 2004; Soeters & Boer, 2000).  
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Empirical research of companies with a high power distance indicates that 
these companies are tall organizations with multiple layers of supervisors and 
management. The ideal supervisor is characterized as a well-meaning autocrat and 
exhibits paternal character.  Subordinates in these organizations expect to be told what to 
do, how to do it and when to do it with little input or opinion.  The leadership style is 
authoritative.  Contrasting high PD to low PD reveals organizations that are flat in 
structure or with fewer supervisory layers.  The ideal boss is characterized as resourceful 
and democratic.  Subordinates expect to be consulted and made a part of the product 
action team.  The leadership style is consultative, where all members of the  
team are seen as having valuable input and information for team and organizational 
effectiveness (Erickson & Peick, 2004). The Hofstede normed means for PD from the 
most recent data are provided in appendix E. 
b. Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty Avoidance focuses on tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity 
within the society. High Uncertainty Avoidance indicates the country’s low tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity. This creates a rule-oriented society that institutes laws, rules, 
regulations, standards, and controls meant to reduce the uncertainty. Low Uncertainty 
Avoidance indicates that the country has less concern about ambiguity and uncertainty.  
There is a higher tolerance for a variety of opinions. This is reflected in a society that is 
less rule-oriented, more readily accepts change, and takes more and greater risks (ITIM, 
2003). 
Uncertainty avoidance (UA) should not be confused with avoidance of 
risk (Soeters & Boer, 2000).  Hofstede (1991) reports that countries with low uncertainty 
avoidance have a more natural response during periods of ambiguity, due primarily to 
simpler and fewer rules and regulations.  High UA organizations are characterized by 
being risk avoidant.  The supervisors do not allow innovation and tend to be critical of 
the organization.  This trait is often found nationally and the country is typically very 
homogeneous, such as Greece.  Low UA organizations are diverse and value risk as an 
instrument of motivation.  Supervisors look for innovation among the workers and take 
great pride in their organization (Hofstede, 2001; Wikipedia, 2005).  Hofstede reports 
that differences in UA can be seen in the unique coping mechanisms seen in an 
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organization as well as the way stress management skills are used (Balaziuk, 
Roszkowski, & Yeager, 2003).  The Hofstede normed means for uncertainty avoidance 
from the most recent data are provided in appendix E. 
c. Individualism/Collectivism 
Individualism/Collectivism focuses on the degree that reinforcement of 
individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships exist within a society 
(ITIM, 2003). High individualism indicates that individuality and individual rights are 
paramount within the society. Individuals in these societies form a larger number of 
relationships (ITIM, 2003). Low individualism, or collectivism, is characterized by close 
relationships with others. These cultures support extended families.  Loyalty for the 
group is viewed with great importance in exchange for protection (Hofstede & McCrae, 
2004).   
Organizations whose nature is individualism have loyal employees who 
are more mobile than collective organizations (Erickson & Peick, 2004).  The reward 
system differs from collectives but both are considered effective for the group structure.  
Individualism organizations see the members as individuals and insure input from all 
levels of the organization on decisions (Balaziuk, Roszkowski, & Yeager, 2003).  These 
organizations can be viewed, at times, as quick deal organizations with interest to the 
short term, instead of lasting long term relations.  Collectivism organizations have very 
cohesive structures with the group interests viewed as more important than the individual 
(Hofstede, 2001).  Long term relations with others is a primary concern and reward 
systems focus on this.  There is less mobility in these groups and the employees are seen 
in a family, or social context (Erickson & Peick, 2004).  Hofstede (2001) cites that 
individualism organizations rank personal time, freedom, and challenge as their top 
priorities, where collectivism groups rank training, physical condition, and use of skills as 
more important.  The Hofstede normed means for individualism/collectivism from the 
most recent data are provided in appendix E.  
d. Masculinity/Femininity 
Masculinity/Femininity centers on the degree that the society reinforces, 
or does not reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, 
control, and power (ITIM, 2003). It refers to the distribution of emotional roles between 
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men and women (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).  High masculinity shows that the country 
experiences a high level of gender differentiation. In these cultures, males dominate a 
significant portion of the society and power structure, with females being controlled by 
male domination.  Low masculinity indicates the country has a lower degree of 
differentiation and discrimination between genders. In these cultures, females are treated 
the same as males in all aspects of the society  (ITIM, 2003). 
Research indicates that organizations high in masculinity are gender-
defined socially.  Men are assertive and usually in charge.  Managers are seen as cultural 
heroes and treated with respect (Erickson & Peick, 2004).   Women are not seen as equal 
and are not an important part of the decision making process.  In low masculinity 
organizations, equality of the genders is maintained and important (Balaziuk, 
Roszkowski, & Yeager, 2003).  Supervisors are not gender-defined.  Selection for 
management is based on ability.  Wages are generally equal across genders and everyone 
is seen as an employee (Erickson & Peick, 2004).  The Hofstede normed means for 
individualism/collectivism from the most recent data are provided in appendix E.  
As stated earlier, debate continues about the validity of characterizing a 
nation’s values by four dimensions based on research data from one company.  Hofstede 
and McCrae (2004) cite four different research efforts to investigate the validity and 
reliability of Hofstede’s conclusions.   
Inkeles and Levision (1940, p.17) reviewed a large number of research 
articles from anthropology and sociology.  Their findings were that “standard analytical 
issues” surfaced.  These are summarized as: 
• Relation to authority 
• Conception of self, including masculinity and femininity concept 
• Methods of dealing with conflict or dilemmas included control of 
aggressiveness, and expressive versus inhibited effect (Hofstede & 
McCrae, 2004) 
Hofstede and McCrae (2004) concluded that these three issues represented 
the four dimensions of culture very well.  Relation to authority reflected power distance, 
conception of self reflected masculinity and individualism, and dealing with conflict 
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reflected uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).  In all of the Hofstede 
writing, care is taken to empirically substantiate any claim.  This is a rare occurrence 
where no empirical evidence to support the above conclusion is offered. 
Despite the ongoing discussion as to the true reliability of the Hofstede 
measures, his work is highly cited.  The 1980 “Software of the Mind” book is referred to 
in over 1300 documents and was recently re-released in 2005.  A concise review of all 
research utilizing the Hofstede dimension is outside the scope of this review.  There is 
agreement and disagreement among researchers.  This dissertation will not review the 
debate as the Hofstede review is meant to provide an understanding of one central theory 
of cultural dimensions and the empirical support for the concept. 
Other researchers have developed theories more associated with an 
organizational view of a cultural, rather then a national view.  Reviewing these theories, 
their development and empirical studies, follows. 
4.   Theories Beyond Hofstede 
a. Hall 
Hofstede identifies Hall among the world’s finest anthropologists and 
refers to Hall’s research as a valuable, often cited research. Hall views culture as a 
communication process with three parts: words, material things, and behavior (Hall, 
1977; Hall & Hall, 1990).  The  domains that Hall believes represent culture are time, 
space, context, information flow and interfacing (Hall & Hall, 1990). 
Time is a fundamental domain of all cultures.  Hall (1990) viewed the time 
domain as monochromic or polychromic.  Monochromic time is seen as doing one thing 
at a time in an orderly uninterrupted manner. This is a very individualistic domain.  
Polychromic time involves simultaneous occurrences of several things at once.  This 
domain is viewed as very collective, with greater involvement with people.  Hall believed 
that Americans and many western cultures were monochromic.  He indicated that 
Mediterranean and Arab countries are primarily polychromic. Hall (1990) also viewed 
space as another core system in all cultures.   
Space is key to unlocking the mental model of a people.  Spatial 
relationships are highly indicative of the communication permeability between groups 
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and cultures.  Polychromic cultures see private space as interfering in the communication 
or informational flow,  where monochromic cultures see the same space as functional and 
time-efficient.  Coupled with context (high/low) Hall (1990) considered low context 
cultures as compartmentalized, which is characteristic of monochromic cultures. These 
cultures require lots of background information and dislike interruptions.  Low context 
cultures can be overloaded easily with too many messages and fall behind with the 
overload.  High context cultures are well informed, with broad access to information, and 
open communication flow.  They require a minimum of background information and do 
not get overloaded from interruption or large message flow.  Both space and context 
focus on another of Hall’s domains:  information flow (fast/slow).   
Fast information flow cultures are characterized by people who are 
expected to read others’ minds.  Information flows freely and rigidity is avoided, in 
contrast to slow information flow cultures, where information is apparent and 
characterized by rigid rules of sharing  (Hall & Hall, 1990).  Hall believed that this 
dichotomy could not be over-emphasized and that one of the major failings of business 
meetings with opposite cultures was the domain of information flow.   Another aspect of 
information flow is message speed (fast/slow).  
Message speed involves decoding a message and acting upon it.  Hall 
(1977) believed everything in life could be placed on a line from slow to fast along a 
message spectrum.  Sending a fast message to a slow-format person will often be missed 
or misinterpreted.  Fast messages are characteristic of newspapers, cartoons, and 
television. Slow message speed is characteristic of books, diplomacy, and culture.   The 
essence of this concept focuses on the fact that the nature of relationships with other 
cultures requires time, and that message speed is an important aspect of information flow.  
The final domain Hall identifies is interfacing (Hall, 1977; Hall & Hall, 1990). 
Interfacing has two features.  First, there are basic differences in the ways 
a culture develops methods to meet the daily needs of the people.  Hall sums up these 
differences by stating that it is easier to get things done at home than in another culture’s 
setting.  Second, top management insures the success of interfacing with another culture 
(Hall & Hall, 1990).   Hall (1990) believed that five principles were the basis for 
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interface: first, the higher the context of either culture, the more difficult the interface;  
second, the more complex the domains, the more difficult the interface;  third, the greater 
the cultural difference, the more difficult the interface; fourth, the more levels of a 
system, such as management levels, the more difficult the interface, and lastly, a low 
context, highly evolved, mechanical system tends to produce less interface problems than 
multilevel systems of great complexity.   Interface or interaction with other cultures is the 
focus of the next researcher, Dr. H.C. Triandis. 
b. Triandis 
Triandis has explored cultures since the mid 1970’s and developed a 
theory of culture termed “cultural syndrome” (Triandis, 1994).  This idea of cultural 
syndromes is similar to the dimensions of Hofstede.  Triandis defines a syndrome as the 
shared patterns, beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles, and values organized around a theme 
(Triandis, 2001).  Triandis identified three syndromes, the first being 
complexity/simplicity.  The second is tight/loose, and the third is 
individualism/collectivism.  Within the individualism/collectivism syndrome there are 
two cultural attributes: horizontal and vertical.  Horizontal culture refers to equality while 
vertical emphasizes hierarchal.  Triandis explains that horizontal individualism (HI) is 
characterized by all people being equal but unique, and horizontal collectivism (HC) as 
characterized by a merging of one’s self into the group, without suggesting that there is a 
status difference.  Vertical individualism (VI) is characterized by the individual being 
distinct, and the best, in relation to others,  where vertical collectivism (VC) is accepting 
of the hierarchy and status is determined by authority (Triandis, 2001).  Empirical 
research by Triandis exploring the individualism/collectivism and horizontal/vertical 
relationships has resulted in several pertinent findings. 
Triandis concluded that collectivists use indirect communications more 
than individualists based on research conducted by Holt-Graves (1997) and Hu (1994).  
HI members will email individuals more than groups, while VC members do the 
opposite.  HI’s communicate multidimensionally, while VC’s normally communicate 
vertically.  HC’s share information with the in-group but hesitate to expand beyond that 
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group, while VC’s limit communication to higher status members.  VC’s are more abrupt 
with lower status members in communications.  
 Triandis’ work is primarily focused on the IC syndrome but he does offer 
other relational designs. Collectivism cultures are observed primarily in tight and simple 
societies.  Societies where tightness exists have many norms.  Punishment for violation of 
a norm is severe.  Individualism cultures are maximized in loose, complex societies.  
Looseness is exhibited in societies with few norms and deviation from the norm is 
tolerated.  Triandis (2001) indicates that there is more research needed on this hypothesis.   
Triandis (2001) found that over twenty different measure methods were 
used in empirical research from 1986 to 1998.  He discovered that despite the methods 
being correlated, there were separate factors in the analysis that was defined.  The 
problem is one of quantitative versus qualitative research.   Triandis argues that cultures 
can only be compared quantitatively using etic factors or pre-established categories for 
organizing and interpreting anthropological data.  Qualitative analysis must be used for 
emic factors or categories recognized within the culture being studied.  This is a 
controversial statement.  Organizational cultural studies appear to be emic.  Researchers 
believe that quantitative measures can and are being developed to provide robustness to 
cultural research (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Matsumoto, Yoo, & LeRoux, 2005; 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).  Despite this difference of opinion, Triandis is a 
well respected and often-cited researcher.  The debate on organization measures provides 
the framework for examining researchers who believe culture can be quantified as 
Hofstede has.  The next researcher’s work is primarily focused on business and 
organizational culture. 
c. Hampton-Turner and Trompenaars   
Hampton-Turner and Trompenaars (1998) view culture as a layered 
construct consisting of three layers: outer, middle, and core.  The outer layer contains the 
explicit layer being the observable reality of language, food, building style, fashion, and 
art (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). The middle layer contains the norms and 
values of a group.  Norms indicate how a group should behave and the values expressing 
the criteria for how members of a group desire to behave when given other choices 
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(Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).  The core layer is the implicit or survival level 
and represents a group’s basic assumptions and methods to effectively deal with their 
environment (Ford, Kotze, & Marcus, 2005).  Hampton-Turner and Trompenaars  
hypothesize that culture is the way a group of people solve problems, and reconcile 
dilemmas, and are connected to the three core layers.  Every culture distinguishes itself 
from another by that culture’s orientation or what Hofstede referred to as “dimensions.”  
These orientations are more business and managerial focused than 
nationally focused.  The research of Hampton-Turner and Trompenaars comprised over 
50,000 cases where participants were managers representing one hundred different 
countries.  Their test instrument was a survey which revealed five orientations that arise 
from relationships with other people: universalism/particularism, 
communitarianism/individualism, Neutral/Emotional, Diffuse/Specific, and 
Achievement/Ascription. 
Universalism cultures believe there is one good approach to follow which 
is well defined and can be applied to any given situation.   Particularism cultures view 
each situation as having unique circumstances, with obligations to relationships being 
primary to the approach to follow.  Communitarianism and individualism are very similar 
to Hofstede’s individualism/collectivism dimension.  The communitarianism cultures 
view themselves as a part of the group, where the individualism culture is focused on 
where the individual believes his/her contributions to the community are most needed.  
Neutral and emotional orientations center on whether emotional expression is accepted.  
Neutral cultures rarely show emotional behaviors in social or business interactions, 
believing that emotional responses hinder group productivity.  Emotional cultures tend to 
express feelings and see these expressions as useful and natural behaviors.   
Diffused and specific describe the relationship between members of 
differing cultures.  Diffused relationships take into account the whole person, whereas 
specific focuses only on the matter at hand.  This orientation has a large impact on 
countries doing business together where one is diffused and the other specific.  Often the 
diffused culture will disregard specific cultures who offer a better product or service for a 
culture that provides more personal contact.  Achievement and ascription orientations are 
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closely related to Hofstede’s power distance dimension.  Ascription refers to status of an 
indicator of importance of the individual being based on birth or kinship as opposed to 
achievement where an individual’s status is based on accomplishment.  This orientation 
includes the Hofstede masculinity dimension as status due to gender or age and is 
considered part of this orientation (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).  These 
orientations are used primarily by Hampton-Turner and Trompenaars to describe methods 
and considerations for doing business with other cultures.  Hofstede and Trompenaar 
have a running debate in the literature over the reliability and validity of each of the 
orientations and dimensions.  The arguments for each are sound.  Other researchers have 
focused their work on a values approach  rather than on the behavioral theory. 
d. Schwartz 
Schwarz uses a different approach than the other researchers (Dahl, 2004).  
His research explores value types and value dimensions instead of the behavioral 
approach, which dominates most other theories.   
The research led to the identification of ten individual value types and 
seven value dimensions. Schwartz believed that all ten value types are found in every 
culture at the individual level and are motivational in nature.  The value dimensions and 
level of importance of each dimension varies from one culture to the next. 
The method Schwartz chose to examine these values was to develop a 57-
item survey called the Schwartz Values Inventory (SVI). Schwartz administered the 
survey to forty-one diverse groups in thirty-eight countries. The participants were asked 
to rate each of the fifty-seven values on a scale from 0 to 7, where "0" is not important, 
"1" is opposed to one's values, and "7" is very important (Schwartz 1984, 91).  
Participants were asked to assess the fifty-seven items on how important the value was as 
a “guiding principle of life” (Dahl, 2004).   The survey was administered in the 
participants’ native language.  Participants, although comprised of diverse groups, 
represent two specific populations: educators and students (Krukenberg, 2005).  The 
survey was developed to avoid ethnocentric bias by including values from around the 
world and items from cultural-specific questionnaires. The results yielded two models: 
one composed of ten distinct value types and one composed of seven value orientations. 
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The ten value types are displayed in the circular diagram in Figure 5.   
 
Figure 5.   Schwartz Values Types  
                  (Krukenberg, 2005) 
 
Schwartz (2001) considered each broad value type to represent a number 
of separate values combined to create a  joint ‘idea’ (value type).  Values located in the 
‘power’ value type represent an individual that values social status and prestige or control 
and dominance over people and resources. High scores in the ‘achievement’ value type 
indicate a high priority for personal success and admiration. ‘Hedonism’ represents a 
preference for pleasure and self-gratification. ‘Stimulation’ represents a preference for an 
exciting life.  ‘Self-direction’ is a distinct group of values that value independence, 
creativity, and freedom. The ‘universalism’ value type represents a preference for social 
justice and tolerance, whereas the ‘benevolence’ contains values promoting the welfare of 
others. The ‘conformity’ value type represents obedience and the ‘tradition’ value is 
representative of a respect for traditions and customs. Lastly, the ‘security’ value type is a 
value orientation for the safety, harmony and welfare of society and of oneself (Dahl, 
2004).   
The ten individual types are scored to indicate the strength of that value as 
a guiding principle of life for that individual. Additionally, Schwartz derived seven value 
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dimensions when he analyzed the values at a cultural level.  These are: conservatism, 
intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism, mastery and 
harmony.    
Schwartz represented his seven dimensions in four domains concerning 
major social group issues in terms of two bipolar generalizations: autonomy (affective or 
intellectual) versus conservatism and hierarchy (mastery versus harmony) versus 
egalitarian commitment (Krukenberg, 2005). Although not a part of the bipolar 
generalizations, Schwartz did make a distinction between the mastery and harmony 
dimensions as part of the hierarchy domain.   
Mastery groups and individuals should master, control, and change the 
social and natural environment through assertive action in order to further personal or 
group interests. There is a cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-
assertion (ambition, success, daring, competence). Harmony means the world is accepted 
as it is. Groups and individuals should fit harmoniously into the natural and social world, 
avoiding change and self-assertion to modify them (unity with nature, protecting the 
environment, world of beauty).  Schwartz is not the only researcher to examine the idea 
of individual cultural orientation.  Dr. David Matsumoto (1983) has focused on individual 
cultural dimensions for over a decade.  The next section examines his work 
5. Individual Dimensions - Matsumoto 
Dr. Matsumoto began his research of cross-culture in 1983.  Since then his work 
has evolved to the development of the Cultural and Emotion Research Laboratory 
(CERL) at San Francisco State University.  It is a social science facility examining the 
relationships between culture and human emotion.  The CERL has developed two 
psychometrically reliable measures: The Intercultural Adjustment Potential Scale 
(ICAPS) and the Cultural Styles Questionnaire (CSQ).   
The ICAPS development took place over a six year period.  Initially it was 
developed to measure the adjustment of Japanese sojourners to the United States.  The 
current research involves seventeen different research studies with over 2500 
participants, which has resulted in a 55-item test that assesses the potential to adjust well 
to a new or different culture.   These studies have tested the ICAPS’s internal and 
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external  reliability as well as the internal, external, and predictive validity (Matsumoto & 
LeRoux, 2003).  Table 1 provides a sample of the research efforts, participants, what the 
study tested for, and what was accomplished. 
 
Table 1.   Summary of Initial Validation Studies of the ICAPS 
 
Study  Scientific Issue 
Being Tested  
What was Accomplished  Participants 
1  Item reduction;  
Predictive validity  
The 193 items were correlated with indices of 
intercultural adjustment. The least important items were 




2  Further item 
reduction;  
Predictive validity;  
Internal reliability  
The items were correlated with indices of adjustment. The 
least important ones were eliminated, resulting in a 55-
item test, which we call the ICAPS-55. Internal reliability 




3  Temporal and 
parallel forms 
reliability  
English and Japanese versions of the ICAPS-55 were 
found to be equivalent. Scores on the tests were found to 





4  Predictive validity  The ICAPS-55 was correlated with a variety of measures 




5  Construct validity;  
Discriminant 
validity;  
Incremental validity  
The ICAPS-55 was correlated with a variety of personal 




6  External validity  Changes in ICAPS-55 scores were associated with 




7  Norming  Factor analyses of the ICAPS-55 confirmed the existence 
of the four primary factors of the psychological engine― 







8  External validity  The ICAPS-55 was associated with a number of 
characteristics of this group of experts that differed from 








9  Predictive validity  The ICAPS-55 was correlated with a variety of measures 





10  External validity  Changes in the ICAPS-55 were associated with 






11  Predictive validity  The ICAPS-55 predicted marital and life satisfaction for 





12  Predictive validity  The ICAPS-55 predicted culture shock, adjustment, and 
life satisfaction for these students, even though the ICAPS 
was administered prior to their sojourn, while the students 




13  Predictive validity  The ICAPS-55 predicted subjective adjustment for 
international sojourners from many different countries 
and cultures to the U.S., and Americans who have 




14  Predictive validity;  
Parallel forms 
reliability  
The ICAPS-55 predicted subjective adjustment and life 
satisfaction in Spanish speaking immigrants and 
sojourners from Central and South America. English and 




15  Incremental validity  The ICAPS-55 predicted adjustment above and beyond 







16  Convergent 
validity; Predictive 
validity; 
Incremental validity  
The ICAPS-55 was correlated with a variety of personal 
and psychopathology measures, and predicted adjustment 




17  Predictive validity  The ICAPS-55 predicted actual behaviors above and 





Note.  (Matsumoto, Yoo, & LeRoux, 2005) 
 
A factor analysis of the data revealed six primary components or dimensions.  
These were: emotion regulation, openness, flexibility, creativity, critical thinking, and 
autonomy.  The most empirically consistent and strongest predictor of adjustment is 
emotion regulation (Matsumoto, 2004).  Matsumoto incorporated the scale for emotion 
regulation (ER) with three other scales he developed to create the Cultural Styles 
Questionnaire (CSQ).   
The CSQ is an individual measure of a person’s cultural orientation.  The four 
scales are similar to the Hofstede dimensions but do not infer a national characteristic like 
the Hofstede claims, according to Matsumoto (2005).  The scales and their connection to 
Hofstede are:  
• Collectivism/Individualism, same as Hofstede 
• Status Differentiation, Power Distance 
• Emotion regulation, Uncertainty Avoidance 
• Mastery, Masculinity/Femininity 
Interviews with Dr. Matsumoto provided insight into the development of the term 
“emotion regulation” and the relationship with uncertainty avoidance.  The discussion 
concluded that the terms related similarly to power distance and status differentiation 
(Burnett & Thomas, 2005).  The development of each scale, the empirical study of that 
scale, and the association to Hofstede follow. 
a. Collectivism/Individualism 
Of all the dimensions referred to in this dissertation, this construct is 
consistently mentioned in almost all theories.  Triandis (2001) states that no construct has 
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a greater impact on cross-cultural psychology than this one.  Matsumoto (1997) 
developed the scale he used to measure individualism/collectivism (IC).  Measuring the 
IC dimension in individuals can lead to understanding the nature of different groups and 
the relative importance of this dimension within that group (Matsumoto, Weissman, 
Preston, Brown, & Kupperbusch, 1997).   Empirical work mapping  the IC tendencies of 
a person or group allows examination of the interrelationships between people or groups 
who have the same or different tendencies.  The Matsumoto work developed over a 
course of six experiments.  The result scales were called the Individual Collectivism 
Interpersonal Assessment Inventory (ICIAI). Analysis of the data from the six studies 
indicated that the ICIAI did detect cultural differences between and within group 
samples.   
  Masumoto (2001) argues that having an individual scale for IC allows 
researchers to eliminate the assumption that individuals from a particular country implies 
a homogeneous representation of that country.  Instead, measuring IC individually within 
a group accounts for IC covariance, refining the ability to test cultural versus individual 
differences on behavior (Matsumoto, Weissman, Preston, Brown, & Kupperbusch, 1997).  
The inclusion of the IC scale in the CSQ provides a means to account for these 
differences in examining both organizational and national cultural differences.  The 
second most researched cultural construct is power distance, which is included in the 
CSQ as status differentiation. 
b. Status Differentiation 
The Hofstede (2005) explanation of power distance accurately summarizes 
status differentiation.  Matsumoto (2004) refers to status differentiation as the degree that 
cultures discriminate behavior differences between people that are based on a person’s 
rank, status or power.  Like power distance, individuals who are high in status 
differentiation will be subjugate to persons they believe are higher in status than 
themselves.  Conversely, persons with low status differentiation see people as more or 





c. Emotional Regulation (ER) 
As described above, the ER scale is the most consistent and predictive 
indicator scale for cultural adjustment. Comparing emotion regulation to uncertainty 
avoidance, Matsumoto (2005) states that cultures high in uncertainty avoidance (UA) are 
most likely characterized by low levels of emotion regulation, while cultures low on 
uncertainty avoidance  have high levels (Matsumoto, Yoo, & LeRoux, 2005).  This may 
at first be confusing but intuitively makes sense.  The more emotionally regulated 
someone’s emotions are, the less the effect of uncertain situations. 
The last scale utilized in the CSQ is the Mastery/Harmony scale similar to 
Hofstede’s Masculinity and Femininity dimensions. 
d. Mastery/Harmony ( Masculinity/Femininity -Schwartz Values) 
Matsumoto did not develop the scale included in the CSQ for 
mastery/harmony.  He utilized the inventory developed by Schwartz (1994) reviewed 
previously in this document. 
The mastery/harmony dimension concerns the relationship of humankind 
to the natural and social world (Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2004). Mastery 
indicates getting ahead through active self-assertion and is similar to Hofstede’s 
masculinity dimension. The concept behind mastery is to master, change, and exploit the 
natural and social environment. Harmony is the opposite and similar to Hofstede’s 
femininity dimension.  Harmony refers to an emphasis on accepting the social and 
physical world as it is, trying to comprehend and fit in rather than change or exploit it 
(Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2004).  
In summary, Matsumoto’s work provides a framework for examining the 
cultural dimensions of individuals within a team, then making organizational 
determinations about the group’s orientation.  This is helpful in two ways. Firstly, no 
general assumptions about the group’s orientation, based on nationally or organizational 
normed values, are involved.  The individual’s and team’s orientation are specific for this 
team.  Secondly, the measurement scale is adaptable to an organization’s specific 




determine whether a modified CSQ for the military maintained the validity and reliability 
of the unrevised scale.  The development of such a scale adds power for the use of the 
CSQ in its original  or revised form. 
The Matsumoto CSQ offers researchers an inexpensive, reliable 
instrument to evaluate cultural orientation.  Further research as to the applicability of the 
scale, in comparison with Hofstede’s, requires time.  There is supporting evidence that 
the use of the Matsumoto scale can provide a researcher with an effective method to 
measure culture. 
This review is not an exhaustive study of all the available research.  It 
does provide the breadth of the business community’s interest and usage of culture as a 
means to identify, improve, and integrate members from differing cultures into 
productive teams.  Although not extensively discussed, the groundwork for including a 
study of potential personality stereotype in evaluating team effectiveness is evident.  Like 
Hofstede’s cultural orientation, personality has an extensive research basis.  In fact, 
Hofstede often teams with McCrae, one of the developers of a largely utilized assessment 
of personality, for evaluation of the culture and personality macro-cognitive process’ 
impact on organizational effectiveness (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).  The next section 
reviews this specific personality literature as another team effectiveness measure for the 
military.  
E. PERSONALITY RESEARCH 
Psychology defines personality as the distinct pattern of behavior, thoughts and 
feelings that characterize a person’s adaptation to life (Rathus, 1996). Many researchers 
believe that personality is the stable disposition of a human and is commonly referred to 
as a trait.  This is the approach we will pursue in the relationship that personality has to 
performance and team process. 
The study of personality has evolved since the study of human behavior began.  A 
key area of interest is the effect that personality may have on performance.  Current 
theories  indicate two primary taxonomies (Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 
2000).  First, Eysenck and Eysenck identify three primary dimensions of personality: 
extroversion, neuroticism and psychoticism.   McCrae and Costa rival this theory with an 
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approach often referred to as the “Big Five” (McCrae, R. R., Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & 
Paunonen, 1996).  Their approach expands on the Eysenck dimensions by replacing 
psychoticism with three other dimensions: openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
and agreeableness (Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000). Costa and 
McCrae have refined their Big Five model and termed the resulting research instrument 
the Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience – Personality Inventory (NEO 
PI).   The NEO – PI consists of 240 items that measured the five personality domains 
across six facets per domain (Costa & McCrae, 2003).  A truncated version of the NEO-
PI was developed for use when time availability for testing was limited (Psychological 
Assessment Resources, 2003).  This version consists of twelve items per domain in a 
sixty item inventory termed the Neuroticism Extraversion Openness to experience Five 
Factor Inventory (NEO FFI). 
A large data base exists indicating the substantial empirical use of the NEO PI and 
the NEO FFI (Psychological Assessment Resources, 2003). The research provides the 
foundation for use of the NEO FFI as a measure of personality providing a 
comprehensive sketch of a person’s emotional, attitudinal and motivational style.  Each 
domain encompasses a specific personality factor. 
Agreeableness is the measure of interpersonal tendencies.  Considered the 
altruism factor, empathy, humility, and willingness to cooperate are characteristic of this 
measure.  A study examining  performance in army military teams,  based on group 
personality composition, determined that homogeneous groups avoid personality-related 
conflicts where agreeableness was similar (Halfhill, Nielson, Sundstrom, & Weilbaecher, 
2005).   The documentation for professional researchers also indicates that agreeableness 
is not a virtue on the battlefield due to the heterogeneous nature of conflict.  This point is 
opinion and not a valid conclusion based on empirical evidence.  The conclusion based 
on research is that agreeableness is  not a significant factor for gauging a team’s 
performance (Halfhill, Nielson, Sundstrom, & Weilbaecher, 2005). 
Conscientiousness is the trait of being painstaking and careful (McCrae, C. N., 
Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996).  This factor may be viewed as a person’s character 
(Psychological Assessment Resources, 2003).  Low scores in conscientiousness are 
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considered by Barrick (1998) and PAR (2003) as the weak link in a team-constraining 
performance.   Moreland and Levine (1992) concluded that low conscientiousness of 
members in small teams can affect performance if members with higher 
conscientiousness spent time trying to resolve personality differences.  There is 
disagreement among researchers with these specific conclusions, but many support the 
view that teams attempting to resolve personality conflicts are distracted from task 
accomplishment.  Often these teams are unaware that this dynamic is occurring.  
Extraversion is a factor many consider very influential on team effectiveness.  
Studies of pilots by Novella and Yousserf (1974) characterized the military pilot as more 
extroverted and independent than the general population.  This was the conclusion 
reached by  Callister (1999)  based on his  research of  Air Force pilots (n = 1301) using 
the NEO PI to measure pilot personality.  Judge and Bono (2000) determined that 
extraversion played a significant role in transformation leadership prediction of leader 
effectiveness (Pike, Hills, & MacLennan, 2002).  Costa and McCrae (1989) concluded 
that extraversion is the most important conceptual advance in research using the five 
factor model. 
Neuroticism may be the most misunderstood factor of the NEO FFI.  Abnormal 
psychologists have used neuroticism as a means to interpret a person’s maladjustment or 
psychologically distressed condition.  This has led to a misrepresentation of the definition 
of neuroticism as a personality trait. Neuroticism indicates an individual’s emotional 
stability.  Individuals who score high in neuroticism have a tendency toward negative 
effects like anxiety, where lower scores indicate sound emotional stability (Psychological 
Assessment Resources, 2003). Research of neuroticism is often contradictory.  Studies 
that show high levels of anxiety linkage to poor performance also show that the same 
levels of anxiety, when viewed in a motivation context, are performance enhancers 
(Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000).   Interpretation of research results, 
with neuroticism as a variable, must be well documented for clarity.   
The last personality factor is openness to experience.  It is the least known of the 
factors but one of the most widely researched (Psychological Assessment Resources, 
2003).  Openness is often related to intelligence and may be an acceptable predictor of 
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training performance (Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000).   Some 
researchers report that military populations may view openness as a weakness or too 
artistic to characterize the military (Burnett & Thomas, 2005).  Regardless of the 
perception, openness is a valuable factor of measurement, and inclusion in military 
research is applicable. 
The use of the NEO FFI as a measurement instrument is valid for  assessing 
individual personality traits..  There are indications that the NEO FFI has been the scale 
used in military populations, but in comparison to the research by business and 
psychology, is more prevalent. Recently, a trend has developed to combine cultural and 
personality studies.   Research by Hofstede and McCrae (2004) make a strong case for 
examination of culture and personality together.  
In any correlation analysis of the relationship between culture and personality, 
extraversion produced the highest correlation with each of the personality factors, r = .64 
(p<.001).   Openness to experience had a positive relationship with uncertainty 
avoidance, but  a negative relationship to power distance  (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). 
Terracciano and McCrae (2005) examined the relationship between personality factors 
and cultural data from fifty countries.  Their findings provide strong evidence for the 
existence of a universal connection between personality and culture.  However, a 
contradictory study of forty-nine countries (n = 3989) indicated evidence of in-group 
perceptions, but were not descriptive of the people themselves (Terracciano & McCrae, 
2005).  Actually, this research supports the hypothesis that stereotypes about a group 
perpetuate information processing bias. The seminal research of Hofstede and McCrae 
seems very applicable to a military setting.  Diverse teams composed of members with 
potential personality stereotypes may have a significant impact on the operational 
effectiveness of the team.  The next section highlights this research.  
F. TEAM EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 
Salas and Fiore (2004) cite that given the critical utilization of teams across a full 
spectrum of domains, it is important to understand the factors affecting team performance 
and effectiveness. For our purposes, team is defined as two or more members interacting 
dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a goal (Salas, E., Dickerson, 
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Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992). Further, we describe military teams as those formed 
rapidly in a joint effects-based environment characterized as asynchronous, and culturally 
diverse, having heterogeneous knowledge among members who rotate frequently (Hayne, 
Smith, & Vijayasarathy, 2005).   These teams are formed with the primary functions of 
sharing information, developing strategies, and decision-making.  Research indicates that 
teams with these functions must develop a shared cognition capability referred to as team 
cognition (Hayne, Smith, & Vijayasarathy, 2005; Salas, E. & Fiore, 2004).  
1. Team Cognition  
Team cognition is defined as the cognitive development that arises during 
complex and dynamic interactions when members in a team are engaged in task 
accomplishment (Salas, E. & Fiore, 2004).  The concept of team cognition fits well into 
the Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework (NCOCF) previously discussed 
(Garstka & Alberts, 2004).  Although a complicated diagram, Figure 6 provides a visual 
representation of the framework for processing information from individuals and teams  
to the network within the context of NCOCF.   
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Figure 6.    Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework  




 Each area is color-coded representing a different aspect of one of the four 
domains of Network Centric Warfare.  The area in blue highlights ( Quality of Organic 
Information, Quality of Individual Information, Quality of Individual Sensemaking, 
Quality of Networking, Degree of Information Shareability, Quality of Interactions, 
degree of Shared Information, Degree of Shared Sensemaking, and Degree of Decisions 
Synchronization) defines the cognitive and information domains. The red area(Quality of 
Interactions, Degree of Shared Information, Degree of Sensemaking and Degree of 
Decision Synchronization) is the social domain and encompasses the regions of quality of 
interactions, shared information, shared sense-making, and degree of decision 
synchronization. For our purposes, we refer to this entire region of the NCOCF as the 
team cognitive area.  We conclude that the design of a team’s cognitive capability rests 
on the ability of the individual members to share information implicitly and explicitly.  A 
concern of researchers interested in team cognition centers on quantitative measurement 
of the quality of interactions among team members and team performance.   
 Research of team cognition measurement is still limited in scope, especially when 
the military is the experimental population.  Many of the techniques under development 
are relatively new.  Cooke (2005) identified four challenges for satisfactory empirically-
based measurement of a team’s cognition.   
The first challenge involves definition, a recurrent theme in social science 
research.  Team cognition research follows one of two paths: information processing or 
ecological approaches (Cooke, Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 2004).  The information processing 
approach conceptualizes team cognition as shared mental models among the team 
members.  Each member has an individual model of the task, technology, and team that 
enables the team to implicitly coordinate, anticipate behavior, and perform effectively if 
the models are concurrent.  Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Converse (1993) theorize that 
mental models are the heart of situational awareness.   
The ecological view theorizes that team cognition resides outside the team.  
Cognition invokes the interactions between team members and the environment (Cooke, 
2005).  Research indicates that similar cultures (equal dimensional values) tend to 
communicate more implicitly than unlike cultures (dimensions with greater separation).  
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Nods, gestures, and signals are understood by like cultures and provide intuitive means to 
relay information without vocabulary.  Unlike cultures require explicit communication to 
pass information and provide understanding.  Recall culture is both a social and cognitive 
phenomena (Garstka & Alberts, 2004).  Team cognition is hampered where implicit 
communication is not effective. Other researchers have supported this view. 
Lausic (2005) found that communication among effective teams had ten different 
patterns of communication where less effective teams used only four.  Her study 
indicated that effective teams used implicit means of communication more often than the 
less effective teams (Lausic, 2005).  Studies of air traffic controllers point out that 
implicit communication is a highly evolved skill among airport tower teams (Stanton et 
al., 2005).  Studies of control room operators in nuclear power plants also confirm that 
highly effective teams use implicit communication.  It is interesting to note that the 
research confirms that more than 50 percent of the nuclear power company’s significant 
events are human performance related, where teams do not function or interact 
effectively (Frye, 1988).  An example of where team effectiveness failed and led to a  
disastrous outcome can be illustrated via the events of  the aviation accident of Avianca 
flight 52. 
Cultural diversity and team communication were determined to be factors in the 
accident that took seventy-three lives (Helmreich & Davies, 2004).  Investigators 
determined that the crash occurred because the aircraft ran out of fuel.  Differences in 
power distance between the captain and crew from Columbia, South America, coupled 
with poor  communication between the American air traffic controllers and the Avianca 
crew, resulted in a breakdown of leadership which contributed to the crash (Salas, E., 
Burke, C. S., Fowlkes, J. E., & Wilson, K. A. , 2002).  The misunderstanding in 
communications between the tower and crew resulted in the crew focusing on 
interpreting the communications network rather than monitoring the actual condition of 
the aircraft.  This was a preventable accident. 
Research indicates that methods do exist to improve communications and lessen 
the impact of diversity among team members that limits effective information sharing.  
The next challenge is to develop methodologies that are applicable to homogeneous and 
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heterogeneous team types, whether formed for long-term purposes or assembled quickly 
for short operational duration.  The development of holistic versus collective metrics for 
homogeneous and heterogeneous team types are the second and third challenges 
identified by Cooke (2005).  
Metrics for heterogeneous teams differ from homogeneous teams.  The shared 
mental model of the homogeneous team can be represented with each member of the 
team focused on a single knowledge referent or holistic knowledge approach.  The 
heterogeneous team is more complex due to diversity and focuses on a role-specific 
knowledge referent or collective knowledge approach.  This complexity decreases the 
effective measurement of team cognition when individual measures are used as a 
representation for collective aggregation of the team’s cognition (Cooke, 2005; Cooke, 
Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 2004).  The holistic approach to cognitive measurement is a better 
predictor of team performance due to its direct link with performance.  Unfortunately, 
researchers are still faced with development of this type of measure versus the collective 
measures, which link only to individual perception and lack a team predictive quality.  
An aspect of holistic measure that may be promising is the study of communications 
between team members.   
As indicated earlier, teams do communicate differently depending on the degree 
of likeness.  Even diverse teams who are becoming cohesive may indicate this likeness in 
both written and verbal communication.  Burnett (2002) used the Linguistic Inquiry 
Word Count (LIWC) developed by Pennebaker (1997) to compare subjective reports of 
ad hoc and established groups with verbal interactions of the group.  The results indicated 
slight support for use of verbal interactions to determine the cohesion of ad hoc and 
established groups.  Other interactions may also provide holistic measurement methods to 
investigate teams.  The final challenge Cooke (2005) addresses is embedding and 
automating measurements that provide real-time assessment to group members. 
Current measurements are anecdotal and can only provide teams with results after 
the fact.  This method lacks value in assisting a team during a task.  Cooke (2004) advises 
the development of software to assist in the further development of measures.  Within the 
military community, research is just beginning to explore embedded training and the 
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benefits of this approach.  Behavioral experimentation is another focus of research but 
still lacks the real-time assistance attribute that heterogeneous teams require.  The 
business community has taken a different approach to solving this problem. 
The rapid expansion of many businesses into the global economy required 
innovative development of methods to improve heterogeneous team effectiveness. Adler 
(1997) estimated that nearly 10,000 companies are involved in global operations (Salas, 
E., Burke, C. S., Fowlkes, J. E., & Wilson, K. A. , 2002).  These businesses require 
multinational as well as organizationally diverse teams to compete effectively in a global 
marketplace. Two organizations, Systematic Information Services Inc. and Sun 
Microsystems, have determined that specific intercultural trainings might result in 
savings from $30,000 to $190,000 per employee (Krukenberg, 2005). The methodologies 
currently used by these global organizations focus on cultural understanding of the team 
members.  Research shows that team members understanding of their own, as well as the 
other members’ cultural orientation, limits the potential negative impact of diversity on 
team effectiveness.  As described in the section on culture, having a basic understanding 
of one’s own cultural orientation, as well as the other team members’ orientation, results 
in improved team performance, better team processes, and shared commitment to 
success.   
Recall that culture is both a social and cognitive phenomena (Garstka & Alberts, 
2004).  It is the cognitive domain that contains the “attitudes, values, and beliefs” as 
fundamental characteristics of the individual.   The importance of understanding one’s 
own culture and personality, as well as others’ cultural orientation, may influence the 
quality of interactions and the degree that information is shared in diverse teams.    
The sharing of mental models from member to member and the holistic 
understanding of the combined mental models between team members is a critical 
process to insure successful team effectiveness.  Team efficiency improves when team 
members have adequate shared understanding of the task, the team, the equipment, and 
the situation (Duncan et al., 1996). The effectiveness of teams rests in their ability to 
share information and develop the shared understanding and shared awareness that 
enables efficient performance.  The next section reviews information sharing. 
  
 55
2. Information Sharing 
An integral part of NCOCF is the quality of information flow among the team 
members and other networked organizations (Garstka & Alberts, 2004).  The information 
sharing between individuals within similar and differing organizations can and will 
dynamically affect the decision-making process.  Researchers have investigated 
information quality for many years and developed theories primarily centered on 
mathematical or probability formulas to illustrate information entropy. 
Shannon (1948) developed the theory commonly referred to as the “Shannon 
Entropy” where information is described as the average amount of information in a 
probability distribution. Atkinson and Moffat (2005) state that information entropy is 
essentially a measure of uncertainty.  The example they use describes a comparison of a 
push and pull system.  In the push system, a single source is the decision maker and 
pushes information to other sources. There is limited shared awareness among all 
members, which may lead to higher levels of uncertainty.  In the pull system, all sources 
are involved in information sharing thus expanding shared awareness and understanding.  
Uncertainty in the pull system is generated in two ways.  Either the information flow is so 
great that important facts can be missed, causing members to doubt they have all the 
significant information, or the source of the information is not trusted. 
 Uncertainty is a perception and therefore a cognitive factor. Psychologists view 
information sharing as a process where the information process is  an implicitly cognitive 
one.  One method to describe the level of uncertainty is based on the flow of information.  
Figure 7 provides an illustration of increased uncertainty due to increased flow and 
elements.     
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D y n a m ic s :  R a t e  o f  C h a n g e
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Figure 7.   Uncertainty: Scale and Dynamics (Garstka & Alberts, 2004, p. 37) 
 
 As Figure 7 illustrates; low uncertainty is characteristic of a low number of 
elements, processes, and rates of change.  Uncertainty increases as the elements, 
processes, and rates of change increase.  This differs from uncertainty generated from not 
trusting the source of information.  The cause for this has been linked to stereotype 
behavior (Marcus & Gould, 2000; Matsumoto, Yoo, & LeRoux, 2005; Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998). 
Stereotype is often confused with bias and prejudice.  Bias and prejudice are 
defined in terms of the individual.  Bias can be a positive or negative subjective opinion 
toward a principle, person, or group (Random House, 1980). Prejudice is described as a 
preformed judgment even more unreasoning than bias toward a principle or person or 
group.  Stereotype is defined as a standardized concept or image invested with special 
meaning and held in common by members of a group (Random House, 1980).    
Researchers have measured the level and effect of stereotype against another 
group for several years.  Typically, self-assessment measures have been employed to try 
to describe this phenomena.  Trompenaar (2000) attempts to describe stereotype between 
groups using overlapping offset normal distributions.  Cultures that are similar tend to 
speak to each other from the shared area of the overlapping distributions, while cultures 
that are different tend to share from the tails of the distributions.  Trompenaar  views the 
tails as areas of limited understanding and trust.   Adler (2000) agrees with this 
assessment.  As members of  one group gain real knowledge about themselves and 
members of other groups, the subconscious inaccurate evaluation gives way to reality.  
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Hofstede (2005) indicates that this emergent reality establishes the environment for true 
integration and improves members’ group interactions.  The core of the process may be 
viewed as trust. 
Stereotypes within an organization can be explored in a person-based or a 
category-based trust environment according to research developed by Adams and Webb 
(2002).  Their literature review of trust, within small military teams, provides an 
interesting insight into the problem of stereotypical behavior in joint ad-hoc teams 
(Adams & Webb, 2002).  Ad-hoc teams do not have the opportunity to develop person-
based trust due to the limited interactions between group members.  Category-based trust 
theorists argue that the category a person belongs to can serve as a substitute for personal 
knowledge (Adams & Webb, 2002). A leader starting command of a new unit can trust 
his soldiers without ever having seen them perform.  The leader believes that his soldiers 
are representatives of a system of military training and expertise that has produced 
soldiers shown to be worthy of trust for generations (Adams & Webb, 2002). Category-
based trust can emerge even in circumstances that preclude the development of person-
based trust where there has been no opportunity to learn from personal interaction 
(Adams & Webb, 2002).  Unfortunately, boundaries between the services limit the 
development of category-based trust forcing trust to develop by person-based means.  
This requires direct communication by the members of the diverse team. 
Adler (2002) describes communication in a culturally diverse group as encoding 
and decoding messages sent between two or more people in a number of manners.  
Information is sent verbally, in writing, by facial expression, or by behavior.  The 
presence of cross-cultural factors can cause misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the 
information being shared simply due to diverse cultural orientation (Adler, 2002).  With 
the evolution to interdependency based on the DoD transformation process, it is critical 
for researchers, system developers, and system designers to understand the impact of 
these cultural differences or stereotypes on the teams that will implement and conduct 
operations using the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) theory.    
A point to stress here is the lack of joint tactical and operational level training 
prior to deployment into an asymmetric-based environment. The category-based theorists 
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maintain that trust is acquired from experience within the organization.  The development 
of trust outside the organization depends more on person-based interactions between 
organizations.  The potential for a stereotype to limit person-based trust is far greater than 
category-based.  This lack of trust occurs from the stereotypical beliefs, feelings, and 
expectations about members of another group (Kunda, 1999).  The differences in group 
members, based on cultural differences and personality stereotypes, are complex 
problems to solve. 
The complexity is described by Fiore and Schooler (2004) as a problem 
conceptualization dilemma.  Group members tend to share information that is believed to 
be common to all members of the group and not information that is unique (Fiore & 
Schooler, 2004).  Group members tend to try to solve a problem instead of determining 
what the problem is and using the group’s expertise to develop courses of actions to 
implement.  Information sharing thus becomes disjointed or withheld, decreasing the 
permeability of communication flow between members (Fiore & Schooler, 2004).  
Garstka and Alberts (2004) identified three categories for problems like these and the 
level of uncertainty matched to each. 
• “Simple Problems” (characterized by low levels of uncertainty) 
 - Nature of problem is well-defined and commonly accepted — well- 
   established mental models of problem exist. 
 -Solution strategy exists, is well understood, and practiced. 
• “Complex Problems” (characterized by medium levels of uncertainty) 
 - Number of elements is large and dynamic but well-defined and   
   commonly accepted mental models exist. 
 - Alternative solution strategies (suggested by mental models) exist and  
   must be evaluated individually across time and space. 
• “Wicked Problems” (characterized by high levels of uncertainty) 
 - Nature of problem is poorly understood (many dynamic elements) with  
  multiple points of view existing across different stakeholders and/or  
  experts ― no clear mental model of problem exists. 
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 - Solution strategy depends upon the understanding of the nature of the   
  problem ― without mental model of problem, it is difficult to develop a  
  solution strategy. (Garstka & Alberts, 2004, p. 37) 
Although a detailed discussion is outside the scope of this document, “wicked 
problems” are an area of research that certainly influence the effectiveness of teams.  A 
condensed review provides some clarity about the potential impact “wickedness” has on 
team efficiency. 
3. Wicked Problems 
Rittel and Webber (1973) developed the theory of “wicked problems” as a means 
to distinguish a simple problem from a complex problem. The theory advanced the 
hypothesis of “wickedness” as a way to describe a complex problem whose 
characteristics follow a distinct set of indicators  (Roberts, 2000).  These indicators are: 
• There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.  
• Wicked problems have no stopping rule.  
• Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad.  
• There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked 
problem.  
• Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because 
there is little opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts 
significantly.  
• Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively 
describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well described set of 
permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.  
• Every wicked problem is essentially unique.  
• Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another problem.  
• The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be 
explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the 
nature of the problem’s resolution.  




Wicked problems are associated with social complexity and can be a 
characteristic of a team composed of culturally diverse members (Institute, 2005). This 
theory may provide some insight into a solution of transforming culture within DoD and, 
in particular, the military services.  Garstka and Alberts (2004) indicate that wicked 
problems are at the challenging core of successful implementation of Network Centric 
Warfare theory. 
Conklin (2005) explains that wicked problems, when coupled with social 
complexity, results in fragmentation.  Fragmentation is one of the key factors in why the 
typical waterfall solution of problem solving is not effective with these types of 
problems.  In fact, when comparing diagrams of the stair step waterfall problem-solving 
process to wicked problems, the results resemble the diagram in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Waterfall diagram for decision making (Conklin, 2005, p. 5) 
 
Fragmentation is what interferes with arriving at a solution for a problem and, in 
fact, pulls the problem apart (Conklin, 2005).  The members of a team experience 
anxiety, begin to blame others for the state of the problem, and cause fragmentation.  As 
these conditions arise, further fragmentation occurs and the team process suffers. Because 
it points deep into the culture and practices of project work, it is difficult to observe 
fragmentation directly (Conklin, 2005).   The solution to fragmentation is to explore 





members instead of trying to solve the entire problem.  Fragmentation decreases as 
shared understanding and shared awareness increase, two areas indicated as significance 
for Network Centric Warfare.  
We propose to focus on a smaller portion of the transformation problem, 
specifically, the application of business solutions to the military environment. NCW has 
tremendous potential to provide a combatant commander operationally superior forces, 
but this requires teams that are integrated for maximum performance.  Cultural 
differences and personality stereotypes limit the effectiveness of these teams if members 
do not fully understand the potential impact of their differences on the team process. 
In conclusion, team effectiveness is a complex research domain.  Despite the 
prevalence of literature from the business community, the military has limited empirical 
study of successful business models in application to a military team.  Our review 
indicates that culture and personality are macro-cognitive processes that may influence 
the effectiveness of a team’s efficiency and performance.  The environment of the 
asymmetric effects-based operation complicates the ability of teams now composed of 
different military organizations to operate as effectively as possible. Our research 
specifically answers the question: “can the business model be applied to a military 
homogeneous and heterogeneous team resulting in similar improvements in team 
effectiveness and information sharing as achieved in the business environment?” 
The experimental design for an evaluation of military homogeneous and 
heterogeneous teams is based on a wargame with four potential seat locations for the 
participants.  The resulting matrix of possible teams is thirty-five with no adjustments for 
seat position.  Accounting for each service location at each of the four possible seat 
positions in the heterogeneous condition requires the evaluation of 512 team designs.  
Using a minimum of ten trials per design and per condition results in over 5000 team 
experiments to reach a minimum degree of designs for evaluation.   A researcher working 
seven days a week and conducting eight experiments a day would require over three 
years to complete the research.  This is impractical. 
Our solution to the problem focuses on the computer science domain, specifically 
agent-based modeling.  We contend that gathering limited data from actual human 
  
 62
experimentation, and populating a model replicating the experiment, will produce results 
applicable to a complete human experimental test.  The last section of this review 
examines agent-based modeling and simulation.  Further, we propose a model combining 
the reliability and validity components of social science with computer science 
Verification, Validation and Accreditation (V, V & A) standards as a method for input 
and referent output of data-based simulations. 
G. HUMAN BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATION USING  AGENT-BASED 
MODELING 
Human behavior representation (HBR) is a term from the DoD modeling and 
simulation community that describes the modeling of human performance that is 
represented in military simulations (Pew & Mavor, 1998).  Since our work is directed 
toward the military community, this is the term we will use to denote the representation 
of human behavior or performance in a modeling and simulation environment.   
Any realistic modeling of human behavior starts with a cognitive design that 
enables computer agents to behave within a model that is representing actual human 
behavior.  This process is a maturing science. We contend that as neuroscience and 
cognitive sciences unlock the brain’s processes, the fidelity of the agents’ replication of 
human behavior will have an equal and like advance.  Prior to reviewing HBR, a 
discussion of human cognition is useful. 
Cognition is generally defined as the acquisition of knowledge (Reed, 2004).  
Typically, a definition of cognition is specific to the relevant domain of study.  Since our 
research focuses on psychology and computer science, the definition we propose centers 
on those domains.  Cognitive and performance psychology view cognition as human 
information processing.  The information received by sensory inputs is transformed, 
reduced, elaborated, stored, retrieved, and used by each human (Reed, 2004).  
Information passes through different stages where it is transformed and transmitted.  
Researchers have varying opinions and models to describe the process. 
Historically, the study of mental processes was a philosophical subfield until the 
development of methods to experimentally examine learning and memory (Kandel, 
Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000).  Until the late 1950’s, the study of the mental processes was 
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largely ignored due to a  behaviorist view focused only on input and output observations 
of behavior in humans and animals.  Researchers believed that human behavior could 
only be studied with rigorous empirical methods developed for the physical sciences.  
This approach led to the erroneous belief that the mental processes between input and 
output  behavior were irrelevant (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000).  The emergence of 
cognitive psychology redirected scientific study of behavior by exposing the weaknesses 
of the behaviorist approach and demonstrated that there is a  neurological as well as 
biological influence affecting human behavior (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000; 
Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000).  This approach maintains that the 
mental processes are an information processing system and has led to the development of 
several theories to explain that process.  However, attempting to empirically quantify the 
internal processes of the brain and create empirically sound models is problematic.   
Most internal processes of the brain are inaccessible, at this time, to 
experimentation and analysis (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000).  The complexity of the 
mental process was one of the reasons behaviorists avoided this aspect of behavior as part 
of their theoretical structure. Today, cognitive science is advancing the study of 
information processing but it is difficult to determine which emerging theory is more 
accurate than another.  Computer science is one domain that has contributed significantly 
to the advancement of the study of cognitive neural science beginning with the 
emergence of artificial intelligence.    
The term artificial intelligence (AI) emerged in 1956 from MIT professor, John 
McCarthy.  During a conference sponsored by McCarthy, Newell and Simon (1956)  
described artificial intelligence’s rational agents as being capable of  thinking non-
numerically (Russell & Norvig, 2003).  These rational agents are central to the theory of 
artificial intelligence. 
Agents are anything that can perceive an environment through sensors and act on 
that environment (Russell & Norvig, 2003).  A collection of agents is commonly referred 
to as a Multi-Agent System (MAS).  The combination of multi-agent systems that are 
interactive within a given environment is further defined as a Complex Adaptive System 
(CAS) (Ferber, 1999; Holland, 1996). The interactions among computer agents is referred 
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to as message passing or information sharing which produces changes in each agent’s 
common environmental picture (Hiles, 2004; Holland, 1996).  Describing the 
environmental architecture has led researchers to develop different models  representing 
the different layers of the cognitive structure.   
Wray (2005) refers to a polymorphic architecture consisting of several layers of 
the cognitive process. There are three specific layers Wray (2005) defines as one 
approach to describe agent architecture.  The three layers are proto-, micro-, and macro-
cognitive.   
The proto-cognitive layer is the perception level where information is acquired, 
processed, and transferred.  The SWARM model is an example of this cognitive layer.  
The micro-cognitive layer  typically represented by Anderson’s (1973) Adaptive Control 
of Thought – Rational (ACT-R) model, is characterized as the expertise level and allows 
for expert-based pattern recognition.  Information is then processed to the macro-
cognitive layer where information reasoning occurs (Hayne, Smith, & Vijayasarathy, 
2005; Wray, 2005).   The Soar model developed by Simon and Newell (1983) is a typical 
representation of the macro-cognitive layer (Wray, 2005). It is this level that our research 
contends is the layer in human cognition where information processing is influenced most 
by the cultural and personality trait’s effects on behavior.  Modeling these processes in a 
military context to represent human behavior,  using an agent based model, is the focus of 
our work. 
For clarity, we need to define the terms ‘model’ and ‘simulation’.  Pew and 
Mavor (1998) assert that a definition for a model has different meanings for different 
domains.  For our purposes, we are adopting the definition used by the Defense Modeling 
and Simulation Office (2005) being that “a model is a physical, mathematical, or 
otherwise logical representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process.” Pew and 
Mavor (1998) point out that the term model implies that “human and organizational 
behavior can be represented by mathematical or computational formulas, programs or 
simulations.”  A simulation is a method to implement a model over time (Defense 
Modeling and Simulations & Office, 2005).  Pew and Mavor (1998) combine the model 
and simulation definitions and recommend terming human representation in military 
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environments as denoting a computer-based model that mimics either the behavior of a 
single human or the collective action of a team of humans.  The model we will use as the 
Human Behavior Representation model for our experiment is NetLogo.   
NetLogo is a cross-platform multi-agent programmable modeling environment 
developed by professors and students at Northwestern University from the Center of 
Connected Learning and Computer Based Modeling (CCL) (Wilensky, 2005).  It is a 
JAVA based program, which uses a scripting language to program the models. It is well 
suited for modeling complex systems or environments developing over time (Wilensky, 
2005). The programmer or modeler can give instructions to hundreds or thousands of 
independent “agents” all operating concurrently. This capability allows for the 
exploration of the connection between the behavior of individuals and the  patterns that 
emerge from the interaction of many individuals (Wilensky, 2005).  
NetLogo has been widely used and contains a modeling library with hundreds of 
working models.  A model developed by Cities (2004) explored information processing 
in a complex system.  Cities (2004) examined information entropy in this simulated 
environment to determine the level of accuracy a decision maker could expect from 
information retrieved from differing departments. Capitalizing on that model, we 
developed a similar model to replicate the wargame for our experiment.   Figure 9  




Figure 9.   NetLogo screen shot of replicated wargame 
 
The results of the development of the model are contained in the next chapter. 
Recall our purpose for developing the NetLogo model is to assist in completing the team 
matrix from the wargame experiment.  Several techniques are used to explore data output 
from agent models. 
It should be noted that to date, very little verification and validation of these types 
of models is available due to the complexity of the environments and the ability to 
change the parameters quickly.  Computer scientists believe these models accurately 
describe a behavioral space and indicate emergent behavior of the agents.  Psychologists 
disagree and refer to the agent behavior in terms of movement strategies or programmer 
definition.  Our belief is that these models do provide an environment to examine 
complex systems and analyze the output data.   
The output from these models can then be compared to human experimentation 
results.  Before a model can be used with confidence, it must go through a process of 
verification, validation and accreditation referred to by DMSO (2005) as V,V&A (Pew & 
Mavor, 1998).  Verification determines whether errors in coding or programming logic 
exist (Pew & Mavor, 1998).  Validation of a model is determined by how closely the 
results from the output resemble reality (Defense Modeling and Simulations & Office, 
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2005).  Populating the models with real data from scientifically sound experimentation 
allows for an interpretation of the results beyond what the models populated with 
notional data allow.  The process of verification, validation and accreditation, where 
human behavior data is used to populate the model, requires social and behavioral science 
reliability and validity standards to be maintained. 
Figure 10 provides a model for inclusion of the reliability and validity standards 
of the social sciences.   
 
Figure 10.   Model of VV&A coupled with social science reliability and    validity measures. 
From “Introduction to Experimental Psychology” by E. Conrad and T. Maul, 1989, p.  74. Defense 




Notice that the reliability and validity aspects of the model fit nicely in a data-
based model as input and referent measures.  We contend that insuring the data used to 
populate models, where human behavior representation is a goal, requires the same 
standards of reliability and validity as the social sciences.  The actual human behavior 
data can also be used as the referent to the simulation outputs.  This is the methodology 
we will use to examine the data input and data output from the NetLogo simulation. 
In summation, the use of human subjects for experimentation requires time, 
coordination, and precise design implementation.  Using models to assist in design and 
research question development may improve human research if the model can be 
populated with data resembling real human behavior.  The research of culture and 
personality indicates that these domains are measurable. Using the data from culture and 
personality research provides an opportunity to investigate the impact of these macro-
cognitive processes on team information sharing in homogeneous and heterogeneous 
military teams. The domains are broad enough to be meaningful, when examined across a 
population, as the research in the business community has shown.  The next section 
summarizes the key points from the literature.  
H. SUMMATION OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Transforming the military requires cooperation by all the services and DoD 
agencies.  Resistance to change within the military is not uncommon and is identified as 
one of the major blocks to progress by every level of leadership from the commander-in-
chief, secretary of defense, the service secretaries and chiefs, to the major combatant 
commanders.  Once independent organizations with minimal dependence due to air, land, 
and sea cold war philosophies, these same organizations now find heterogeneous 
missions common with the emergence of asymmetric warfare. 
The realization that technology and sophisticated symmetric warfare  strategies 
are not as effective against a resistance force with “limited means” but “unlimited will” to 
fight has been painfully slow. The loss of life and equipment, both military and civilian, 
has decayed the national will to maintain support of our military efforts for peace-
enabling, resemblant of past conflicts where an asymmetric environment was present.  
Alternative means to sustain the national and political will, coupled with methodologies 
  
 69
to cripple and deteriorate the “unlimited will” of an enemy, are critical for success in this 
environment.  Transformation is the key to maintaining our ability to wage symmetric as 
well as asymmetric warfare.   
Transformation is the theory to shift the military from an industrial-based 
platform to an information-based platform.  Fundamental to transformation success is the 
emergence of Network Centric Operations (NCO).  The four domains of Network Centric 
Operations: physical, information, cognitive, and social are intertwined to insure that the 
right force mix is at the most strategically significant location with the correct systems to 
defeat any threat (Alberts & Garstka, 2001).  NCO identifies the social domain, 
characterized as the domain of culture, as the key domain influencing the other three 
domains.   At this level, culture is ill defined and often a term used to describe concept 
versus reality.  The establishment of the Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework attempts to correct the problem of definition and measurement but lacks 
empirical analysis.  This is not true of the research by the psychological and business 
communities.  Both domains have determined that cultural orientation influences 
productivity at the individual and team levels. 
Extensive empirical research within the business community indicates that 
methodologies exist to overcome the potential negative impact of team member diversity 
on team effectiveness.  Business teams from culturally different segments of the 
organization are joined together in order to improve business integration into a global 
marketplace.  The development of methods to insure team efficiency resulted in business 
and psychological measures being developed and implemented to insure heterogeneous 
teams, composed of culturally and personality-diverse members, could perform unabated, 
regardless of stereotype or miscommunication.  These factors are cognitive in nature.  
Cognition is viewed by many researchers in the cognitive and computer science 
domains as an information processing system.  Based on the research from the business 
and psychological communities, further examination of the impact of cultural differences 
and personality stereotype on the information sharing procedures within a military team 
is important.   Culture can be viewed across several domains.  Researchers, such as 
Hofstede, believe culture is primarily a national dimension with organizational influence.  
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His seminal work beginning in the early 1970’s established the possible cognitive nature 
of culture, and by factor analyses, developed the “Software of the Mind” theory 
(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005).  From his research, the dimensions of power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity have evolved. By comparing one 
country’s dimensions to another, relationships can be grouped together between countries 
that share similar dimensional characteristics.  Hofstede’s national dimensions of culture, 
which focus on status, individuality, and uncertainty, have led other researchers to 
develop theories focused more at the organizational level.  
Hall (1977), Trompenaar (1998), Schwartz (1999), and Triandis (2001) 
individually developed theories at the organizational level.  They offer organizations 
methods and techniques to evaluate the effect of differences on processing information, 
team effectiveness, and global interactions.  Disagreement among these researchers is 
limited in the literature with each routinely citing another’s research especially when 
characterizing the domains of individualism and status.  Where differences do exist, focus 
is primarily on terminology of the dimensions. 
Triandis views culture as a syndrome primarily influenced by individualism and 
collectivism societies with either horizontal or vertical relationships (Triandis, 2001).  
Hall views cultural differences in terms of communication processing with the key 
factors being time, space, context, information flow, and interface (Hall & Hall, 1990).  
Trompenaar, using a layered approach to explain culture, believes that these orientations 
explain the way an organization solves problems and reconciles dilemmas.  His seven 
variables are: universalism/ particularism, diffuse/specific, communitarianism/ 
individualism, neutral/specific, achievement/ascription, time, and context. Additionally, 
Trompenaar (1998) suggested the distributions of a cultural orientation, when overlaid, 
indicated that the level of stereotype lay in the tails extending beyond the distributions.   
Schwartz (1999) approaches culture behaviorally to explain his values and dimensions.  
His research identifies ten value types contained within the seven dimensions of 
autonomy: (affective/intellectual), conservatism, hierarchy (mastery/harmony), and 
egalitarian.  The business community and psychology are rich with empirical studies.   
Businesses today routinely incorporate cultural metrics into normal business plans to 
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insure global relativity and smooth organization team effectiveness.  However, teams 
formed in organizationally diverse manners, which are foundationally ad-hoc, may need 
further refinement of the cultural structure.  To accomplish this, individual metrics have 
been developed. 
Matsumoto (2005) has investigated culture for two decades and devised a means 
to measure individual cultural orientation using the Cultural Styles Questionnaire.  The 
metric measures an individual’s orientation for status differentiation, emotion regulation, 
individualism, and mastery.   In doing so, team scores can be combined to determine an 
ad-hoc team’s cultural orientation.  Matsumoto provides a metric to determine whether a 
rapidly assembled team has cultural barriers that may limit effectiveness. Military teams 
are characteristic of  these types of teams with the evolution of asymmetric effects-based 
operations based on Network Centric Operations doctrine. 
The business world is rich with empirical research exploring cultural relations 
among people. Whether the cultural examination is a dimension, syndrome, domain or 
orientation, the evidence from research indicates that culture is a macro-individual 
difference that can be measured.  The true variation in the dissimilarity, whether called an 
individual difference or a national difference, is still a debated subject. 
There are researchers who believe culture is simply a modifier of behavior and 
not to be viewed as a higher level construct (Hills, 2002; Parsons & Shils, 1951).  We 
contend this is not true but rather that culture is a macro level individual difference like 
personality or intelligence (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).  Culture orientation can be 
measured; it has a cognitive component that influences behavior and  this behavior 
influences performance (Cole, 1988).  The same argument is held by social scientists for 
intelligence and personality influence on individual and group behavior (Matthews, 
Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000).  Viewed in this manner, culture can be defined, 
measured, analyzed, and results interpreted as other macro level differences are.  Further, 
these differences can be viewed, measured, and interpreted in the team setting.   
Like culture, personality is another macro level process that researchers have used 
to examine the impact of personality on team effectiveness.   Personality is believed to be 
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a stable trait within humans allowing for the development of measures and analysis 
methods.  McCrae and Costa (1989)  developed the Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness 
to Experience Personality Inventory (NEO-PI) as a means to evaluate personality. Often 
referred to as the five-factor model, the factors examined are: neuroticism, extraversion, 
openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.   
Neuroticism refers to a person’s tendency to experience negative feelings and the 
effect that high or low levels of neuroticism have on that person’s emotions.  
Extraversion is seen as a person’s engagement in the external world and is considered one 
of the influential factors in a team’s effectiveness. Openness to experience refers to a 
person’s imaginative or creative interest.  Despite a large body of research examining 
openness, much is still much unknown about its influence.  Agreeableness is viewed as 
the individual’s differences in cooperation and social harmony. Studies indicate the 
significance of this measure in a homogeneous environment, but find limits to accuracy 
in more heterogeneous studies.  Conscientiousness  focuses on how an individual controls 
and regulates their impulses and relates to a person’s character.  Hofstede and McCrae 
(2004) have determined that a connection exists between the cultural dimensions and 
personality types.  Although they disagree about which factor influences the other, they 
suggest research will benefit by investigating both.  The business and psychological 
domains have focused their cultural and personality research on  team effectiveness.  
A team is defined as two or more members interacting dynamically, 
interdependently, and adaptively toward a common goal (Salas, E., Dickerson, Converse, 
& Tannenbaum, 1992).  Team effectiveness is seen as the successful integration of all 
team members with diverse backgrounds.  The business community understands the 
importance of successfully integrating all members of the team and that cohesive teams 
must communicate effectively.  This social component identified as one of the four 
domains of Network Centric Operations accounts for  the influential effect on military 
teams that are formed with the primary functions of sharing information, developing 
strategies, and decision-making.  Research indicates that teams with these functions must 
develop a shared cognition capability referred to as team cognition (Hayne, Smith, & 
Vijayasarathy, 2005; Salas, E. & Fiore, 2004). 
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Cognition is an information processing system.  Members develop mental models 
of the task at hand and the social implications involved in completing the task.  
Researchers have struggled to develop empirically sound experiments that investigate the 
team cognitive process and have identified four challenges (Cooke, Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 
2004). 
The first challenge is one of definition, a common factor in social science 
research.  Defining team cognition is subject to interpretation.  Researchers are still 
attempting to identify what the true components of team cognition are.  For our purposes, 
we adopt the information processing approach which views team cognition as the sharing 
of individual mental models of the task, technology, and team that enable the team to 
implicitly coordinate, anticipate behavior, and perform effectively if the models are 
concurrent (Cooke, Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 2004; Salas, E. & Fiore, 2004).   Measurement 
conceptualizes the last three challenges identified by Cooke (2005).  The  challenges of 
measurement focus on differences in team structure: homogeneous or heterogeneous.  
Developing a metric that captures both structures requires the combination of single 
knowledge referent and holistic methods.  This is a complex problem.  There are 
indications that evaluating the communications between group members may provide a 
method for further refinement of metrics.  The final challenge is developing a method to 
embed the measurement instrument and provide members feedback that adds real-time 
assistance to the team instead of the current anecdotal system.  
The sharing of mental models from member to member, and the holistic 
understanding of the combined mental models between team members, is a critical 
process to insure successful team effectiveness.  The effectiveness of teams rests in their 
ability to share information and develop the shared understanding and shared awareness 
that enables efficient performance.   
Information sharing is an integral part of Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework.  The information sharing between individuals within similar and differing 
organizations can and will dynamically affect the decision-making process.  Mathematics 
has determined that information will be disrupted in a system.   Atkinson and Moffat 
(2005) state that information entropy is essentially a measure of uncertainty and can be 
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characterized by the flow of information and the trust between the members of the 
system, or for our purposes, the team.  Uncertainty increases as the elements, processes, 
and rates of change increase.  Contributing to uncertainty is the element of trust between 
members of the team, which is influenced by personality stereotype. This results in what 
Rittel and Webber (1973) termed a wicked problem.  Conklin (2005) asserted that these 
types of problems can only be tamed by examining smaller parts of the problem space so 
that fragmentation of the problem does not occur.    
Our research focuses on the smaller part of the transformation problem: military 
team effectiveness influenced by cultural diversity and personality differences.  To 
accomplish this requires a large number of military teams as participants.  Our approach 
will combine human experimentation with a human behavior representation model to 
replicate the human experiment.   
Human Behavior Representation (HBR) is a term from the DoD modeling and 
simulation community that describes the modeling of human performance that is 
represented in military simulations (Pew & Mavor, 1998).  The emergence of artificial 
intelligence in the 1950’s led to the fields of computer science and cognitive science 
jointly attempting to represent human behavior in a meaningful manner. The 
development of agents to represent human performance has advanced as neural science 
develops methodologies to explain the cognitive processes that lead to behavior, and 
psychology has interpreted those behaviors.  Our study chose the NetLogo model 
developed at Northwestern University to replicate our human experiment. 
NetLogo is a cross-platform multi-agent programmable modeling environment 
from the Center of Connected Learning and Computer Based Modeling (CCL) developed 
by professors and students at Northwestern University (Wilensky, 2005).  It is a JAVA 
based program that uses a scripting language to develop models. It is well suited for 
modeling complex systems or environments developing over time, as our experiment 
does. 
The use of a model to replicate the experiment can provide researchers a useful 
tool provided the model follows certain standards. In the behavior and social sciences, 
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these standards are the measures of reliability and validity.  In the computer sciences, the 
standards are verification, validation and accreditation.  Merging these standards provides 
a framework to develop an agent model.  This accomplishes two things.  
First, the output from large simulations developed from the models provides the 
opportunity for researchers to evaluate possibilities not previously considered.  Human 
experimentation and sample sizes are often limited by the availability of participants.  
Agent modeling overcomes this limitation as long as the results are not improperly used.  
The challenge for developers is to adhere to strict verification and validation standards in 
model development, just as the human behavior scientists must adhere to reliability and 
validity standards in their experiments. 
After reviewing the literature, several questions arose that our experimentation 





















































This section will describe the methods for each of the three studies.  There are no 
results provided.  Our experiment incorporated all the aspects from the literature we 
reviewed to develop the methodology and experiment we accomplished.  The results 
from this experimentation  answered five research questions.   
1.  Can profiles of the military services indicate differences using the macro-
cognitive factors of cultural orientation and personality as quantitative measures? 
2.  Do the service differences in cultural orientation and personality significantly 
impact team effectiveness during Effects Based Operations? 
3.  Can the business model for improving team effectiveness be applied to the 
military to improve information sharing and thereby affect joint team effectiveness? 
4.  Can computer simulations using agent-based models replicate human behavior 
experimentation results? 
5.  Can the reliability and validity standards of the social and behavioral sciences 
be incorporated into the simulation science Verification, Validation and Accreditation 
(VV&A) standards resulting in a model for Human Behavior Representation (HBR). 
We answered these questions by experimentation across three separate studies. 
Study One was developed to investigate each military service’s cultural orientation and 
personality.  Study Two was a wargame designed to examine information sharing in 
homogeneous and heterogeneous teams composed of military participants.  Study Three 
replicated Study Two using the NetLogo Model populated with the behavioral data from 
Study One and Study Two.  
The design of these studies is based on the belief that the business construct can 
be used to evaluate and examine military team effectiveness.   Developing profiles of 
service culture and personality to explore potential barriers to team effectiveness in 
homogeneous and heterogeneous teams should indicate specific differences in cultural 
orientation, personality stereotype, and performance resemblant to teams in business 
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organizations.  Homogeneous teams should share more information and outperform 
heterogeneous teams.  Based on our research questions and methods, we believe 
experimentation will yield the following results: 
Study One  
 
a.  Cultural orientation differences measured by the Matsumoto CSQ variables for 
status differentiation and emotion regulation will be evident in a least one of the services 
when compared to the others.   
b.  Personality type differences measured by the NEO FFI for extraversion, 
neuroticism, and openness to experience will be evident in a least one service when 
compared to the other services.     
c.  Personality stereotypes measured by the NEO FFI will be evident between at 
least one of the services when compared to the other.   
Study Two 
 
a.  Homogeneous teams will outperform heterogeneous teams in the control 
condition for percentage of facts shared. 
b.  No significant difference for performance will be evident between the 
homogenous control team type and the heterogeneous experimental team type for 
percentage of facts shared.   
c.  Linguistic analysis of composite team communications will reveal differences 
between the homogeneous and heterogeneous team types for word count, pronoun usage, 
and social variables as measured by Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC, fully 
explained in the method section).  
d. Linguistic analysis of team participants’ communications will reveal 
differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous team types for word count, 
pronoun usage and social variables as measured by Linguistic Inquiry Word Count 
(LIWC). 
e. Linguistic analysis of team participants’ communications will reveal 
differences between the four services for word count, pronoun usage and social variables 






a.  No performance differences between the data collected from the wargame and 
the data collected from the replicated wargame using NetLogo.   
 This chapter provides the methods for the experimentation.   
 
A.  STUDY ONE  
Study One consists of two parts.  The data collection method for this study was an 
online survey.  Participants completed the Matsumoto (2005) Cultural Style 
Questionnaire (CSQ) for Part A of Study One and the McCrae and Costa (2002) 
Neuroticism, Extraversion and Openness to Experience Five Factor Inventory (NEO FFI) 
for Parts B and C.  Due to the proprietary nature of both instruments, a copy of the 
complete survey is unavailable.  Appendix G provides the information to contact Dr. 
Matsumoto and Professional Assessments Resources (PAR) Corporation to obtain 
permission to receive copies of their inventories.  A sample of the online version of the 
instrument is located in appendix C.   
For analysis purposes, the surveys are identified as Part A, Part B and Part C.  The 
actual surveys were combined for online presentation.  The following sections describe 
each survey individually followed by combined detailed sections for participants, 
materials, and procedures.  
1. Part A – Cultural Orientation Evaluation 
a. Hypothesis 
H0 =    No difference for Status Differentiation or Emotion Regulation 
between  the individual services 
H1 =     At least one service is different in Status Differentiation  
            H2 =     At least one service is different in Emotion Regulation  
b. Instrument  - Cultural Styles Questionnaire (CSQ) 
For this experiment, a 4 (Group Type; Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) X 
2 (Cultural orientation; Emotion Regulation, Status Differentiation, design was 
accomplished.  (The surveys for the two orientations of mastery and 
individualism/collectivism were collected but are not part of the statistical analysis.) 
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Study One Part A was designed to identify the cultural orientation of a 
participant. Understanding each service’s cultural orientation may provide insight into 
methods that would lessen the potential negative effects of differences and develop more 
effective team processes. 
Each participant’s cultural orientation is examined by a separate survey for 
each of the four orientations.  The Collectivism/Individualism scale consists of nineteen 
items measured on a seven-point Likert scale anchored from 0 (Very Appropriate) 
through 6 (Not at all Appropriate).  The Status Differentiation scale consists of fifteen 
items measured on a seven-point Likert scale from 0 (Not at all Important) to 6 (Very 
Important).  The Emotion Regulation scale is a fourteen-item inventory measured on a 
seven-point Likert scale anchored from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  The 
Mastery scale consists of twenty-one items adopted from the Schwartz Values Inventory.  
The items are measured on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 
(Strongly Agree). 
2. Part B – Personality Domain Evaluation  
a. Hypothesis 
H0 =     No difference for Extraversion, Neuroticism or Openness to               
              Experience between the individual services.  
H1 =     At least one service is different in Extraversion.  
H2 =     At least one service is different in Neuroticism. 
H3 =     At least one service is different in Openness to Experience. 
b. Instrument - NEO-FFI  
For this experiment, a 4 (Group Type: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) X 
3 (Personality domain: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience) design was 
accomplished.  (The surveys for agreeableness and conscientiousness were collected but 
are not part of the statistical analysis.) 
Each domain of the inventory consists of twelve questions totaling sixty 
items rated on a five-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (Strongly Disagree) through 5 
(Strongly Agree).  Scoring the NEO FFI requires summing the responses and transferring 
the total to a scale provided.  The scale indicates a normed T-score from 25 to 75 for each 
respondent.  Additionally, each score is placed in one of five categories ranging from 
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very low to very high. (Scores for any respondent who left ten or more questions blank, 
failed to answer fewer than six domain-specific questions, or answered with only neutral 
responses, were not calculated.) 
At the end of the NEO FFI are three questions that are used to check for 
validity.  Scores for any respondent who did not answer the three questions are not 
calculated.   
3. Part C– Personality Stereotype Evaluation 
a. Hypothesis 
H0   =     No difference between the service perception for Extraversion, 
    Neuroticism and Openness to Experience. 
H1   =     At least one service is perceived differently in Extraversion.  
  H2  =     At least one service is perceived differently in Neuroticism. 
  H3    =     At least one service is perceived differently in Openness to  
   Experience   
b. Instrument – NEO FFI 
For this experiment, a 4 (Current Service: Air force, Army, Marines, 
Navy) X 4 (Rated Service: Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy) x 3 (Personality domain; 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to experience) design was accomplished.  (The 
surveys for agreeableness and conscientiousness were collected but are not part of the 
statistical analysis.) 
Part C uses the NEO FFI to measure a participant’s potential stereotype 
against another service.  The respondents were asked to rate each item for the NEO FFI 
as they believed a member of another service would respond to that item.  The data 
collection for Part C was synonymous with Part B.  Differences between group responses 
may indicate a potential stereotype.  The same evaluation for Part B pertains to this part. 
4. Combined Survey Methodology 
a. Participants 
Two hundred thirty-five military personnel participated in the online 
version of the survey constructed for Study One.  Table 2 provides the participant 




Table 2.   Online Survey Participants 
 
Data Collection Method Current service On Line  
Male 8 










As described above, the instrument was a combined Cultural Styles 
Questionnaire and the NEO FFI personality inventory.   
c. Procedures 
Prior to completing the online survey, participants were provided a log-in 
password to a secure website.  After providing informed consent by initialing a block 
after the informed consent document, each respondent answered a series of demographics 
questions.  Prior to presentation of each survey, an instruction screen was presented to 
clarify how to complete that survey.  This method was administered for each survey until 
completion of the entire combined survey.    
After completing the section on the four surveys for cultural orientation, 
three questions were asked.  Question one asked each participant to indicate, from a list 
of positive and negative words, which words accurately portrayed each service’s 
attributes.  Respondents were not required to provide a response for each service for each 
word, but only whether that word was an attribute of a specific service.  This was 
followed by question two, a fill-in-the-blank allowing the respondents to list any 
attributes not listed in the previous question but that the participant felt was an accurate 
attribute of a service.  Question three asked each participant to indicate on a scale from 
“strongly adverse” to “very willing” a participant’s desire to work on a team with each 
service.  (Appendix C provides the framework for these questions.) The prompt questions 
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were followed by the five personality surveys.  After completing the five surveys for 
personality, two additional questions were asked of each participant.  
Question one asked: “If you could influence or recommend one change to 
improve joint team effectiveness, what would you recommend?”  Participants typed their 
response in the block provided. This question was followed by a second prompt: “Use 
this block for any additional comments. Also, you can use this section to revise an answer 
or add to an answer since you are unable to go back in the survey to do so.” 
After completing the survey, each participant was presented with a screen 
providing a debriefing form, with instructions on ways to receive information about the 
survey and study results, and how to contact the researchers.   
B.  STUDY TWO 
The purpose of the team exercise was to collect data on the interactions between 
team members during a course of action analysis in a wargame experiment.  There is no 
previous experiment to provide reliability or validity measures for this experiment.  The 
design of this experiment was a 4 (Service: Air Force, Army, Marine, Navy) x 4 (Seat 
position: Seat one, Seat two, Seat three, Seat four) x 2 (Group composition: 
Homogeneous, Heterogeneous) x 2 (Group type: Control, Experimental) design where 
four-person teams were alternately assigned to the control or the experimental condition.  
The dependent variable was the percentage of total facts shared. The individual 
participant analysis dependent variables were the percentage of facts shared by seat 
position.   
The development of the thirty-two facts used for this experiment occurred in 
February 2006.  A five-member panel discussed and developed the thirty-two facts for 
the wargame experiment using the Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (Joint Publication 2-01.3) and the Joint 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) checklist.  The panel consisted of the 
primary researcher (command sergeant major–retired), an Army lieutenant colonel, a 
Marine major, a Navy lieutenant commander, and a retired Air Force first sergeant.   The 
primary researcher did the initial evaluation of a potential fact list and presented the list 
to members of the panel.  (Note ― except for the Army CSM and the Army LTC, each of 
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the panel members was located at different installations.  Communication was face to 
face with the primary researcher but the panel was never co-located for discussions.) 
After discussion, each member separately rated the developed composite fact list by order 
of importance. The initial list was reduced to thirty-two facts based on the order of merit 
list and inter-rater reliability results.  Further refinement of the list included the 
descriptions to be used for each fact and which facts would be grouped together for each 
participant.   Possible courses of action (COA) were discussed and a list of the six most 
likely COA’s was developed.  Eight pilot wargames resulted in only minor changes to the 
documentation needed and none of the facts were changed.  The hypotheses investigated 
for Study Two are grouped by composite team results and by individual participant.  
1. Hypothesis - Composite Team Analysis (Twenty-six teams) 
The composite team consisted of the twenty-six teams from the wargame data 
collection.  Recall, we hypothesize that homogeneous teams will outperform 
heterogeneous teams due to cultural and personality differences.  Heterogeneous teams 
will demonstrate improved performance when cued to this fact.  Additionally, linguistic 
analysis will be sensitive to differences in team type.   The primary hypotheses evaluated 
were: 
a. Team Type – Control Condition 
H0   =     No difference for performance between team types  
H1   =     Teams in the homogeneous control condition will outperform 
the  teams in the heterogeneous control condition. 
b. Team Type – Experimental Condition 
H0  =     Difference for performance between homogeneous control and 
the  heterogeneous experimental teams will be evident. 
H1   =     No differences between the homogeneous control and the  
    heterogeneous experimental teams.  
c. Team Type - Linguistic Analysis 
H0  =    No difference for language usage between team types  
H1  =    The LIWC will be sensitive to differences between team types 




2. Hypothesis – Team Analysis by Individual Participant 
The individual participant analysis allowed for the evaluation of the cultural and 
personality factors in the analysis by service.  The 104 participants were grouped by 
service to evaluate the above hypothesis for within group differences and between group 
differences.  Recall from Study One that the cultural orientation for Emotion Regulation 
and Extraversion was significantly different between the services.  Further, indications of 
stereotype were present between the services.   We hypothesize that these differences will 
be present in the team experimentation. The hypotheses are: 
H0  =    No evidence of cultural or personality differences between the services 
in  the  wargame experiment.  
 H1  =     At least one service is different in emotion regulation.  
 H2  =     At least one service is different in extraversion  
It is evident that a number of complex designs will be explored to determine 
whether the hypotheses are true.  Recall, as in the team composite evaluation, we contend 
that the heterogeneous experimental team will perform as well as the homogeneous 
control team given the cue to cultural and personality effect in the experimental 
condition.  The same analysis as the composite team is undertaken, with the addition of 
examining within and between service differences, to determine further the effect of the 
cue in the experimental condition. The hypothesis for this evaluation is central to our 
research.   
We withhold a list of hypotheses at this time and will provide each hypothesis in 
the results section corresponding with that analysis. 
a. Participants 
Twenty-six four-person teams from across the United States participated 
in the wargame.  The teams were all male. This was not by design.  The different 
commands who provided volunteer participants determined the availability of the 
participants and who would be on what team.  The lack of female participation was not 






Table 3.   Wargame Survey Participants 
 
          Data Collection Method  
Current service Wargame Method 










Additionally, Table 4 below provided the participant breakdown by 



































 Number of 
 Participants by 
Service 
Total 
          AF A M N   
1 4AF TAFB Homogeneous Control HC 4       4  
2 4AF TAFB Homogeneous Experimental HE 4        4 
3 4AF SAFB Homogeneous Control HC 4        4 
4 4A FS Homogeneous Experimental HE   4      4 
5 4A FS Homogeneous Control HC   4      4 
6 4A FS Homogeneous Experimental HE   4      4 
7 4M 29P Homogeneous Control HC     4    4 
8 4M Q Homogeneous Experimental HE     4    4 
9 4M Q Homogeneous Control HC     4    4 
10 4N DLI Homogeneous Experimental HE       4  4 
11 4N DLI Homogeneous Control HC       4  4 
12 4N DLI Homogeneous Experimental HE       4  4 
13 3A1M FS Heterogeneous Control HTC   3 1    4 
14 3M1A FS Heterogeneous Experimental HTE   1 3    4 
15 1AF3A TAFB Heterogeneous Control HTC 1 3      4 
16 3M1A 29P Heterogeneous Experimental HTE   1 3    4 
17 3M1A 29P Heterogeneous Control HTC   1 3    4 
18 3M1A FS Heterogeneous Experimental HTE   1 3    4 
19 3M1N 29P Heterogeneous Control HTC     3 1  4 
20 3M1N 29P Heterogeneous Experimental HTE     3 1  4 
21 2AF2A  SAFB Heterogeneous Control HTC 2 2      4 
22 2AF2A SAFB Heterogeneous Experimental HTE 2 2      4 
23 2A2M FS Heterogeneous Control HTC   2 2    4 
24 2A2M FS Heterogeneous Experimental HTE   2 2    4 
25 2A2N DLI Heterogeneous Control HTC   2   2  4 
26 2AF1M1N TAFB Heterogeneous Experimental HTE 2   1 1  4 
       Totals  19 32 36 17 104 
Note. AF – Air Force; A – Army; M – Marines; N - Navy 
          TAFB – Tinker Air Force Base, OK; SAFB – Sheppard Air Force Base, TX; FS – Fort Sill, OK;  
          29P – Twenty-nine Palms, CA; Q – Quantico, VI; DLI – Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA          
 
 
The team structures were homogeneous (all one service) or heterogeneous  
(a mixture of services).  Each group was divided by condition (control, experimental).  
The condition determination was an alternating selection method. (Team one was in the 
control condition, team two the experimental, team three the control.) 
b. Materials/Apparatus 
Four half-inch gray binders 
Scenario for control and experimental conditions 
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Seat information composed of eight specific facts relevant to the wargame  
   (different for each seat position)  
Three photos of Pratas Island 
Sample Military Decision Matrix 
One Blank Decision Matrix 
Risk Analysis Matrix 
Three sheets of blank paper 
Sony voice-activated recording device with Maxell MC-60UR tapes 
1:600,000 map sheet of South China Sea 
Enlarged photo of Pratas Island 
Pens, pencils and grease pencils (red, green, black and blue) 
c. Procedures 
Prior to the wargame, each participant completed the revised cultural and 
personality survey.  Recall, no data was collected on potential stereotype in this 
experiment as a time-saving measure.  Team experimentation took place based on 
participant time schedules and availability.  The researcher accommodated each team and 
service based on prior coordination with the units providing participants for the wargame. 
Several pilot experiments attempted to have the participants complete the online version 
of the survey.  It was determined that this was ineffective and the actual team 
experiments required participants to complete the survey in the presence of the researcher 
prior to the wargame. 
The team composition for the wargame was four participants who were 
members of active duty military units representing all services.  Participants arrived at a 
predetermined location based on the sponsoring military unit’s mission and space 
availability.  The set up for the wargame was identical across all locations.  Each location 
had an adequate space with a long table (more than nine feet in length) and four identical 
chairs.  All locations were well lit, environmentally comfortable, and situated in a manner 
that eliminated interruption by visitors.  Signs were posted outside entrances that 
indicated experimentation was ongoing and requesting not to be disturbed or interrupted.   
Prior to participant arrival, four gray half-inch binders were prepared, one 
for each participant. These binders were placed in the middle of the table between the 
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four seat positions and stacked one on top of the other.  Prior to placement, they were 
shuffled so that the researcher was not aware of which binder represented which seat 
position.  The following information was standard for each binder. 
1.  Scenario 
2. Seat Information composed of eight specific facts relevant to the 
wargame (different for each seat position)  
3.  Three photos of Pratas Island 
4.  Sample Military Decision Matrix 
5.  One Blank Decision Matrix 
6.  Risk Analysis Matrix 
7.  Three sheets of blank paper (The exact information on each document 
is located in appendix G.) 
Adjacent to the four seat positions was a 1:600,000 map sheet for the 
Taiwan Strait, South China Sea area.  An overlay, depicting the current operation, was 
taped over the map sheet.  Next to the map was a photograph of Pratas Island with an 
overlay of the occupation force’s deployment on the island.  All items were placed 
upside-down so that the back (white) side of each sheet was the only portion visible when 
the participants arrived.  A Sony Clear Voice Plus recorder was positioned behind the 
seat positions wherever electrical outlets were available. The taping device used Maxell 
Micro cassette tapes (MC-60UR) to record the communications between participants.  
Additionally, a white sixty-minute food timer was positioned next to the map along with 
an assortment of pencils, pens, and wax pencils. 
Upon arrival at the experiment location, participants were briefed by the 
researcher and instructed to take a seat at any of the four possible locations.  Participants 
randomly selected a seat.  Informed consent and demographic documents were handed 
out and read to the participants prior to their filling out those documents.  Once 
completed, the researcher took up the documents, reviewed the informed consent for 
completeness, and proceeded with the experiment.  Figure 11 provides an example of the 




Figure 11.   Example of room setup prior to participant arrival. 
 
All participants were instructed to take one binder and open it.  The binder 
for seat one was always designated as the leader.  Selection of the leader for the team 
could only be determined after all binders were open and each seat position identified.  
Each binder contained exactly eight different facts based on the seat position.  This was 
not known to the participants and never revealed by the researcher. Figure 12 provides an 







Figure 12.   Room setup after the reading of the wargame scenario. 
 
  Once the binders were open, the scenario was read out loud by the 
researcher.  Each participant had a copy of the scenario in their binder.   The maps were 
turned over at precise points in the scenario reading to reveal their contents to the 
participants.  Each scenario concluded with pointing out the recording device position 
and the opportunity for questions.  The participants in the control condition were only 
cued to the recording device.  Participants in the experimental condition received an 
additional cue concerning the cultural and personality surveys they had completed prior 
to the wargame.   
After all questions were answered, the timer was set for thirty minutes, the 
recorder was turned on, and the participants began their experiment.  During the 
wargame, the researcher did not answer any questions except to say, “Please refer to your 
scenario and continue.” 
During pilot studies, it was determined that once any participant made 
reference to how much time was left to finish, the researcher stopped the experiment.  
The reasoning for this developed when it became apparent the participants stopped 
information sharing and course of action development in order to fill out a Decision 
Matrix.  Their focus changed completely to how to fill out a piece of paper and added no 
value to the experimental variables.  The tape recorder was stopped at this time and 
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participants were asked to complete two documents.  Document One asked each 
participant to rate each of the eight facts for their seat position by importance.  Document 
Two asked each participant to write a short paragraph responding to three questions. 
1.  Please write a short paragraph describing your satisfaction with your 
group’s effectiveness in completing this wargame.  Please list the positive and negative 
experiences during this experiment.  
2.  Do you believe having members from other services would have made 
determining Red Cell course of action decisions easier? Yes or No 
3.  Please explain your answer to question 2. 
After completing the short paragraphs, each participant was handed a 
debriefing page outlining the experimental focus and this document was read to them.  
After answering questions, the researcher emphasized the necessity of not discussing this 
experiment with any other members of their unit.  Each participant was provided with 
information on ways to contact the researcher if they desired the experimental results or 
to discuss the experiment.   
3. Tools for Analysis 
The wargame is evaluated using several methods.  The cultural and personality 
combined survey responses are examined as described for Study One, Parts A and B.  
Performance during the wargame is evaluated at the team and individual level. Team 
performance is based on  the percentage of facts shared.  Individually, each team member 
is evaluated on the percentage of facts shared by the seat position they occupied.  Recall 
that each seat position has eight specific facts to share.  Analyses evaluated seat position, 
team structure, team type, and military service affiliation.  In addition to the performance 
parameters, the taped sessions of the wargame will be evaluated using the Linguistic 
Inquiry Word Count described next.    
a. Linguistic Inquiry Word Count – LIWC   
The communication analysis among participants is an integral part of the 
team exercise.  The tool used to analyze the written and transcribed communication is the 
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC).  A detailed explanation of this tool follows.   
The use of linguistics to analyze communication dates back to the early 
research of the group process.  Lippitt (1940) conducted studies of pronoun usage where 
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the use of "we" more than "I" during discussions among group members showed greater 
group belongingness. Ketchum (1965) used the same pronoun distinction to show the rise 
and fall of prisoner solidarity and morale of British soldiers in a German prisoner of war 
camp during the First World War.  Little research on pronoun usage, as a measure of 
belongingness group members feel, has occurred since.  The adaptation of using 
linguistic analysis to measure team communication offers the research community an 
opportunity to measure this construct and team effectiveness objectively, based on the 
work conducted by Pennebaker (2000).  
The relationship between verbal interactions of members on a team and 
communication is not widely researched.   Early researchers utilized word usage by 
participants to study team constructs such as cohesion, but this research never evolved.  
The studies by Pennebaker (1993) and Francis (1993) offer the re-examination of this 
concept of word usage and team communication by utilizing their Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC).  This instrument was developed during their exploratory research 
studying language and disclosure (Pennebaker, Francis & Booth, 2001).  
The LIWC is a text analysis program designed to analyze written text on a 
word-by-word basis (Pennebaker et. al., (2001).  It categorizes words based on eighty-
two word variables, which are divided across five dimensions. (Appendix I lists the 
eighty-two different variables the LIWC examines.)  Text is analyzed then categorized 
into a word category generating a frequency use table.  The development of the LIWC 
evolved over the past eight years to what is now a comprehensive text analysis strategy.  
Pennebaker et al., (2001) research during the development of the LIWC reveals that 
having people write about a significant emotional event does indicate improvement in 
health. 
Pennebaker and Campbell (2001) studied the idea that the words people 
use when they write impact health and emotional stability.   In the past few decades, 
researchers have found that the word an individual uses predicts mental and physical 
health (Pennebaker, 1997; Smyth, 1998). Pennebaker and Campbell (2001) examined the 
effect that writing about emotional experiences over a three- or four-day period had on 
the general health of the participants during a subsequent six-month study.     
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Specifically, the experiment involved three groups.  The first group was 
composed of first-year college students from a Midwestern community.  The second 
group was composed of upper-level college students from the same community, and the 
last group consisted of psychiatric inmates from a maximum-security institution in the 
Midwest.  All participants were divided into a control group and the experimental group. 
The control groups were told to write about a superficial topic for a three-day period.  
The experimental group was told to write about a traumatic period. The first-year student 
participants and the inmates were instructed to write fifteen to twenty minutes per day for 
three days, and the upper-level students to write for four days for ten to fifteen minutes.  
Data was collected on the number of hospital visits or infirmary visits the participants had 
made two months prior to the writing assignment and four months after the writing 
assignment was completed.  The results indicated that participants in the experimental 
condition had improved health and fewer visits to the doctor than the participants in the 
control condition.  These results were important, but the researchers wanted to explore 
whether the words written by all the participants could be predictors of health. 
Pennebaker and Francis (2001) examined the writing of the participants 
using the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) which is designed to see if the important 
words people use indicate any significance between health and the different writings of 
the participants.  Figure 13 gives an example of the different words the LSA examines. 
 
 Coming to college conjured up these feelings;.  Excitement, anxiety, happiness, 
worry, anticipation, glee, nervousness, sadness, grief, energetic and many others.  
Figure 13.   Example of LSA analysis 
 
They found no connection between the LSA control words and health so 
concluded that what people wrote about made no difference to their health.  They then 
did an analysis of the other words known as particle semantic space or "junk words" 





Coming to college conjured up these feelings.  Excitement, anxiety, happiness, 
worry, anticipation, glee, nervousness, sadness, grief, energetic and many others.  
Figure 14.   Example of LIWC analysis 
 
Although the words gave no indication of the topic being discussed, the 
researchers were surprised to discover these words had a significant relationship to health 
prediction.  For example, the use of pronouns was related to health improvements.  
Specifically, Pennebaker and Campbell (2001) concluded that it was not important what 
participants in the study talked about, but rather how they talked that mattered.   
The results of the Pennebaker and Campbell study (2001) led Dzindolet 
and Purcell (2001) to examine pronoun usage and performance during a brainstorming 
task.  The experiment involved participants from a southwestern university who 
brainstormed an ecology problem in dyads or four-member groups.  The sessions were 
forty-five minutes long and recorded.  The results indicated that the more groups used 
first person personal pronouns (I, me, my; r = -.76), the less productive they were.  
Positive emotions (r =.53) and positive feelings (r =.59) indicated that the group 
perceived their performance as high, but when performance was analyzed, they had not 
done better at all (r = -.73).  It should be noted that Hofstede (2005) indicated significant 
relationships to pronoun usage and cultural orientation (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). 
Dzindolet and Purcell's (2001) experiment provided the framework to evaluate the 
team communications by seat position and team.  The experimental design of this project 
is to determine if teams composed of homogeneous and heterogeneous military members 
will communicate differently in the control and experimental condition. This will be 
accomplished by examining the communication between group members during task 
performance as analyzed by the LIWC.  The design for evaluating communication is to 
transcribe the communications between team members. The communication files will be 
analyzed by the LIWC and subjected to a MANOVA to determine if the LIWC indicates 






C.   STUDY 3 - NETLOGO 
1. Hypothesis 
H0  =   There are significant differences for performance between the 
wargame and the NetLogo simulation results. 
H1  =         There are no performance differences between the wargame and the 
   replicated wargame results  using the NetLogo model in simulation. 
Our development of the NetLogo model accomplishes two purposes.  First, we 
want to demonstrate that a model populated with data from human experimentation yields 
results that replicate those seen in human experimentation.  Further, we want to 
demonstrate that simulation of a human behavior model can add robustness to results 
where limitations for participants of the human experimentation are evident.    
a. Materials 
NetLogo is a downloadable software package available online from 
Northwestern University. (This model was explained in the literature review section.)  
We coded our model with the assistance of researchers at Northwestern and Mr. Lawton 
Cities, an analyst for Referentia.  Using the wargame as the setup for the model, agents 
were coded four models.  Each model represented one of the environments for each of the 
four team types.  The wargame environment included seat position, eight facts per seat 
position, a common repository for facts shared, a course of action template, a weighting 
system for facts, and a weighting system for sharing based on the cultural and personality 
data M (mean) formulated from Study One and Two for each service.  The decision to 
code a separate model for each team type was made after complications surfaced with 
developing arrays of the different service cultural and personality data sets within 
NetLogo.   
Seat position was coded so that any combination of service members 
totaling four was required.  The homogeneous models output team data for four of the 
thirty-five team types.  The heterogeneous models output data for the remaining thirty-
one team types.   
The facts coding replicated the importance of a fact.  The weighting was 
determined by the scoring sheets each participant completed for their seat position, 
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summed and averaged to determine the weight.  The weight was coded into the model by 
seat position to insure that accuracy of fact to seat position was maintained.   
Sharing of a fact between seat positions was developed to determine when 
a fact would be understood by the other seat positions.  This weighting system, along 
with the individual service means from the cognitive data, was used to degrade the 
information flow between seat positions.  Each model had different cognitive data 
depending on team type.  Facts that were shared and understood by all other seat 
positions, based on the weighting system, were sent to a common decision list.   
As facts were entered into the decision list, coding from a template of 
possible courses of action determined what course of action was selected based on the 
facts in the decision list.  (Note that due to the subjective nature of the course of action 
selection we did not include course of action selection as a performance parameter for 
either the wargame or the models.)   
The last coding for the models focused on insuring that the time steps for 
simulation runs replicated the actual wargame time constraints.  We based a time step on 
the average time participants in the wargame actually engaged in communication.  
For the experimental runs, we used the behavior space capability within 
NetLogo.  The first simulation run consisted of thirty-five trials for each of the four 
models.  The second simulation run consisted of one hundred trials for each team type 
model followed by a third simulation run of one hundred trials.  (Homogeneous 
simulation trials = 400, heterogeneous trials = 3100.)  The first simulation run of thirty-
five trials revealed a coding error for time step which allowed some models to run longer 
than other models.  This was corrected and rerun.  It should be noted that after the 
simulation was rerun, no modifications or recoding of NetLogo occurred.  Analysis from 


































Data collection for the three studies was accomplished from January to July of 
2006. Study One required the administration of several surveys as described in the 
method section. The online survey was available all seven months with 425 participant 
responses.  The data collected from this survey was evaluated for completeness and valid 
responses.  The validity of each survey was based on completeness, recommendation 
validity from the survey developers professional guidelines, and participants’ responses 
across each survey. (We eliminated surveys with only a middle response selection for 
each survey question.)  The final sample size from the online data collection was 235.  
The survey completed by the wargame participants was a revised version from the online 
version.  The survey items investigating stereotype were eliminated.  The remainder of 
the wargame version duplicated the online version.  The sample size for this collection 
method was 104.  All surveys used for evaluation were valid and met the criteria for use 
in the analysis.   Table 5 provides the summary table for the data set used for Study One 
analysis.  
Table 5.   Data Collection Method Demographics 
 
Data Collection Method 
Current service 
On Line Method Wargame Method 
Male 8 19  
Air Force Female 8 0 
Male 65 32  
Army Female 2 0 
Male 123 36  
Marines Female 14 0 
Male 14 17  
Navy Female 1 0 
Totals 235 104 
Our analysis began with determining whether there were gender effects for survey 
completion.  The analysis determined that there was one significant effect for gender by 
service.  Marine gender differences were significant for neuroticism [F (1, 172) = 5.80, p 
= .01].  Since this was the only indication of significance for gender across the five 
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variables of interest and between the four services, we decided to remove gender as an 
independent variable from further analysis.  The remaining data sets will not include the 
gender factor in the summaries.    
The following group of tables provides the summary data for all participants.  
Table 6 provides the rank structure, current military specialty, time in service, and 
additional variables of interest tables.   
Table 6.   Summary Tables for all Participants 
 
Summary Table for Rank Structure 
Current service 
Rank Air Force Army Marines Navy 
0-1 3  (.88%) 39  (11.5%) 93  (27.4%) 7 (2.06%) 
0-2 2  (.59%) 3  (.88%) 19  (5.60%) 2  (.59%) 
0-3 24  (7.08%) 51  (15.04%) 57  (16.81%) 17  (5.01%) 
0-4 6  (1.77%) 2  (.59%) 4  (1.18%) 2  (.59%) 
0-5 0 4  (1.88%) 0 4 
Note. % is calculated as percentage of total respondents. 
Summary Table for Age and Time in Service 
Current service 
 Air Force Army Marines Navy 
Time in Service 8.62 6.60 3.09 9.40 



















Summary Table for Military Specialty 
Current service 
Military 
Specialty Air Force Army Marines Navy 
None listed 24 1 44 5 
Administration 1 0 17 6 
Air Defense 
Artillery 0 1 0 0 
Armor 0 0 1 0 
Field Artillery 0 78 6 0 
Aviation 
Maintenance 4 1 6 4 
Aviation Pilot 6 1 27 6 
Infantry 0 4 56 0 
Maintenance  0 0 5 1 
Chemical 0 10 2 0 
Engineer 0 0 2 0 
Communications 0 2 2 6 
Medical 0 0 1 3 
Intelligence 0 0 3 1 
Security 0 1 1 0 
 
Summary Table for Additional Variables of Interest 
Additional Variables of Interest 
  Air Force Army Marines Navy 
Prior Service 1 40 55 11 
Parent/s member 
of service 5 45 43 5 
Member of a 
Joint team 3 68 19 9 
 
Analysis did not indicate significant main effects for any of the variables listed 
when compared to cultural orientation and personality domain.   As with gender, these 
variables were eliminated from inclusion with the analysis.  
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A comparison between participant responses to the online survey and responses to 
the survey prepared for wargame participants was conducted in order to determine 
whether differences between the two methods of data collection existed.  Table 7 below 
shows the results. 
 







t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  
















































  .571 210.71 .569 .04054 .07106 -.09954 .18063 
 
The analysis did not indicate any significant difference between the two methods 
of data collection.  This being so, the following analysis utilizes the combined data sets 
from both methods of data collection. 
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The results from all threes studies is formidable considering the amount of data 
and the robustness achieved.  For simplicity, a standard pattern of presentation was 
developed to avoid repetition during the transition between variables and studies.  In an 
attempt to limit the written interpretation, only brief comments about the results are 
offered.  The discussion section will elaborate on each analysis.  
A. STUDY ONE 
The purpose of Study One was to evaluate the four different services by cultural 
orientation and personality domains.  The 339 surveys were initially evaluated for 
linearity and normality.  Using the JMP statistical package and the SPSS graphing 
package, the data was investigated for normality by evaluating the histograms for each of 
the five variables of interest (Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, Status 
Differentiation and Emotion Regulation).  The graphs from JMP indicated limited 
support for the normality assumption so additional investigations of the P-P Plots by 
















Table 8.   P-P Plots for the Cultural and Personality Variables 
________________________________________________________________________

















Normal P-P Plot of Status Differentiation
 

















Normal P-P Plot of Emotion Regulation
 

















Normal P-P Plot of Extraversion
 

















Normal P-P Plot of  Neuroticism
 

















Normal P-P Plot of  Openness
 
 
The P-P plots graphs a variables cumulative proportions against another variables  
cumulative proportions to test for similar distributions.  The determination was made that 
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the distributions for all variables are normal.  The Q-Q plots were also evaluated and 
indicated that several outliers were influencing the normality assumption.  The decision 
to keep the outliers in the data set was made after finding little substantial evidence for 
their removal.  The analysis of the data begins with an investigation of cultural 
orientation. 
1. Part A – Cultural Orientation Evaluation 
The analysis began with an evaluation of the summary data for each service.  
Table 9 summarizes the data for status differentiation and emotion regulation.   
Table 9.   Cultural Orientation Summary Data by Service  
 









 Upper  Lower  
Air Force SD 35 1.733 .721 .120 1.977 1.489 
Air Force ER 35 3.331 .271 .045 3.423 3.239 
Army SD 99 1.889 .639 .062 2.013 1.764 
Army ER 99 3.886 .709 .069 4.024 3.748 
Marines SD 173 1.960 .578 .043 4.048 3.877 
Marines ER 173 3.755 .608 .045 3.845 3.665 
Navy SD 32 1.985 .677 .119 2.231 1.743 
Navy ER 32 3.633 .485 .085 3.809 3.458 
Note.  SD – Status Differentiation, ER – Emotion Regulation 
           n = population size, M = sample mean, Sd = standard deviation, se = standard error 
  
The first analysis focused on evaluating whether differences existed between each 
service.  In a 4 (Military Service: Air Force, Army, Marine, Navy) x 2 (Cultural 
Orientation: Status Differentiation, Emotion Regulation) each service was compared to 
determine whether differences existed across any of the cultural variables.  The 
hypotheses evaluated were: 
H0 =   No difference for Status Differentiation or Emotion Regulation 
between  the individual services 
H1 =     At least one service is different in Status Differentiation  
            H2 =     At least one service is different in Emotion Regulation 
The data was initially analyzed using the standard Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA).  To insure that variances were equal, several homogeneity of variances 
comparisons were tested.  The conclusions from that analysis indicated the variance for 
Status Differentiation was equal but not for Emotion Regulation. Additional hypothesis 
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testing, using the Welch ANOVA, provided a more accurate examination of Emotion 
Regulation. The use of the Welch ANOVA test takes into account the differences in 
group variance.  We are more confident that the significant differences found using the 
Welch ANOVA were not caused by chance occurrence.   Table 10 summarizes the 
ANOVA for Status Differentiation and the Welch ANOVA for Emotion Regulation. 
Table 10.   Comparison of M for SD and ER between the Services  
 
One Way ANOVA 
Cultural Variable Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F 
Status  
Differentiation All Services 3 1.53 0.51 1.08 0.35 
 
Welch ANOVA 
Cultural Variable Source DF Number DF Density F Ratio Prob > F 
Emotion regulation All Services 3 1.53 18.34 *.0001 
Note.  PD = Status differentiation UA = Emotion regulation   
* p < .05 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) is not upheld.  There appears to be no difference between any 
of the services for status differentiation.  This was initially a surprising result.  However, 
on reflection, the military environment is founded on subordination to persons of higher 
rank.  This factor may account for the lack of differences and will be further discussed in 
the next chapter. 
The second hypothesis (H2) for emotion regulation is upheld. To determine which 
pairings were different, we examined the Tukey-Kramer (HSD) and the student’s t tables 
for significant differences between the paired services.  These methods indicated that the 
Air Force  was the only service significantly different when compared with each of the 
other services.  Table 11 summarizes the pairing for each service and the levels of 
















Level M DF t Ratio p-Value
Emotion 
Regulation Army 3.92 Air Force 3.33 335 4.29 *<.0001 
Emotion 
Regulation Marines 3.73 Air Force 3.33 335 3.84 *.0001 
Emotion 
Regulation Navy 3.62 Air Force 3.33 335 2.42 *0.016 
Note. * Indicates p < .01 
 
Of the six possible pairings between the services, three pairings indicated 
significant main effects for emotion regulation. As a reminder, the higher the rating for 
emotion regulation, the higher the tolerance for differing opinions and for ambiguity and 
uncertainty (Matsumoto, Yoo, & LeRoux, 2005).  Examining the means for all the 
services supports Hofstede’s (2005) rating of the United States’ low score for uncertainty 
avoidance, which translates by Matsumoto (2003) to higher scores for emotional 
regulation.  The results indicate that high ER is a trait for all services but that the level of 
magnitude is significantly different between the Air Force and the other services.  
Discussion of the implications follows in the next chapter.  The next element that Study 
One examined is personality. 
2. Part B – Personality Domain Evaluation  
The data for personality was evaluated exactly the same as the cultural data.  The 
analysis began with an evaluation of the summary data for each service.  Table 12 












Table 12.   Same Service Comparison for Personality Domains  
 
 
95% M 95% M Service NEO Domain n M Sd se Upper Lower 
Air Force Extraversion 35 45.11 5.72 .95 47.04 43.17 
Air Force Neuroticism 35 55.38 4.15 .69 56.79 53.98 
Air Force Openness 35 45.52 4.25 .70 46.96 44.08 
Army Extraversion 99 52.75 7.36 .72 54.18 51.31 
Army Neuroticism 99 53.81 5.93 .58 54.97 52.66 
Army Openness 99 41.98 4.92 .48 42.93 41.02 
Marines Extraversion 173 57.39 8.49 .63 58.66 56.14 
Marines Neuroticism 173 48.30 7.08 .53 49.35 47.26 
Marines Openness 173 42.38 6.35 .47 43.33 41.44 
Navy Extraversion 32 54.03 7.79 1.37 56.86 51.21 
Navy Neuroticism 32 51.65 5.17 .91 53.52 49.79 
Navy Openness 32 47.43 5.95 1.05 49.58 45.92 
Note.  n = population size, M = sample mean, Sd = standard deviation, se = standard error 
The next analysis focused on evaluating whether differences existed between each 
service.  In a 4 (Military Service: Air Force, Army, Marine, Navy) x 3 (Personality Type: 
Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience) each service was compared to 
determine whether differences existed across any of the personality variables.  The 
hypotheses evaluated were: 
 H0 =     No difference for Extraversion, Neuroticism or Openness to  
   Experience between the individual services.  
            H1 =     At least one service is different in Extraversion.  
            H2 =     At least one service is different in Neuroticism. 
            H3 =     At least one service is different in Openness to Experience. 
Again, unequal variance testing indicated inequality for all populations.  As with 
Emotion Regulation, we evaluated the data with the Welch ANOVA.  The data is 








Table 13.   Comparison of M for Personality Domains  
 
Personality Domain Source DF Number DF Density F Ratio Prob > F 
Extraversion All Services 3 93.057 24.4976 *.0001 
Neuroticism All Services 3 100.75 18.2034 *.0001 
Openness to 
Experience All Services 3 93.606 7.3816 *.0002 
Note.  * p<.05 
 DF = Degrees of Freedom 
 
 The results support the hypothesis that there are differences between the services 
for personality.  The method used to determine the specific service pairing for differences 
is constructed using the same method as for cultural orientation.  The results of only the 
significantly different pairings from this analysis are provided in Table 14. 







Level M DF t Ratio p-Value
Extraversion Marines 56.78 Air Force 45.80 335 7.27 *<.0000 
Extraversion Navy 54.25 Air Force 45.80 335 4.24 *<.0001 
Extraversion Army 53.06 Air Force 45.80 335 4.53 *<.0001 
Extraversion Marines 56.78 Army 53.06 335 3.62 *.0003 
Neuroticism Marines 48.86 Air Force 54.45 335 -4.57 *<.0001 
Neuroticism Marines 48.86 Army 53.49 335 -5.55 *<.0001 
Neuroticism Marines 48.86 Navy 42.40 335 -2.14 *.0329 
Openness to 
Experience Marines 42.49 Air Force 45.02 335 -2.36 *.0335 
Openness to 
Experience Army 42.06 Air Force 45.02 335 -2.60 *.0095 
Openness to 
Experience Navy 46.31 Army 42.06 335 3.61 *.0002 
Openness to 
Experience Navy 46.31 Marines 42.49 335 3.42 *.0003 




Of the different pairings for each service, Table 13 indicates strong support that 
between the services, significant differences in personality across at least one domain are 
evident. An elaboration on these findings follows in the discussion chapter.  However, as 
a reminder, differences in scores are not meant to imply a negative connotation. This 
research focuses on determining whether these differences exist and evaluating that 
potential influence on joint team effectiveness. Recall, the business community 
understands that these types of differences are boundaries to team effectiveness and, if 
understood, can be overcome.  The next analysis examines perception and stereotype 
between the services. 
3. Part C– Personality Stereotype Evaluation 
This portion of the study involved participants scoring the other three services 
using the NEO FFI.  Having determined the differences between the services, the next 
task was to determine whether the services perceived each other the same way that a 
service perceived itself.  The use of the NEO FFI for this purpose is common (McCrae, 
R., 2005).  For this research section, the participants scored the other services while 
completing the survey about themselves.  Note that the n for this study is 235 
participants, all from the online method for data collection. The wargame participants did 
not complete this section of the survey as a time-saving measure.  We felt that 
administering the complete survey to the wargame participants would be too time 
consuming and result in degraded performance during the wargame.  Recall that no 
significant difference between data collection methods was indicated.   
In a 4 (Military Service: Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy) x 4 (Other Service: Air 
Force, Army, Marines, Navy) x 3 (Personality Perception: Extraversion, Neuroticism, 
Openness to Experience) experiment, the following hypotheses were evaluated: 
H0   =  No difference between the service perception for Extraversion, 
Neuroticism and Openness to Experience 
H1   =     At least one service is perceived differently in Extraversion  
 H2    =     At least one service is perceived differently in Neuroticism 




The analysis utilizes the same method as for the previous evaluation for 
Personality.  The Oneway ANOVA table is not presented.  Only three instances were 
noted in the analysis where the homogeneity test did not indicate unequal variance.  All 
three instances were not significant by ANOVA and are not presented.   The Welch 
ANOVA is offered for the remaining analysis.  Table 15 summarizes the results. 
Table 15.   Comparisons of M for Personality Domains as Rated by 
Other Services 
 
Personality Domain Source DF Number DF Density F Ratio Prob > F
Extraversion Air Force 3 39.06 2.39 *.0430 
Extraversion Army 3 44.413 10.8375 *<.0001 
Neuroticism Army 3 46.615 8.3688 *.0001 
Openness to 
Experience
Army 3 44.425 7.8573 *.0003 
Extraversion Marines 3 44.19 33.7183 *.0001 
Neuroticism Marines 3 45.091 30.5479 *.0001 
Openness to 
Experience
Marines 3 47.267 5.6224 *.0022 
Extraversion Navy 3 40.47 3.2267 *.0323 
Neuroticism Navy 3 41.245 2.9723 *.0427 
Note. p < .05 
The next analysis investigates which of the services indicated a difference in 
rating for personality.  Table 16 summarizes the entire data set. The “Rating Service” 
indicates how that service sees the other services and highlights the means that are 













Table 16.   Comparison of Rating between the Services 
 
Rating Service 
Air Force Army Marines Navy Rated Service Personality Domain 







T Score Extra 44.31 NA 47.84 *.02 48.06 *.009 47.80 .07 
T Score Neurotic 54.88 NA 56.18 .44 56.66 .27 54.13 .73 Air Force 
T Score Openness 45.69 NA 46.00 .84 48.03 .12 46.93 .55 
T Score Extra 45.00 *.0002 51.76 NA 49.82 *.0043 48.47 .12 
T Score Neurotic 58.75 *.0009 54.33 NA 56.50 *.01 55.13 .66 Army 
T Score Openness 45.13 *.03 41.93 NA 45.53 *<.0001 46.00 *.009
T Score Extra 45.31 *<.0001 49.15 *<.0001 57.13 NA 51.27 *.006
T Score Neurotic 57.81 *<.0001 54.45 *<.0001 48.37 NA 51.47 .10 Marines 
T Score Openness 45.13 .06 41.88 .57 42.39 NA 46.53 *.007
T Score Extra 45.44 *.01 48.01 .08 49.02 .23 50.93 NA 
T Score Neurotic 57.56 *.02 55.76 .07 55.56 .07 52.80 NA Navy 
T Score Openness 46.38 .52 45.94 .83 46.77 .73 46.27 NA 
Note. Red * p < .05 
 
 Table 16 illustrates that the services do see each other differently than they see 
themselves, which research has determined could indicate a possible stereotype of a 
group.  Examining the means reveals several interesting conclusions worth pointing out 
now.   Notice that the means for neuroticism show that all the services see the other 
services as more neurotic than they do in self-evaluation.  Although not significant across 
all services, the data does indicate a trend worth further exploration.  Recall that 
neuroticism scaled above a T score of 56 indicates an evaluation score of “high” for 
neuroticism.  Additionally, between the services, the Army and the Marines have the 
majority of stereotypical perceptions by the other services with the Air Force having the 
most single service stereotype perceptions compared to the other services.   
Again, we reinforce that these results are not to be seen as negative perceptions of 
another service.   The literature does not connect negativity to these types of results in the 
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least.  The business community identifies that these perceptions may interfere in the 
communication process and team effectiveness.  Business domains simply acknowledge 
that the differences exist and have developed methods to limit their influence without 
demeaning or degrading another’s culture or personality.  Further, business enterprises 
have overcome these potential barriers with simple methodologies thereby improving the 
team communication process.    
Again, the results substantiate the hypothesis that services do not perceive each 
other the way a service perceives itself.  This is an important discovery and will be 
further discussed in the next chapter.   
In summary, support for the first two research questions and the first three 
hypotheses were found.  Profiles of the services can be developed by the use of 
empirically sound instruments and there are differences between the services’ cultures 
and personalities.  Table 17 illustrates the combined results from all three parts of Study 
One.  
Table 17.   Summation of Significant Differences for Cultural and 
Personality 
 
Study One Results 
Part C 
Stereotype 





Air Force Army Marines Navy 
Rating Service SD ER E N O E N O E N O E N O E N O
Air Force  1 1 0 1    1 1 1 1 1  1 1  
Army  0 0 0 0 1      1 1     
Marines  0 0 1 0 1   1 1 1       
Navy  0 0 0 1      1 1  1    
Note. Legend     1– Significant Difference with other service 
             0 – No Difference with other service 
             SD – Status Differentiation, ER – Emotion Regulation 
             E – Extraversion, N – Neuroticism, O- Openness to Experience 
The table illustrates several interesting relationships.  First, the columns with the 
“1” indicate the services that were significantly different and the service to which it is 
different is marked with a “0”.  Part C displays the rated service in the vertical columns 
and the rating service in the horizontal column.  The complexity of the different 
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relationships is discussed in the next chapter.  The fact that there is complexity 
emphasizes the necessity to understand and develop methods to overcome the potential 
impact.  Communications across boundaries between the services, when in a joint 
environment, requires understanding of the relationship to insure that information flow is 
not impeded by potential stereotype or misunderstanding.  A caution is important.  The n 
for this study for the Air Force and Navy is low.  Making conclusions about specific 
relationships lies outside the scope of this dissertation, however, the fact that significance 
was found with such low power requires further investigation on a much larger scale.  
The third research question focuses on the extent that the cultural and personality 
differences influence the military team.  The next study attempts to clarify the potential 
impact of these differences in an actual team information sharing experiment.  The next 
section summarizes the analysis of Study Two. 
B.  STUDY TWO  
This study examined the primary research question: “Can the business model for 
improving team effectiveness be implemented by the military indicating improved joint 
team effectiveness in a wargame?”  The wargame described in Chapter Three was 
conducted  at several military installations from April 2006 through July 2006.  The 
results of that experiment follow.  
1. Part A – Composite Team Evaluation 
The wargame was structured to allow for survey, performance, and linguistic data 
collection.  The initial analysis of the results focuses on the composite teams.  Recall that 
Table 4 provides the demographic of the twenty-six teams that participated in the 
wargame. 
Our primary research questions focus on information sharing and the performance 
indicator for the wargame is the percentage of facts shared. Recall that the facts were 
developed as described in the method section.  Table 18 below presents the inter-rater 
reliability analysis between these five panel members who developed the fact list of the 





Table 18.   Correlations between Raters for Fact List Development 
 
  Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 3 Rater 4 Rater 5 
Rater 1 1     
Rater 2 0.96 1    
Rater 3 0.93 0.90 1   
Rater 4 0.96 0.96 0.89 1  
Rater 5 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.93 1 
 
The results indicated agreement among the developers of the thirty-two facts used 
as the information sharing parameters during the wargame. The scale developed for this 
analysis was to divide the total facts shared by the total facts available (32).  The result 
was the percentage of facts shared.   
The analysis methodology for this study follows the one used for Study One.  The 
data was initially analyzed using the standard Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).  To insure 
that variances were equal, several homogeneity of variances comparisons were tested. 
The analysis for team type across the twenty-six teams follows. 
a. Performance by Team Type 
There are four possible team types for the wargame: homogeneous control 
(HC), homogeneous experimental (HE), heterogeneous control (HTC), and 
heterogeneous experimental (HTE).  In the control condition, teams are not given any 
information about the potential effects of cultural orientation or personality stereotype, 
while the experimental condition is cued to those factors. 
In a 4 (Team Type: HC, HE, HTC, HTE) x 1 (Performance: Percentage of 
Facts shared) experiment the following two sets of  hypotheses were evaluated.   
H0  =     No difference for performance between team types  
H1  =     Teams in the homogeneous control condition will outperform           
the teams in the heterogeneous  control condition. 
Further, we hypothesize that the heterogeneous experimental team’s 
performance will be similar to the HC teams given the cueing in the experimental 
condition. The hypotheses for the experimental condition are: 
H0  =     Difference for performance between homogeneous control 
and the  heterogeneous experimental teams will be evident. 
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H1  =     No differences between the homogeneous control and the  
  heterogeneous experimental teams.   
The results from the ANOVA did not support either hypothesis [F (1,25) = 
1.16, p = .34].  However, individual students’ t analysis did detect a significant difference 
between the HTE (M =  .52, SD = .11) and HTC teams at .05 significance level [(M = .41, 
SD = .10) t (22) = 2.16, p < .04 (one-tailed), d = .11].  This difference between the teams 
in the experimental condition was not hypothesized initially but makes sense.  An 
inferred hypothesis that results from combining the two hypotheses for team type would 
be that the HTE team type would outperform the HTC team type, since our original 
conclusions were that the HC team would outperform the HTC team, but the HTE team’s 
performance would be comparable to the HC team’s.   We conclude that the finding of 
significance between the HTC and the HTE team types strongly supports the research 
question as the only difference in the experimental design was the cueing.  Further, given 
the small n, finding any significance is an important indication that applying the 
businesslike solution to a joint team does improve information sharing among the team 
members.  For clarity, we present the box plots from the analysis. Figure 15 provides the 























Figure 15.   Box plots for Performance by Team Type. 
 
The box plots are a method to illustrate the sample mean and the 95% 
confidence interval.  Evaluating figure 15 reveals a trend in support of the control 
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condition hypothesis for percentage of facts shared.  Examination of the plots indicates 
that despite lacking a significant difference, the HC team does share more facts than the 
HTC team, which we expected. The difference between the HTC and the HTE teams is 
well illustrated by the diagram.  We discuss these results in more detail in the next 
chapter.  The next analysis focuses on the linguistic communication among the team 
members.   
b. Linguistic Evaluation  
This analysis evaluates the transcripts of the dialog of the twenty-six 
teams using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC). Recall the hypothesis for this 
analysis is: 
In a 4 (team type: HC, HE, HTC, HTE) x 1(LIWC), the following 
hypothesis was evaluated. 
H0  =     No difference for language usage between team types  
H1 =     The LIWC will be sensitive to differences between team types 
for  word count, pronoun usage, and social variables. 
 The tapes of the communications were transcribed by two raters, and the 
reliability computed between the transcriptions, based on the LIWC analysis results for 
both raters.  The correlation between the two rates (r = .61) indicated significant 
differences between the raters’ transcriptions.  After discussing the problems that could 
have caused the differences, a determination was made that the tapes had been damaged 
during the delivery between the two raters.  One additional transcription of the best tape 
was still unsatisfactory but improvement in the correlation was evident (r = .68).  Since 
the primary rater was present during the actual team experiment, the decision was made 
to use this rater’s transcription.  This aspect of the experiment is discussed in detail in the 
next chapter.   
The hypotheses for this experiment were: 
H0  =     No difference in word count, pronouns, social processes, or 
relativity between team types  
H1  =     There will be differences in word count, pronouns, social 
processes and relativity between the HC and HTE team types 
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No significant differences for language were noted by ANOVA except for 
the inclusive variable.  Significant difference between two team types was inclusive 
(with, include) was evident [F (1,25) = 4.86, p < .01].  The lack of support across any 
other variables requires the null to be upheld.  There are no significant differences in 
language usage between teams. 
The results of the linguistic analysis were disappointing.  Further 
evaluation of language involved an examination of pairwise correlations between all the 
team performance variables and the LIWC language variables.  This examination 
attempted to determine whether there was any indication that a relationship existed 
between a team’s performance, the team type, and language usage.  The results of this 
analysis were very robust across several factors.  A summary table of the significant 
results is offered in Table 19.  (Note: A complete table of the results of the correlation 
evaluation was 100 pages long.  This table is not included in  appendix B.) 
Table 19.   Correlation Summary Table for Language Usage 
 
Teams Count Variable By Variable Correlation Prob 
HC 6 Word Count Percentage of Facts Shared .81 .04 
HC 6 Total Second Person (You) 
Percentage of Facts 
Shared -0.84 .03 
HE 6 1
st Person Plural 
(We) 
Percentage of Facts 
Shared -0.88 .03 
HE 6 Positive Emotions (happy, good) 
Percentage of Facts 
Shared .88 .01 
HE 6 Inclusive (with, include) 
Percentage of Facts 
Shared .87 .02 
HTC 7 Positive Emotions (happy, good) 
Percentage Facts 
Shared .86 .02 
 
The results indicate that there is some correlation within teams for 
language usage and performance.  One point of interest was the relationship of word 
count for the HC and HTE teams.  The data was further analyzed by multiple 
regressions, using as regressors, the variables indicated by the LIWC as significant (word 
count, you, inclusive, I, we and positive emotions).  Prior to completing the regression, a 
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stepwise regression indicated the removal of the I and we variables.  The final regression 
fit was moderate (R2adj = .76), but the overall relationship was significant [F (1,25) = 
9.94, p < .0001].  One interaction was evident for inclusive between the control and 
experimental condition.  Inclusive language in the control condition had a positive 
relationship to percentage of facts shared, but in the experimental, the opposite was true. 
Inclusive language word usage in the team communications resulted in a smaller 
percentage of facts shared.  One factor the regression indicated was that as word count 
went up, a like increase percentage of facts shared was observed, with the experimental 
condition indicating a higher increase for performance than the control condition.   
The next chapter will elaborate further on these results.  The next part of 
Study Two involved a detailed examination of teams by the individual participants that 
made up the teams.   
2. Part B – Team Participant Evaluation  
Part A of this section was dedicated to strictly evaluating the composite twenty-
six teams.  Part B of this analysis will evaluate the individual members of each team by 
the performance parameter percentage of facts shared.  
The analysis starts with a focus on the survey results for cultural orientation and 
personality by the wargame participants.  Recall that no significant differences were 
observed comparing the online data collection method from the in-person data collection 
method.  Additionally, no significant differences were evident by a re-evaluation of the 
survey for team participants only.  We conclude that further analysis of these results 
would be repetitive and unrevealing.   
Our next analyses will include performance by seat position, by service, by team 
structure, by team condition, linguistic analysis, and a summary of the responses by each 
participant to the following question and prompts. 
1.  Do you believe having members from another service on your team would 
improve or did improve your team’s performance? 
2.  Please write a short paragraph describing your satisfaction with your group’s 
effectiveness in completing this wargame.  Please list your positive and negative 
experiences during this experiment. 
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3.  Please explain your answer to Question One. 
Additionally, the actual cultural and personality factors, by participant, will be 
incorporated into the analysis to determine whether there were any main effects or 
interactions within the teams.  This analysis was not possible for the composite team.  
Normalized means of a team’s culture and personality were inappropriate for a four-
member team.  
The evaluation of performance for this analysis is percentage of facts shared.  
This scale was arrived at by dividing the number of facts shared by a participant with the 
number of facts available (8).  The scale established was 0 (no facts shared) to 1 (all facts 
shared).  The analysis begins with checking this data for normality. 
The test for normality revealed that the data is close to normal and the assumption 
is made that the data set is normal.  Figure 16  provides the histogram and normal 
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Figure 16.   Histogram and Quantile Plots for Individual Performance   Data         
 
The analysis for this Part B is complex.  We could refine the analysis since we 
had individual participant data for this evaluation with an n of 104.  We are eliminating 
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the analysis for team structure, condition, and type, to percentage of facts shared, as it is a 
replication of the analysis for team composition.  The analysis for service is next. 
a. Performance by Service                  
In the 4 (Service: Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines) x 1 (Performance: 
percentage of facts shared), the following hypothesis was examined: 
H0  =     No difference for performance between the services 
H1  =     At least one service is significantly different for performance 
from another service. 
The ANOVA concluded that there were no differences between the four 
services [F (1, 103) = 2.44, p < .06].  However, individual students’ t analyses did detect 
a significant difference between the Marines (M =  .50, SD = .21) and Army at .05 
significance level [(M = .38, SD = .18) t (100) = 2.58, p < .01 (two-tailed), d = .12].  The 



























Figure 17.   Box plots for Performance by Service. 
 
Army participants shared fewer facts.  The box plots illustrate the 
difference between the Army participants and the other service participants.  Further 
analysis reveals the source of the difference.  We now focus our evaluation on whether 
the difference between the services can be refined by seat position. 
b. Performance by Seat Position to Service  
In a 4 (seat position: seat 1, seat 2, seat 3, seat 4) x 4 (service: Air Force, 
Army, Marines, Navy) x 1 (Performance: percentage of facts shared) experiment, each 
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seat position was evaluated to determine whether a service performed differently based 
on the seat position occupied.  The matrix in Figure 18 provides the number of times each 
service occupied each seat. 
 
Participants by Seat Number 
Service by Seat 
Seat 1 Seat 2 Seat 3 Seat 4 
Air Force 5 5 4 5 
Army 6 8 8 10 
Marines 11 9 9 7 
Navy 4 4 5 4 
Figure 18.   Participants’ Seat Position by Service 
 
Recall that seat one was always designated the leader of the team.  The 
hypothesis for this experiment was: 
Within Service Comparison 
H0  =    No difference within a service for performance by seat position 
H1  =   At least one service will differ significantly in performance by 
seat position. 
A test for homogeneity across variance indicated no significant 
differences.  Table 20 provides the ANOVA results from the data analysis. 
Table 20.   Shared Facts by Seat Position for each Service 
 
Seat Position Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F
All Air Force 3 8.976 2.992 1.1348 0.3667 
All Army 3 21.410 7.1368 4.0527 0.0164 
All Marines 3 30.336 10.1121 4.6524 0.0083 
All Navy 3 1.214 .04049 .3618 .7817 
Note.   * p < .05. 
 
Significant differences within services were observed for the Army and 
Marines. Comparing Army participants occupying seat one to Army participants 
occupying seats two, and  three, the occupants of seat one share fewer facts.  The finding 
that the Army participants shared a lower number of facts in the leadership position is 
worth further investigation.  Between the Army participants there is a difference in fact 
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sharing.  The same holds true for the Marines.  Marines occupying seat four shared fewer 
facts when compared with Marines occupying seat one, two or three.   
The next analysis compared whether there were differences between the 
services.  In a 4 (service: Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy) x 4 (seat position: seat 1, seat 
2, seat 3, seat 4) x 1 (Performance: percentage of facts shared) experiment, the following 
hypotheses were examined. 
Between-Service Comparison 
H0  =     No difference between the services for performance based on 
seat position. 
H1  =      At least one service will differ significantly in performance 
between the other services based on seat position. 
Figure 16 also gives the tabulated data for this analysis.  Instead of reading 
across the table, which compares participants within the service, read down, which 
compares participants across the services. Table 21 summarizes the analysis for this 
experiment. 
Table 21.   Shared Facts by Service for each Seat Position 
 
Seat Position Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F
Seat 1 Service by Seat 3 37.3740 12.4580 4.2817 *0.0159 
Seat 2 Service by Seat 3 7.5899 2.5299 1.6103 0.2156 
Seat 3 Service by Seat 3 .26623 .08875 .0497 0.9849 
Seat 4   Service by Seat 3 2.2703 .7567 .4741 0.7034 
Note.   * p < .05.     
 The results indicated significant performance differences for the seat one 
position.  We refined the evaluation for seat one and we determined the evaluation for 
unequal variance was significant so we present the Welch ANOVA results for this seat 





Table 22.   Seat One Evaluation 
 
Service N M Abs (Dif) - LSD p-Value 
Air Force 5 4.6000 .328 *0.0252 
Army 6 1.6666 -2.48 1.000 
Marines 11 4.5450 .695 *0.0084 
Navy  4 4.2500 -0.19 0.0719 
Note.   * p < .05 
 
Again, as with the within-service examination, the Army shared fewer 
facts when seated in the seat one position than the Marines and Air Force participants 
seated in that position.  Examining the team structure, condition, and type did not reveal 
any reason for this result.  The n is very low: normality for this specific evaluation is 
missing, however, non-parametric examination still indicates a significant difference [X2 
(3, N = 104) = 10.54, p = .01].   
Adding to the dilemma, an analysis of the individual fact rating, by 
service, indicates no significant difference in how the service participants in seat one 
ranked the facts.  The Army participants rated the eight facts equal to or higher than the 
other services.  This can be interpreted as meaning the Army participants felt the facts 
were important but failed to share them at the same levels the other three services did.  
The possibility exists that in-service differences may be occurring.  In the conclusion 
chapter, we expound on this possibility as a topic for future work.  We continue the 
analysis examining team type by seat position. 
c. Performance by Seat to Team Type 
The last of the 4 x 4 x 1 designs evaluates the team type by seat.  The 
design for the next two analyses is a 4 (team type: HC, HE, HTC, HTE) x 4 (seat 
position: seat 1, seat 2, seat 3, seat 4) x 1 (Performance: percentage of facts shared).  The 
services are compared by participants within that service.  The tabulated data in Figure 19 
















Seat 1 6 6 7 7 
Seat 2 6 6 7 7 
Seat 3 6 6 7 7 
Seat 4 6 6 7 7 
Figure 19.   Participants  Seat Position by Team type 
 
Evaluating both the designs resulted in no significant difference within the 
services for seat position based on team type or between the services.  The final analysis 
compares the services for team type. 
d. Performance by Service to Team Type  
The design for this analysis is a 4 (service: Air Force, Army, Marines, 
Navy) x 4 (team type: HC, HE, HTC, HTE) x 1 (Performance: percentage of facts 
shared).  The tabulated data in Figure 20 provides the matrix for this evaluation. 
Participants by Service  Team  
Type Air Force Army Marines Navy 
Homogeneous Control (HC) 8 4 8 4 
Homogeneous Experimental (HE) 4 8 4 8 
Heterogeneous Control (HTC) 3 13 9 3 
Heterogeneous Experimental (HTE) 4 7 15 2 
Figure 20.   Participants’ Service by Team Type 
 
We first evaluated difference for team type within each service and 
determined there was a significant difference within each service for performance in the 
Homogeneous Control teams [F (1, 23) = 4.81, p < .01].  Analysis indicated that within 
the service, the Army’s performance for facts sharing was significantly different than the 






























Figure 21.   Box plots for Homogeneous Experimental Team Type by Service. 
 
The box plots illustrate the differences between the services in the 
Homogeneous Experimental condition. This is an unexpected result and will be discussed 
further in the discussion chapter. 
This concludes this portion of the analysis.  Further comparison for team 
types is a repetition of the analysis for the composite team. The results for the participants 
can be further evaluated by correlation.  The following section will provide the results 
from the correlation analysis.   
e. Correlation Analysis 
We began the correlation analysis by examining the following variables: 
time in service, extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, status differentiation, 
emotion regulation, and percentage of facts shared by team type.  Our decision to add 
these variables was due to the added robustness.   The results of this analysis are 











Table 23.   Correlations for Cultural and Personality Variables by 
Team Type 
 
HC (n = 24) 
 TIS Extra T Score Neuro T Score Open T Score SD ER % of Facts shared 
TIS 1.00 -0.36 0.25 0.26 0.10 0.08 -0.36 
Extra T Score  1.00 *-0.66 -0.16 0.02 *0.42 0.01 
Neuro T Score   1.00 0.07 0.10 *-0.46 -0.04 
Open T Score    1.00 0.29 0.16 -0.09 
SD     1.00 0.02 -0.15 
ER      1.00 0.19 
% of Facts 
shared       1.00 
HE (n = 24)
TIS 1.00 0.19 0.05 0.30 0.29 -0.04 0.37 
Extra T Score  1.00 -0.40 0.06 0.29 -0.04 0.05 
Neuro T Score   1.00 0.01 -0.22 0.19 -0.05 
Open T Score    1.00 -0.02 -0.32 0.02 
SD     1.00 -0.11 0.21 
ER      1.00 0.11 
% of Facts 
shared       1.00 
HTC (n = 28) 
TIS 1.00 0.18 -0.17 -0.01 -0.21 0.12 -0.18 
Extra T Score  1.00 *-0.54 -0.15 -0.02 0.23 *-0.40 
Neuro T Score   1.00 *0.44 0.11 -0.33 0.07 
Open T Score    1.00 *0.43 *-0.55 0.23 
SD     1.00 *-0.45 0.06 
ER      1.00 -0.04 
% of Facts 
shared       1.00 
HTE (n = 28) 
TIS 1.00 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.29 0.15 *0.39 
Extra T Score  1.00 -0.36 -0.13 -0.16 0.03 *0.41 
Neuro T Score   1.00 0.08 0.15 -0.17 0.00 
Open T Score    1.00 *0.42 -0.35 -0.27 
SD     1.00 *-0.38 -0.05 
ER      1.00 0.07 
% of Facts 
shared       1.00 
  
As hypothesized, the homogeneous teams had few relationships to the 
cultural and personality factors.  However, in the heterogeneous condition, there are 
several interesting results worth noting now.   
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for the heterogeneous team types 
revealed main effects for extraversion between the heterogeneous control teams [ F (1, 
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26) = 4.93, p = .03] with a correlation of (r = -.39, p <.03) and the heterogeneous 
experimental teams [ F (1, 26) = 5.17, p = .03] with a correlation of  (r = .41, p = .03). 
This is an interesting result.  Notice that in the control condition, extraversion has a 
negative correlation to percentage of facts shared, yet in the experimental condition, the 
opposite is observed. Without the cue for culture and personality, extraversion has a 
negative relationship with information sharing, but with the cue, a positive relationship 
with information sharing is observed.  Further discussion is contained in the next chapter.  
The analysis continues with the linguistic evaluation. 
f. Linguistic Analysis – LIWC 
The communications between the participants was analyzed exactly like 
the team transcription.  The same problems described in that section hold true for this 
analysis. Low inter-rater reliability was determined to be caused by the same problems as 
the team transcription with one additional factor: the rater not present at the team 
exercises had greater difficulty determining who was speaking on the tape than the rater 
present during the wargame.  The decision was made to only use the rater’s transcription 
for the individual analysis without determining the reliability across several raters.  This 
is discussed in detail in the next chapter.  The analysis for the individual transcriptions is 
similar to the team transcriptions. 
In a 4 (team type: HC, HE, HTC, HTE) x 1(LIWC), the following 
hypothesis was evaluated. 
H0  =    No difference for language usage between team types.  
H1  =   The LIWC will be sensitive to differences between team types 
for word count, pronoun usage, and social variables. 
The LIWC data is evaluated in two ways.  First we inspect the data by 








Table 24.   LIWC Correlation Results by Team Type 
 
HC (n = 24) 
 Extra T Score Neuro T Score Open T Score SD ER % of Facts shared 
Extra T Score 1.00      
Neuro T Score -0.66 1.00     
Open T Score -0.16 0.07 1.00    
SD 0.02 0.10 0.29 1.00   
ER 0.42 -0.46 0.16 0.02 1.00  
% of Facts 
shared 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.15 0.19 1.00 
Word Count -0.18 0.07 -0.16 0.06 0.14 0.68 
Pronoun -0.60 0.52 0.08 0.20 -0.40 -0.25 
I -0.33 0.03 0.23 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 
We -0.43 0.55 0.15 0.26 -0.25 -0.15 
Self -0.59 0.47 0.29 0.18 -0.26 -0.20 
You 0.00 0.11 -0.26 0.21 -0.01 -0.43 
Negative 
Emotion 0.09 -0.19 -0.47 -0.05 -0.10 0.22 
Anxiety 0.43 -0.28 -0.51 -0.02 0.21 0.40 
Past -0.22 0.24 -0.58 -0.35 -0.12 -0.03 
Future -0.55 0.47 -0.17 -0.22 -0.20 0.16 
HE (n = 24) 






SD ER % of Facts 
shared
Extra T Score 1.00      
Neuro T Score -0.40 1.00     
Open T Score 0.06 0.01 1.00    
SD 0.29 -0.22 -0.02 1.00   
ER -0.04 0.19 -0.32 -0.11 1.00  
% of Facts 
shared 0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.21 0.11 1.00 
You -0.13 0.12 0.03 -0.42 0.38 -0.36 
Affect -0.41 -0.16 0.16 -0.10 -0.18 0.40 
Positive 
Emotion -0.31 -0.16 0.15 0.02 -0.13 0.44 
Other 
references to 0.13 0.21 0.10 -0.18 0.17 -0.42 
HTC (n = 28) 




Score SD ER 
% of Facts 
shared 
Extra T Score 1.00      
Neuro T Score -0.54 1.00     
Open T Score -0.15 0.44 1.00    
SD -0.02 0.11 0.43 1.00   
ER 0.23 -0.33 -0.55 -0.45 1.00  
% of Facts 
shared -0.40 0.07 0.23 0.06 -0.04 1.00 
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Word Count -0.39 0.38 0.18 -0.19 0.07 0.22 
I 0.22 -0.19 -0.45 -0.16 0.19 -0.27 
Other 0.12 0.06 -0.11 0.23 -0.23 -0.41 
Affect -0.06 0.14 0.35 -0.12 0.12 0.58 
Positive 
Emotion -0.11 0.17 0.31 -0.04 0.02 0.59 
Optimism -0.19 0.26 0.16 -0.02 0.07 0.47 
Communication -0.54 0.00 -0.22 -0.14 0.14 0.14 
Present 0.39 -0.19 -0.22 -0.02 -0.01 -0.53 
HTE (n = 28) 




Score SD ER 
% of Facts 
shared 
Extra T Score 1.00      
Neuro T Score -0.36 1.00     
Open T Score -0.13 0.08 1.00    
SD -0.16 0.15 0.42 1.00   
ER 0.03 -0.17 -0.35 -0.38 1.00  
% of Facts 
shared 0.41 0.00 -0.27 -0.05 0.07 1.00 
Word Count 0.15 -0.05 -0.27 0.13 -0.05 0.54 
I -0.42 0.03 0.43 0.06 -0.15 -0.28 
Other -0.18 0.18 0.13 0.29 -0.13 -0.38 
Negate -0.47 0.40 0.38 0.36 -0.18 -0.27 
Positive 
Emotion 0.25 0.07 -0.48 -0.34 0.31 0.40 
Anxiety -0.22 -0.10 0.02 0.04 0.17 -0.39 




-0.15 0.40 -0.25 0.26 -0.12 -0.09 
Past -0.30 0.09 0.17 0.48 -0.24 -0.25 
Present -0.27 0.61 0.09 0.00 -0.21 -0.21 
Inclusive 0.25 -0.16 -0.14 -0.20 0.57 -0.21 
Exclusive -0.40 -0.08 0.16 -0.01 0.28 -0.29 
Note.  p < .05 
The results of this analysis are discussed in the next chapter. The last 
LIWC analysis is by service.  The results are presented in Table 26. 
In a 4 (service: Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy) x 1 (LIWC), the 
following hypothesis was evaluated. 
H0  =   No difference for language usage between the services  
H1  =   The LIWC will be sensitive to differences between the services 





Table 25.   LIWC Correlation Results by Service 
 
Air Force (n = 19) 
 Extra T Score Neuro T Score Open T Score SD ER % of Facts shared 
Extra T Score 1.00      
Neuro T Score -0.14 1.00     
Open T Score -0.36 -0.16 1.00    
SD 0.17 0.09 0.19 1.00   
ER -0.03 -0.14 0.23 0.27 1.00  
% of Facts shared -0.10 0.04 0.27 0.00 0.11 1.00 
Word Count -0.08 -0.14 0.33 0.11 0.04 0.72 
Pronoun 0.17 0.17 -0.23 0.60 -0.08 -0.17 
Other 0.08 0.48 -0.11 0.36 0.24 -0.15 
Positive 
Feeling 0.24 -0.48 0.04 -0.05 0.16 0.38 
Cognitive 
Processes 0.18 0.25 -0.50 -0.22 -0.17 -0.20 
Social 0.26 0.38 -0.11 0.54 -0.17 -0.11 
Other references to 
people 0.30 0.35 -0.13 0.49 -0.13 0.02 
Past 0.21 0.00 -0.76 -0.26 -0.15 -0.20 
       
Army (n = 32) 




Score SD ER 
% of Facts 
shared 
Extra T Score 1.00      
Neuro T Score -0.26 1.00     
Open T Score -0.12 0.53 1.00    
SD -0.44 0.35 0.30 1.00   
ER 0.06 -0.43 -0.43 -0.59 1.00  
% of Facts shared -0.15 -0.08 -0.25 0.00 0.33 1.00 
Negate 0.41 -0.13 -0.25 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Affect 0.06 -0.28 -0.13 -0.16 0.36 0.31 
Positive 
Emotion 0.13 -0.20 -0.19 -0.25 0.38 0.19 
Anxiety 0.01 -0.28 -0.17 -0.01 0.35 -0.04 
Communication -0.45 0.17 0.17 0.19 -0.06 0.01 
Past -0.42 -0.18 -0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.15 
Present 0.49 -0.27 -0.21 -0.15 -0.15 -0.43 
Inclusive -0.06 0.22 0.02 -0.04 0.36 0.06 
Exclusive 0.38 -0.39 -0.06 -0.24 -0.01 -0.25 
Marine (n = 36) 
 Extra T Score Neuro T Score Open T Score SD ER % of Facts shared 
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Extra T Score 1.00      
Neuro T Score -0.37 1.00     
Open T Score 0.01 0.13 1.00    
SD -0.09 0.21 0.37 1.00   
ER 0.03 -0.09 -0.22 -0.21 1.00  
% of Facts shared 0.19 0.15 -0.25 0.04 0.01 1.00 
Word Count 0.12 0.00 -0.33 0.10 0.07 0.51 
Negate -0.34 0.11 0.10 0.37 -0.12 -0.18 
Assent -0.10 0.26 -0.11 0.05 0.39 0.02 
Affect 0.11 0.16 0.14 -0.03 0.18 0.43 
Positive 
Emotion 0.07 0.30 0.08 0.02 0.17 0.44 
Optimism 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.27 -0.09 0.43 
Negative 
Emotion 0.09 -0.34 0.19 -0.11 0.06 -0.03 
Present -0.28 0.37 0.04 0.25 -0.07 -0.35 
Exclusive -0.37 -0.03 0.10 0.07 0.14 -0.08 
Navy (n = 17) 




Score SD ER 
% of Facts 
shared 
Extra T Score 1.00      
Neuro T Score -0.84 1.00     
Open T Score 0.15 0.05 1.00    
SD 0.25 -0.46 0.19 1.00   
ER 0.24 0.07 -0.10 -0.42 1.00  
% of Facts shared -0.08 -0.10 0.12 0.13 -0.36 1.00 
Word Count -0.44 0.62 -0.15 -0.40 0.30 0.06 
We -0.36 0.58 0.03 -0.52 0.03 -0.02 
Self -0.13 0.41 0.22 -0.35 0.15 -0.17 
You -0.04 0.32 0.03 -0.61 0.69 -0.30 
Affect -0.50 0.39 0.00 -0.34 -0.08 0.40 
Optimism -0.57 0.74 0.11 -0.56 0.29 -0.02 
Cognitive 
Processes
-0.32 0.50 0.01 -0.49 0.33 -0.32 
Other references to 
people
-0.28 0.59 0.11 -0.49 0.23 -0.24 
Note.   p < .05 
This concludes the team analysis.  The correlation analysis for language 
demonstrates that the services do have different linguistic patterns for culture and 
personality.   
Support for the hypothesis for the wargame is observed throughout the 
analysis.  The analysis from Study One revealed the cultural and personality differences 
between the services.  The conclusions from Study Two are that these differences do 
interfere with the sharing of information in a joint heterogeneous team that is not present 
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in service homogeneous teams. Our next study combines the human behavior results with 
computer modeling.  The results from Study Three follow.  
C. STUDY THREE 
Study Three incorporated the data from the first two studies in a behavioral model 
that replicated the wargame.  The data from Study One was used to program the NetLogo 
agents with cultural and personality characteristics.  The data from Study Two was used 
to program the facts list, the weighting assigned to the facts list, and the shared facts list.  
Four models were developed which represented each of the four team types.   
Simulations of the models were executed three times.  The first simulation run 
consisted of thirty-five trials per model (referred to as Run One). The models in the 
homogeneous structure required four iterations each totaling 280 runs (4: possible teams 
combinations) x  ( 2: condition) x (35: number of trials per team combination).  In the 
heterogeneous structure, thirty-one iterations were required, representing the total 
combination of teams.  Each combination was executed in simulation by team type 
resulting in 2170 total trials (31: possible team combinations) x ( 2: condition) x (35 : 
number of trials per team combination).  These initial runs indicated that a time step 
problem existed that was easily corrected by insuring all models were coded with 
identical stop conditions representing a twenty-minute wargame session. 
The next simulation run consisted of 100 trials per team per model (referred to as 
Run Two).  In the homogeneous condition, this resulted in 800 trials and in the 
heterogeneous condition, 6200 trials. The data output was consolidated in an Excel file 
where the results for facts sharing were summed and averaged exactly like the composite 
team data in Study Two.  We examined consistency of output from Run Two by 
executing another simulation run of 100 trials per team (referred to as Run Three).   A 
comparison between the model Runs Two and Three revealed no statistical differences in 
outputs for either of the simulations. The summary statistics for simulation Runs Two and 












Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
HC 4 14.2550 0.63392 12.989 15.521 
HE 4 14.0875 0.63392 12.822 15.353 
HTC 31 12.8258 0.22771 12.371 13.280 






Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
HC 4 14.4975 0.65802 13.184 15.811 
HE 4 13.9550 0.65802 12.641 15.269 
HTC 31 12.8890 0.23637 12.417 13.361 
THE 31 15.4965 0.23637 15.025 15.968 
Comparing the means from the two simulations indicated no significant 
differences between Run Two (M =  .44, SD = .08) and Run Three at .05 significance 
level [(M = .45, SD = .08) t (69) = .22, p = .82 (two-tailed), d = .01].  Concluding that 
there were no differences, we decided that Run Two would be the data utilized for 
comparison to the wargame.  The results of that analysis follow. 
1. NetLogo Comparison to Wargame 
The first analysis was to determine whether the results from the simulation were 
statistically different from the wargame results.  The hypothesis for this analysis was: 
H0  =     Significant differences for performance between the wargame and the 
  NetLogo simulation 
H1  =    No performance differences between the wargame and the replicated   
              wargame using NetLogo. 
The results from the analysis indicated no significant difference between the 
wargame and the simulation across all team types [F (1, 95) = 1.68, p = .19]. It should be 
noted that a test for unequal variance indicated a significant difference, but the Welch 
ANOVA and corresponding 2 sample t- test and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis Rank Sums 
























Figure 22.   Box plots comparing Human to NetLogo Performance results. 
 
 
The next analysis compared homogeneous and heterogeneous teams by human 
and model.  The results have been reported previously for the team condition by human 
data collection method as not significant.  The results for the model data collection 
method were not significant [F (1, 68) = 1.27, p = .26].  Further, the test for unequal 
variance was not significant.  We conclude that the data collection method and results 
between the human wargame and the NetLogo model are similar.   
The next analysis compared the control condition to the experimental condition.  
The results previously reported indicated no significance for condition; however, recall 
we noted that a trend was evident in the wargame data.  The results from the model data 
collection method did indicate significant difference [F (1, 68) = 38.35, p <.01].  We 
anticipated these results.  Recall we hypothesized that teams in the heterogeneous 
experimental condition would perform similarly to the homogeneous control teams.  
Finding significance at this stage of the analysis does not provide enough information to 
make a decision about that hypothesis.  The next analysis focuses on team type. 
The first analysis for team type compares the model output to the human 
experiment.  The results indicated a significant difference in the human data collection 
for the HTE team type (M =  .53, SD = .11) when compared to the model data collection 
for HTE team type at the  .05 significance level [(M = .48, SD = .01) t (36) = -2.27, p = 
.03 (two-tailed), d = .04].  Significance was not indicated in the one tail lower confidence 
level but was very significant at the upper confidence level, which we believe is the 
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factor that resulted in the significant difference between the data collection methods.  
Still, we conclude that the model supports further analysis as we anticipated some level 
of significance in heterogeneous teams.  The next analysis combines the model and 
human data to explore our hypothesis. 
Recall the hypotheses for team type in Study Two were: 
H0  =     No difference for performance between team types  
H1 =    Teams in the Homogeneous control condition will outperform the 
teams in the Heterogeneous control condition.  
H2  =     No differences between the homogeneous control and the   
  heterogeneous experimental teams.    
 
The results indicated significance for team type [ F (1, 95) = 10.64, p <.001].  




















Figure 23.   Box plots of Combining Human and NetLogo Performance by Team Type. 
 
The significant differences occurred as hypothesized. The analysis indicated that 
the homogeneous control team (M =  .44, SD = .03) did outperform the heterogeneous 
control team at the .05 significance level [(M = .40, SD = .05) t (66) = -2.03, p = .04 (two-
tailed), d = .02].  Further, no significant differences were observed between the HC and 
the HTE teams.  This supports the second hypothesis. 
These results strongly support our two research objectives for this study.  First, 
we show the power of the developed model using empirical data from human 
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experimentation to replicate the wargame.  Second, we demonstrate that teams given only 
small cueing, to the cultural and personality business solutions to information sharing in 
heterogeneous teams, do display improved information sharing.  The next chapter 







































The research questions we proposed combined the domains of business science, 
cognitive science, simulation science, computer science, psychological science, and 
military science. This chapter will review the empirical findings and elaborate on the 
significance and applicability of the most important.  The discussion begins with a review 
of the findings from our research. 
A. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
Our research focused on five primary questions.  
1.  Can profiles of the military services indicate differences using the macro-
cognitive factors of cultural orientation and personality as quantitative measures? 
2.  Do the service differences in cultural orientation and personality significantly 
impact team effectiveness during Effects Based Operations? 
3.  Can the business model for improving team effectiveness be applied to the 
military to improve information sharing and thereby affect joint team effectiveness? 
4.  Can computer simulations using agent-based models replicate human behavior 
experimentation results? 
5.  Can the reliability and validity standards of the social and behavioral sciences 
be incorporated into the simulation science Verification, Validation and Accreditation 
(VV&A) standards resulting in a model for Human Behavior Representation (HBR). 
We examined these questions in three specific studies.  For simplicity we will 
review each one separately prior to a discussion of the combined findings. 
1. Study One 
We developed cultural and personality profiles for each service and examined the 
differences between the services.   The dimensions we investigated were emotion 
regulation and status differentiation.   
The services were very similar for status differentiation.  This assessment is 
understandable considering the overall military culture for rank and discipline.  The four 
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services do have a common respect for the rank structure.  However, we believe there is 
cause to elaborate on this point. 
It was interesting to note that during the interviews conducted as part of our 
research, the discussion of rank was common.  It became apparent that the rank structures 
of each service are not well understood at the operational and tactical level of the other 
services.  Each service understands the pay scale terms of ‘E’ grade and ‘O’ grade but 
they do not speak to one another by that terminology.  Each service addresses members 
of their service by  rank and during  most interviews it was evident the other services’ 
rank terminology was not common knowledge across all the services. 
Student and cadre Marines at The Basic School (TBS) in Quantico, Virginia 
believed that more training on inter-service ranks, structures, and traditions was needed to 
improve joint effectiveness.  In responses to the survey question concerning methods to 
improve joint team effectiveness, many responders indicated the same.  An example of 
their responses was: 
A basic understanding of each service’s structure is needed.  We address 
each other in a service according to tradition.  How can another service 
know what our traditions are and how important they are with no training.  
Picking it up during the rare combined training or on the battle field is not 
a good way to get it done.  When someone from another service fails to 
properly address a member of my service, I know my traditions are 
unimportant to him. (Marine,    0-3) 
Failure to properly address members of another service can be translated as a lack 
of respect.  During an interview with a Marine staff sergeant, the interviewer was stopped 
after addressing the staff sergeant as “Sergeant.”  The staff sergeant said he was tired of 
the Army disrespecting him by addressing him by a rank he was not.  He informed the 
interviewer that in the Marine Corps, a staff sergeant was addressed that way.  The 
Marine acknowledged his understanding of Army terminology, but not addressing 
members of the Marine Corps properly was viewed as disrespectful.  Now this can be 
seen as trivial, but consider the consequences in a joint team environment composed of 
all services.  Improperly addressing a member from another service could lead to 
unintentional consequences that could negatively impact team performance.  Despite the 
  
 141
lack of significance observed for status differentiation,  we conclude that this is an 
important factor in team effectiveness.   
Emotion regulation was the cultural dimension where we did find significant 
differences between the services.  The Army, Marines, and Navy reported higher scores 
for this factor than did the Air Force.  It is not the purpose of this research to make 
conclusions concerning the differences for emotion regulation between the services so 
that it can be corrected.  Rather, like the business community, acknowledging that 
cultural orientations are different provides the opportunity to limit any negative effect on 
the team processes, especially information sharing.  
Research by Matsumoto (2005) indicates that communications can be affected 
when members of a team have differing scores for emotion regulation. In fact, his work 
has determined that successful adjustment within a culturally diverse environment is 
related to higher scores for ER.  Our research demonstrated that simple cueing to 
differences had a significant impact on improving heterogeneous team performance.   
We extended our examination to include the dimensions not included in the initial 
evaluation to determine whether either were significant across the service comparisons.  
In conjunction with SD and ER, our research did collect data on 
individualism/collectivism (IC) and for mastery/harmony (MH).  Recall our analysis did 
not evaluate these dimensions of cultural orientation.   
Analysis of these two factors did reveal that significant differences do exist 
between the services for both.  In both cases, the Air Force was again identified as rating 
themselves differently than the other three services.  The results for IC were [ F (1, 338) 
= 12.49, p = .001] and for MH were [ F (1, 338) = 2.69, p = .04]. (Box plots and graphs 
are presented in appendix B.) Additionally, IC results revealed that the Army and 
Marines were significantly different.  On reflection, including the IC factor in our 
research analysis would have been wise.   
We can conclude from the analysis for cultural orientation that the services have 
cultural differences and that these differences can be measured using instruments 
available from the business community.   Differences do not translate to right, wrong, 
good, or bad.  Based on the literature reviewed, the fact that differences exist indicates 
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their presence can influence effective team processes.  Additional research evaluating 
these techniques and their influence on improving joint team effectiveness should be a 
priority.  Next, we examined differences between the services’ personalities.  
Our research examined three of the five personality factors scored by the NEO 
FFI: extraversion, neuroticism and openness to experience.  We did this is two ways.  
First, we analyzed scores from the NEO FFI for differences between the services’ self-
ratings, and second, we examined the potential stereotypical perceptions using scores 
from the services’ perceived rating of another service using the NEO FFI.  The analysis 
of the data supports our hypothesis that differences exist between the services for each of 
the personality domains as well as stereotype perceptions.   
The Marines rated themselves higher in extraversion than the other services.  
McCrae (1989a) states that high extraversion scores indicate a strength in assertiveness 
and interest in innovation.  The strongest effects for extraversion are seen between all the 
services and the Air Force.  The Air Force mean for extraversion is 45.11, an equivalent 
T-score of average, while the Army and Navy rated at the highest end of the average 
category.  The Marines are the only service to score high in extraversion and rank farthest 
from the Air Force in comparison.   
The results also indicate a significant difference for neuroticism between at least 
two of the services. Neuroticism is considered the most pervasive domain of the 
personality scales.  McCrae (1989a) describes neuroticism as a key component in 
successful adaptation to a new environment.  Reviewing the analysis indicated 
significance when we compared the Marines with all other services and the Navy paired 
with the Air Force.  Again, differences are not meant to infer good or bad characteristics.  
The difference points to potential interference to communication and team process, not 
that one service is superior to another. There were two domains for personality our study 
did not evaluate: agreeableness and conscientiousness. 
Analysis of these two factors did reveal significant differences do exist between 
the services for both.  The results for agreeableness were [ F (1, 338) = 9.34, p <.0001] 
and for conscientiousness were [ F (1, 338) = 48.81, p <.0001]. (Box plots and graphs are 
presented in appendix B.)  Agreeableness was most significant comparing the Navy to the 
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other three services.  Paired  t-tests were significant for all three services.  The  Marines 
were significantly different when compared to the other services for conscientiousness.  
Paired t-tests indicted significance for all pairing with the Marines.  Again, a critical flaw 
in our research is not having included the domains in the final analysis of the teams. Our 
efforts to select what were felt would be the critical factors, as determined by the 
Hofstede and McCrae (2005) summaries, was inappropriate.  The final evaluation of the 
data for Study One examines a comparison of the way in which each service perceives 
another service. 
The services do not perceive the other services in the same manner that they 
perceive themselves.  The Air Force differed more in perception than any of the other 
services.  McCrae (2005) claims that these differences in perception, as scored on the 
NEO FFI, can be related to a stereotype that influences effective communications across 
diverse groups.   The extent these perceptions influence team effectiveness is difficult to 
determine.  The literature does point out that stereotyping a group hinders the 
development of trust between team members.  Alberts and Garstka (2004) identified that 
a key component for limiting uncertainty during Network Centric Operations was the 
trust between team members.  Newell and Swan (2000) refer to the trust needed in teams 
that are short-term, complex, and task-oriented as ‘swift trust’ (p. 1294).  According to 
Newell (2000), teams who develop swift trust are able to stay task-oriented and focused 
on the task at hand, rather than on the dynamics of the team.   
 Combining the analysis for culture and personality leads us to conclude that the 
services have differences common to all diverse organizations.  Matsumoto (2005), 
McCrae (2004) and Hofstede (2005) have written extensively on the possible 
consequences of failing to understanding the impact of these differences on team 
processes.  Caution should be taken in attempting to state that these differences are 
absolute traits for any service.  The possibility of confounding variables influencing our 
results and other problems are reviewed next. 
a. Problems 
Gathering data from an online instrument  is problematic.  The most 
obvious flaw of our online research was the length of the questionnaire.  From the outset, 
we accepted the fact that many of the participants would fail to accurately or properly 
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complete the survey.  We felt there was no alternative.  Lacking an existing research 
protocol where the number of items in the questionnaires was reduced, we concluded that 
we would include them all.  As part of the research, we were going to perform a factor 
analysis and make a determination of which items from the questionnaires were the most 
significant.  Future surveys could capitalize on these condensed surveys.  However, when 
we discovered the proprietary characteristics of the surveys, this effort was abandoned.  
We could not ethically complete and report a factor analysis that violated those 
proprietary requirements.  
However, we never intended for that questionnaire to be a final version for 
incorporation into military research or possible follow-on studies to this experiment.  We 
understand fewer items should be used in the development of a more permanent 
instrument. The length of the survey is certainly the primary reason so many of the 
surveys were incomplete or inaccurately completed.  We believe these limitations could 
be overcome if senior government officials intervened with the agencies holding the 
copyrights on the instruments in order to develop a more usable instrument. 
Secondly, self-reports have limitations that affect external validity. 
Controlling the sample populations by determining who would participate was not 
possible.  We relied completely on volunteers from the different military commands who 
agreed to participate.  Additionally, being an online instrument, there was no control as to 
when and where a participant took the survey.  The method we utilized to maximize 
external validity was to follow each of the test instrument guideline’s validity checks.  
The NEO FFI is more advanced in the development of these checks than the CSQ.  
Following these methods, a substantial number of surveys that failed the validity checks 
mentioned above were eliminated.  Interestingly, all of the participants from the in-person 
survey collection method met the validity checks.   The success of our efforts to maintain 
the best possible validity is demonstrated by the lack of significant difference when 
comparing the two data collection methods.  This indicates our success in following the 
best possible means to maintain the standards for reliability and validity during Study 
One.   
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The limited number of participants for the Air Force and the Navy is 
another concern.  There is no reasonable explanation for the lack of participation from 
either of these services.  The discovery that differences exist with such small populations 
for these services is important.  We maintain that despite the small sample of participants, 
there are cultural and personality differences that exist between the services. 
2. Study Two  
The team experiment was the focus for Study Two.  We determined that the 
business model is appropriate in the military environment.  Given that Study One 
supported that differences between the services exist, this study described the impact of 
differences as possible barriers that limit information sharing among heterogeneous 
teams. Further we demonstrated that a simple cueing to the differences resulted in 
statistically different performances between teams in the heterogeneous structure.   
In the composite team evaluation, teams in the heterogeneous control condition 
were outperformed by all other team types.  We had anticipated that significant 
differences would be observed when comparing the heterogeneous control teams and the 
homogeneous control teams.  The results did not support this hypothesis.   
Referring back to figure 14 (p. 125), the box plot does suggest a trend in support 
for the hypothesis that a significant difference for performance does exist when 
comparing the two team types.  There are several possible explanations for a lack of 
significance we had thought would  be evident.  The power of our statistical test was 
limited (power = 0.26, n = 26, α =  .05).  The possible causes for low power value are the 
small sample size for each team type and the low magnitude of the influence for the 
independent variable. These contributed to the limited treatment effects.  The finding that 
a significant difference did exist between the heterogeneous teams for condition is worth 
emphasizing, given these constraints.  Next, we extended the examination of the team 
data to evaluate the individual participants. 
The most interesting finding from the analysis by individual participant was the 
degraded performance by the Army participants when in the leadership position.  The 
analysis did reveal that only six participants occupied seat one (leader position) during 
the wargame and the significant difference occurred only in the homogeneous condition.  
This led us to conclude that possible within-service differences may be the root cause.  
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Cultural and personality differences within the service may impact homogeneous 
team performance as well as the hypothesized between service differences.  At one point 
in the data collection, we considered investigation into this hypothesis using the Army or 
Marines as the subject population.  Comments from several of the interviewees and 
participants in the wargame indicated that service members believe that differences 
within the services should be investigated.  Recall, our analysis for job type, rank, and 
gender did not indicate significant differences for culture or personality.  Still, this is a 
plausible explanation for this unusual occurrence between Army participants.   
Differences were significant for the heterogeneous structure teams. 
Our analysis determined that the teams in the heterogeneous control condition 
were outperformed and were significantly different than those in the heterogeneous 
experimental condition.  Despite the low power values discussed previously, analysis did 
indicate significant levels between the control and experimental conditions.  This strongly 
supports further exploration of the implementation of a business-like model as part of 
improving joint team processes.  The evaluation for cultural and personality effects 
supports this. 
There were no statistically significant findings for cultural orientation influence 
on performance.  Personality influence did reach levels of significance and one 
interaction was observed.   
Extraversion influenced performance and was significantly different between the  
heterogeneous teams.  As  extraversion scores increased, performance decreased for 
participants in the heterogeneous control team type.   The opposite was found for the 
heterogeneous experimental team type.  As extraversion scores increased, performance 
increased.  Although we cannot assert that the cause of this interaction was due to the 
cueing for culture and personality, we can conclude support for the hypothesis for 
applying a business solution to improve joint team effectiveness. Team performance 
improved in heterogeneous teams made aware of cultural and personality differences.  In 
an attempt to extend support for the hypothesis, we examined the communications 
between team members. 
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Recall we hypothesized that teams would communicate differently where there 
was knowledge of the factors that limit effective team process.   First, we evaluated 
communication from the composite teams and did not discover any indication that 
communication by team types was significantly different.  We had hoped that the 
linguistic analysis would have provided more insight.  Only the inclusive language 
variable from the LIWC supported that heterogeneous teams, with knowledge of cultural 
and personality differences, would communicate differently.  Examining the 
communication between the participants was more robust. 
When examining the linguistics for team types by participant, we discovered  that 
the HC and the HTE teams had the strongest correlations by the linguistic variables.  
Both team types were positively correlated for  performance and word count (r = .68, p 
=.0002; r = .59, p = .002 respectfully).  No support was found for the hypothesis that 
difference in team type would be evident by pronoun usage. There was no indication that 
the use of third person personal pronouns is an indication of better team effectiveness.   
Extending the evaluation for within services comparisons revealed that the Air  
Force and Marines had positive correlations for  word count and performance (r = .72, p 
= .0006; r = .51, p = .001 respectfully).  As with the team type evaluation, no support was 
evident for our hypothesis.  Still, we believe further experimentation of communication 
patterns between the services will yield useful information.  The lack of significance 
could be a result of the limitation of this study.    
Problems with our research certainly interfered with the results.  The problems 
from the wargame experiment fell into three categories: small number of teams, 
difficulties controlling for extraneous variables, and low population of participants from 
the Air Force and the Navy.   
a. Problems 
Only twenty-six teams participated in the data collection effort.  
Separating those teams into four categories diminished the sample size for analysis.  The 
design matrix of possible team types is complex.  In the homogeneous structure, there are 
eight combinations of teams possible.  In the heterogeneous structure, there are sixty-two 
combinations of teams possible.  Conducting ten wargame evaluations per team type 
results in a matrix of seven-hundred experiments for the two different conditions just to 
  
 148
achieve a minimum sample size.  Further, since our experiment could be extended to 
evaluate each service by seat position, the resulting matrix exceeds five thousand 
combinations if evaluating each team type ten times.  The time for completing the entire 
matrix would exceed three years, which is impractical.  Coordination for the twenty-six 
teams for our experiment was difficult; coordinating for seven hundred teams would 
require senior joint military cooperation.  Even with cooperation, field condition 
experimentation increases the possibility of extraneous variable influence. 
Extraneous variables are those variables that act on the dependent variable 
and must be controlled by the researcher to limit their influence on the dependent 
variable.  In our research, extraneous variables changed by data collection location and 
military service.  Failure to control these variables limits a researcher’s ability to 
conclude that the effects recorded on the dependent variable were caused by the influence 
from the independent variable.  Unfortunately, several variables were uncontrollable.   
Recall that the leadership position was a random selection.  In the military, 
this would never occur.   Persons senior in rank always assume the position of leader in 
situations where no defined leader is present.  There is no method to measure a 
participant’s reaction to being senior and having a subordinate role during the wargame.  
Also, we limited our investigation to cultural and personality factors, which does not 
account for other macro-cognitive traits such as: intelligence, emotional intelligence, 
mood, age, or decision-making process.  Each of these influences a participant’s 
performance.   
Other extraneous variables that could be controlled in a laboratory, but 
rarely in the field are: climate, lighting, interruptions, participant selection, time, and 
location.  For instance, three of the teams from Ft. Sill required a start time of 0500 so as 
not to conflict with other training requirements.  Two teams from Twenty-nine Palms had 
recently returned from Iraq and were going on leave the evening after participation in the 
experiment.  The participants from Sheppard Air Force Base were volunteers who 
responded to a first sergeant’s request for participants.   Several experiments were 
cancelled due to one participant not arriving at the experiment site.  Each location had 
different lighting, climate control, and set up.  Despite the variety of variables that could 
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have confounded the results, field research is an accepted method for data collection and  
we attempted to minimize the effects in several ways. 
First, the set up for the wargame was consistent for all teams. The 
researcher coordinated with each unit participating for the use of one long table, four 
similar chairs, a location that would limit interruptions, and the ability to control lighting 
and climate.  Most locations were in a conference room that accommodated all of these. 
The pilot studies enabled the researcher to hone the process for reading, question 
answering, and behavior during the experiment.  We discovered that when the population 
for experimentation is the military, going to their unit and working within their 
parameters was met with excellent coordination and cooperation.  However, we note that 
we are a military at war.  Everyone is competing for an airman’s, soldier’s, marine’s or 
sailor’s time.  The lack of sufficient population was not due to a lack of interest by any 
service, but a lack of available personnel. 
The team experiment was a huge undertaking but the results provide 
strong support that business models can be incorporated into the military team process.  
Despite our limited ability to state causal effects and make predictions, we believe our 
research provides a foundation baseline for further research in this area.  Providing the 
field with alternative approaches to successfully defeat an adversary in an asymmetric 
environment requires improving our information sharing between the services, and 
limiting the adversary undenied access to our boundaries to exploit them.   
Finally, the major limitation of our research is the small sample size of 
four-man teams in Study Two.  To overcome this limitation we extended the work to 
include the development of four agent-based models.  The models enabled further 
evaluation of all team designs we were unable to capture by human experimentation. The 
next discussion focuses on the implementation of the model developed for Study Three. 
3. Study Three 
We coded the NetLogo models using the data collected in human 
experimentation.  After coding, we simulated each model 100 times.  The results from the 
simulation were evaluated to explore the problem space left void in the human data 
collection effort.  We were successful in that endeavor.  In fact, the results exceeded our 
expectations.  We had hypothesized two specific results.  First, performance output from 
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the model would not be significantly different from actual human experimentation. 
Second, incorporating the reliability and validity measures from human experimentation, 
into the modeling effort, would add to the model’s verification and validation process. 
We found strong support for the first hypothesis and discovered that our models 
added significantly to the data analysis from Study Two.  In Study Two, we saw a trend 
in the data that indicated homogeneous control teams outperformed the heterogeneous 
control teams.  However, adding the data from the NetLogo output for both teams types 
increased the teams’ matrix and added robustness to the evaluation.  The HC teams did 
significantly outperform the HTC teams.  Further, we determined that HTE teams had 
comparable performance to the HC teams. Our results demonstrate that modeling human 
behavior can add robustness in complex human experimentation.  Despite the simple 
approach to coding, having actual data to code the agents within the model instead of 
notional numbers, provided added meaning to our human experimentation.  However, 
regardless of the robustness of the results, there are problems that future researchers must 
be made aware of. 
a. Problems 
There will be those who will argue that our model was a manipulation 
model where the coder just kept tweaking the model until it did what we wanted it to do.  
This is still a viable argument that will be made until agent modeling techniques advance.  
Also, it is an argument that should be made.  In human experimentation, the purpose of 
strict adherence to standards of reliability and validity force researchers to explain, in 
detail, limitations in experimentation.  These standards are the honest brokers in the 
process.  In model development, verification and validation are still immature as rigorous 
methodologies for insuring strict adherence to prescribed standards.  If you doubt this, 
then explain to the American tax payer the three billion dollar expenditure for  the Joint 
Simulation System (JSIMS) and the colossal failure it was. Most social scientists can 
quickly determine why.  Coders lack a common methodology to follow that is agreed 
upon within the domain and analysts lack tools to accurately replicate a coder’s product.  





used to overcome the possible manipulation concern was the inclusion of human behavior 
reliability and validity standards into the computer science verification and validation 
process.   
Our model only attaches to the VV&A model at the level of the data-
driven model.  We do not see the use of human reliability and validity in a physics-driven 
model at this time.  However, if human behavior data is incorporated into a physics-
driven model, the same standards for that data should be used for input as well as referent 
data. 
Our models used both reliability and validity measures prior to the 
incorporation into the model.  We have discussed those as we examined Studies One and 
Two so we will not reiterate them.  Prior to model development, we were unsure of 
exactly what methodology we would use to code the NetLogo model with this data or to 
weight the model factors.  We delayed coding the model beyond a framework stage until 
the data collection process was complete.  We want to point out that this process 
extended our time schedule for model development, which we had not anticipated prior to 
the data collection.  This is an important point and may provide the simulation 
community an important lesson to be learned when human data collection is a portion of 
the experimental design.   
Further, model selection is an enormous undertaking.  There are a large 
number of model developers using agent-based techniques.  The decision to use a pre-
existing model framework, versus coding a model from scratch, was based on the 
primary researcher’s lack of expertise in coding. These were the two main  problems with 
Study Three: unexpected delay in coding, and lack of expertise to code.  Otherwise we 
are very satisfied with the results. 
We conclude from this study that the military can implement the business 
model to improve joint team performance.  Also, we believe that combat models can and 
should be coded with more accurate human behavior data and steer away from the use of 
notional numbers as representative of a human trait.  Lastly, incorporating the rigors of 
human reliability and validity standards into data-driven models adds to the verification 
and validation process. 
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We have discussed the results of the threes studies, but our research 
extended into several other areas.  Although not included in the data analysis section, we 
report the results from these studies. 
B. DISCUSSION OF OTHER DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS  
During the course of data collection, other methods were employed to evaluate 
the research questions.  We have already indicated that prompt questions from the survey 
and wargame were completed.  Additionally, a behavior analysis utilizing the System for 
the Multiple Level Observation of Groups (SYMLOG) method for naturalistic behavior 
observation, and one additional agent-based simulation using the Pythagoras non-
traditional model were included.  We briefly add a discussion of these efforts to provide 
researchers interested in pursuing this line of research insight into our discoveries during 
data collection and analysis.  We start with the prompt questions and interviews. 
1. Prompt Questions 
The 104 participants in Study Two responded to three prompt questions at the 
completion of the wargame.  Those questions were: 
(1)  Please write a short paragraph describing your satisfaction with your group’s 
effectiveness in completing this wargame.  Please list the positive and negative 
experiences during this experiment.  
(2a)  Do you believe having members from other services would have made 
determining Red Cell course of action decisions easier? Yes or No (Question in the 
homogeneous structure) 
(2b)  Do you believe having members from the other services made a difference 
in determining Red Cell course of action? Yes or No (Question in the heterogeneous 
structure) 
(3)  Please explain your answer to question b. 
The results of examining question one reveal that most participants felt that their 
team’s performance was satisfactory.  Negative comments focused on the lack of 
communication between different members of the team and the resulting frustration from 
poor communication.  We attempted to analyze the transcribed data using the LIWC to 




The most interesting aspect of this analysis was the response to question 2.  Table 
28 provides the responses to that question by service. 
 











Would  members of 
another service help 
Would  members of 
another service help 
Did members of another 
service help 
Did  members of 




No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Air Force 0 8 0 4 0 3 0 4 
Army 0 4 1 7 2 11 1 6 
Marines 6 2 3 1 1 8 5 10 
Navy 0 4 4 4 0 3 1 1 
Totals 6 18 8 16 3 25 7 21 
 
A majority of the respondents indicated that having other members of the services 
present would have contributed or did contribute to the performance of the team.  We had 
intentionally designed the scenario for this purpose.  We wanted the wargame to require a 
multi-service aspect so that all participants could use their expertise equally.  The island 
design focused on the naval aspects and the land movement. Special forces incorporated 
the Army; potential ocean landing and land component focused on the Marines, and the 
air strip and air reconnaissance focused on the Air Force.  We had hypothesized that with 
so many avenues of approach, a single service would have difficulty with developing 
courses of action where lack of experience in another service domain would limit their 
course of action development.  Our failure to develop more robust performance criteria 
for courses of action limited our ability to examine this hypothesis. 
We want to stress at this point that fact-sharing was the final determinate for 
performance, but from the outset we had planned to include a number of courses of action 
developed.  We eliminated that performance factor after the subjective nature of 
evaluating a course of action limited interpretation of the results. 
The diverse nature of the wargame and the need for multi-service representation 
was obvious from the responses to question three.  Most respondents indicated that 
having a member of a service present would have helped or did help in decision making.  
Again, analysis by LIWC was not significant for performance.   
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The last point we want to make for the prompt question evaluation was the 
problem with examining the questions themselves.  When we began our analysis, we 
wanted to incorporate a word analysis dictionary specifically designed for military key 
words.   We failed in our attempt to locate such a dictionary.  It occurred to us that for 
evaluating research such as ours, this type of dictionary would be critical.  There are 
several research projects ongoing that examine text communications between different 
units and we believe that developing a joint key word list for research would be very 
beneficial.  The next analysis discusses the results from the prompt questions contained in 
the written survey. 
2. Survey Prompt Questions 
The survey had two specific areas designated for prompt questions: after the 
cultural surveys and at the end of the personality questions.  The questions examined 
after the cultural section were: 
(1) Indicate, by an x or check mark, which positive and negative characteristics 
you believe accurately portray each service’s attributes. Select as many as you believe are 
appropriate. 
The word list was developed from the sub-categories of the NEO FFI domains for 
personality.  We ask this question to assist in the development of an implicit measuring 
tool for stereotype similar to the one developed by three Harvard professors known as the 
Implicit Association Test (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2004).  Table 28  provides the 
results from that analysis with the items in red indicating results we felt were worth 
















                    Air Force Army Marines Navy 
Number of 
Respondents 
Aloof 71% (98) 23% (32) 19% (27) 32% (44) 139 
Anxious 23% (28) 47% (57) 46% (56) 18% (22) 122 
Calm 47% (79) 15% (25) 41% (70) 39% (66) 169 
Careless 35% (48) 65% (90) 22% (30) 16% (22) 139 
Cautious 51% (88) 53% (91) 33% (56) 39% (67) 172 
Confident 25% (53) 36% (74) 96% (199) 25% (51) 208 
Demanding 11% (22) 31% (65) 97% (203) 13% (27) 209 
Efficient 23% (41) 13% (22) 84% (147) 26% (46) 176 
Enthusiastic 21% (42) 28% (54) 89% (175) 16% (32) 196 
Excitable 24% (37) 39% (61) 66% (103) 16% (25) 157 
Friendly 73% (136) 29% (55) 25% (46) 57% (106) 187 
Imaginative 48% (82) 27% (46) 58% (100) 24% (42) 172 
Impulsive 15% (21) 47% (67) 59% (84) 13% (19) 142 
Optimistic 42% (65) 31% (47) 57% (88) 31% (48) 154 
Suspicious 23% (26) 46% (52) 46% (51) 21% (24) 112 
Thorough 22% (43) 29% (57) 84% (165) 24% (47) 196 
Tolerant 63% (93) 42% (62) 24% (35) 50% (74) 147 
Trusting 32% (45) 32% (44) 63% (87) 29% (41) 139 
Withdrawn 46% (53) 20% (23) 29% (33) 28% (32) 115 
Worrier 48% (51) 47% (50) 21% (22) 30% (32) 107 
 
(2)  If you believe their are other word descriptors that were not listed in question 
1, use this  space to add your own. 
The results from this question will not be revealed as the majority of responses are 
very negative.  We did not anticipate this result.  There were 28 responses and all came 
from the grades of O-1.  We will discuss a possible explanation later in this chapter.   
(3) Please indicate your desire to work as a member of a team composed of 
members from another service. 
This question was the most interesting of all the prompt questions asked.  The 
majority of responses indicated a willing or very willing reply.  This is an encouraging 
result and indicates that cooperation is desired.  Table 29 provides a summary of the 




















Willing Very Willing 
Response 
Total 
Air Force 4% (8) 6% (12) 8% (17) 20% (43) 9% (20) 33% (71) 22% (47) 218 
Army 2% (4) 3% (6) 8% (17) 20% (42) 12% (24) 
34% 
(70) 22% (45) 208 
Marines 0% (1) 0% (1) 2% (4) 7% (14) 0% (1) 24%  (49) 
66% 
(134) 204 
Navy 0% (1) 1% (2) 3% (7) 11% (24) 11% (23) 
44% 
(96) 30% (66) 220 
 
 The last section of the survey asked two additional prompt questions.  We will 
only discuss the question: “If you could influence or recommend one change to improve 
Joint Team Effectiveness, what would you recommend?”  One hundred and thirty 
participants responded to this question and the majority indicated that training was a top 
priority to improve joint team effectiveness.  Several of the responses are included here 
that indicate the emphasis of training. 
Have more interservice training in order to improve communication and 
effectiveness of the armed forces. ( Air Force O-3) 
More opportunities for Joint training and joint exercise environments. I 
think that educating, even at the lower level officer ranks, on how the 
different branches' duties overlap and how they interact would be useful.  I 
also think that limiting comments that generalize about members of the 
other branches would decrease negative stereotypes. (Army O-3) 
Require joint service for every mid-grade officer within the four services.  
Junior officers should be learning their service-specific jobs, and senior 
officers should have already learned the joint arena by the time they reach 
that level.  Mid-grade officers, however, can truly improve themselves as 
warfighters, and in turn benefit their own service, by experiencing and 






I would recommend that all members of the joint team are thoroughly 
vested in the goals and interests of the joint  mission.  Members of the 
team from each service must ensure that their efforts are focused on the 
team effort, not  individual or service-related achievement.  There must be 
one person in charge who is responsible for maintaining  the effectiveness 
of the entire team, regardless of service component. (Marine O-4).  
The comments are supported by the interviews.  The next section discusses the 
results from interviews. 
3. Interviews 
Fifty-Seven individual interviews were conducted over the data collection period.  
Each interview lasted approximately ninety minutes.  All services were represented and 
most interviewees were officers.   Most interviews were taped with the intention of 
conducting a linguistic analysis of each and comparing answers to the interview questions 
across services.  We had hypothesized that the language and answers to the interview 
questions would indicate differences between the services.  Due to the lack of a 
performance or other dependent variable for the analysis, we eliminated the LIWC 
analysis.  After further consideration, we determined the hypothesis was not of value to 
this research and did not report the results.  However, the interviews themselves are very 
revealing and a synopsis of those interviews follows.   
Six questions were asked of each interviewee.  These questions were: 
 1.  Have you worked with members from the other services? 
 2. What are the most difficult aspects of the work environment where the 
team is composed of members from the other services? 
 3.  Were there occasions these differences between team members resulted 
in degraded performance? Improved performance? 
 4.  Was there a common language? 
 5.  What do you believe is the most significant problem to effective 
performance in a team composed of differing organizations? 
 6.  Do you have any comments on how to improve a joint team’s 
performance? 
 We are not going to summarize all the interviews as that would take some time.  
Our focus for this section is to provide support to the recurring suggestion that joint 
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training needs a higher priority.  The interviewees list four main reasons: common 
language, training prior to joint integration for combat, boundaries, and schooling. 
The lack of a common language between the services was addressed during every 
interview.  We concluded that at the strategic level, common language is not as 
fragmented as at the operational or tactical level.  It is at those levels where different 
service-specific terminology causes problems in communication.  Many of the 
interviewees and survey participants indicated that training on service-specific 
terminology occurs only when a joint assignment or training event happens.  It was not 
unusual for someone to tell a story where misunderstanding the language led to 
misinterpretation of orders or intent.  The interviewees who participated in joint combat 
in Iraq explained that this was often the case just prior to engagements. 
 A specific incident where communication problems and lack of training hinder 
battlefield effectiveness occurred when marine and army tank units were integrated for an 
assault.  Coordination for the attack took place at the line of departure (LOD) and had to 
be delayed due to miscommunication and no standardization for attack tactics.  The 
comment made was, “Why didn’t we work stuff like this out at the National Training 
Center (NTC) and Twenty-nine Palms prior to real engagement? It didn’t make sense that 
we lieutenants  and sergeants found out about different methods to attack at the LOD.” At 
the tactical level, this type of comment was common when interviewees had been 
involved in joint operations.  The responses from others at high command did not 
indicate the same level of frustration and often indicated that previous command center 
training had been helpful in integration and coordination.   
Another idea discussed during the interviews centered on boundaries being not 
just lines on a map.  One officer remarked, “The enemy knows where our boundaries are 
and exploits them.  They just look for where the uniforms change and hit us in-between.”  
When we asked about boundaries, there was a common response that they exist, but the 
means to overcome them varied widely.  Several interviewees thought that training would 
be the most effective method. 
The Marines repeatedly referred to The Basic School (TBS) as the place they 
received their tactical proficiency.  It is interesting to see that since the interviews, a 
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scaled down school similar to TBS has started at several Army installations.  The concept 
of schooling across the military, similar to TBS, coincides with the comments we referred 
to on the questionnaire from the junior officers.   Although there is no statistical 
evidence, it seemed that the most belligerent group across the services was at the O-1 
level.   
We started to ask a question about what would cause this and learned that maybe, 
in an attempt to develop esprit de corps at Officer Basic schools, cadre use demeaning 
language and terms when discussing other services.  Several officers indicated that this 
may have a strong influence on young impressionable officers.  There was no method in 
our research to determine the actual impact of cadre negativity toward another service.  
The  perception emerged from the research and indicated that cadre influence on the 
students they are entrusted to train may inadvertently develop into a stereotype. There is 
no other explanation for how a group of young officers, never exposed to other military 
services, could develop such negative impressions of a service not their own.  There are 
examples other than the ones voiced during the interviews. 
At one experimental site, a sign was hung in the cadre administrative area 
indicating that another service was unwelcome in that area.  It read “(Name of Service) 
UNWELCOME.”  Interestingly, cadre from that service were members of the staff and 
students that routinely had to be in that area.  We believe it does not require a detailed 
experiment to determine the negative impression left by that sign on the service it 
referred to.  The idea being pointed out is that training centers need to insure that the 
other services are not used as the adversary in the fight on terror  in an effort to motivate 
the students. 
It is encouraging to report that this was not a factor outside the training base.  As 
reported above, coordination, cooperation, and integration were the topics for officers at 
the unit level.  We suggest that training is a fundamental process for integration into the 
military and provides a setting to limit the possible development of cultural and 
personality differences between the services instead of it being the atmosphere for 





4.  Behavioral Analysis 
We completed a substantial behavioral analysis for every participant in the 
wargame using the System of Multiple Level Observation of Groups (SYMLOG) 
procedure (Forsyth, 1999, p. 34).  Unfortunately, the method we used was from an 
academic online source, which lacked the proper proprietary permissions.  At the time we 
used the SYMLOG technique, we were unaware that a copyright violation had occurred 
at the academic site.  We initiated a request for permission to use the SYMLOG method 
and report the results; however, at this time, we are still waiting on a decision for 
disclosing our results.  We can explain that the analysis was significant across several 
variables contained in the SYMLOG behavior instrument.   We mention this analysis so 
that future researchers understand that behavioral analysis of military teams is practical 
and worth including as a variable in examining the joint team process. 
5. Agent-Based Model – Pythagoras 
Pythagoras is an agent-based model developed by Northrop Grumman for use by 
Project Albert, a former Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory organization.  Pythagoras 
is a Java-based, platform-independent model capable of being run in a super computer or 
batch job environment (Pythagoras 1.10 Manuel, 2006).  Programming a model that will 
simulate the incident in Iraq that we reported in the problem statement (p. 20) is ongoing 
and being refined.   
As we discussed with NetLogo, one of the problems we encountered was our 
failure to adequately allot enough time for model completion prior to the defense date.  
Our efforts are ongoing as we want to examine differing scenarios from the Iraq incident 
to determine if there is a state that would prevent an occurrence such as we described.   
Our purpose for choosing Pythagoras was based on the model’s use of soft 
decision rules.  These rules assign each agent an individual threshold within a fuzzy logic 
space, which includes decision as well as human factor variables.  Pythagoras uses 
changes in color based on these decision rules to represent group or individual behavior.  
This is a complex process to code without violating one of the basic principles we have 




The model is working and we have developed communications across three agent 
types: Army, Marines and Insurgents.  Each agent group is sub-divided into small groups 
representing squads of patrolling agents, command center teams, and insurgent groups.  
The problem space being evaluated  incorporates the data from Studies One and Two into 
the Iraq scenario.  We are exploring the effect of increasing and decreasing the impart of 
cultural differences and stereotype behavior on the ability of the insurgent force to 
maneuver across the boundaries.  Our proposed final coding will be to alter the barriers 
presented by cultural and personality differences to determine the points where insurgents 
do not have free access to the boundaries between military units and the improvement of 
communications across those boundaries.   
C. EXPERIMENTAL TOOLS DEVELOPMENT 
Currently, the development of a more realistic survey is a project being 
undertaken by researchers from the Army and Air Force Research Laboratories.  We 
believe the data we have collected will be a valuable asset to the development of that 
instrument.    
The answers to the survey prompt questions for characteristics of each service is 
being integrated into an implicit stereotype indicator under development at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The instrument is based on the Implicit Association Test (IAT), 
created by Nosek, Greenwald and Schwartz (1998).  The IAT was developed to 
distinguish whether measures of implicit cognition, when compared to self-reports, 
revealed mental associations without individual introspection (Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2005).   
Our tool is a design similar to the IAT but extends the 2 x 2 format of the IAT to a 
2 x 4 format for use by the military. This tool, currently termed Joint Environment Trust 
Indicator (JETI), is a means for the detection of implicit stereotype, which may not be 
revealed in a self-report survey.   
Data from the responses to the prompt questions was used to program the wording 
for JETI. A working copy is being tested to determine the effectiveness of JETI to detect  
potential stereotype between the services.  Our hope is that this method of measurement 
will eliminate the need to fill out a lengthy NEO FFI inventory for stereotype detection.  
JETI takes approximately ten minutes to complete and outputs data in two ways.   
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First, a spreadsheet is created that allows for the analysis of participants’ scores 
and determines whether a potential stereotype exists for a certain service. Second, future 
coding will allow for an immediate evaluation to be printed on the screen of the computer 
a participant is using.  If a potential stereotype is indicated, an embedded training 
program will start, similar to those currently being used in the business community, to 
assist in providing a participate with methods to limit a stereotype from interfering in the 
team process.  The first iteration of JETI will be tested in December 2006. 
Lastly, the wargame we designed is being considered for future use at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Professors are considering implementing the wargame for use in 
the wargaming classes as well as for independent student research of joint teams.  The 
wargame provides an excellent environment to examine decision-making, team process, 
communications, and interoperability. 
This concludes the discussion chapter.  We have limited our discussion to main 
points that are pertinent to answering the research question we purposed.  Our 





VI. CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
Business methodologies are applicable in the military domain for the 
improvement of joint team effectiveness.  These mythologies utilize reliable instruments 
to determine cultural orientation and personality of individual teams members to evaluate 
potential limitations of an effective team process.   Using these instruments, our research 
determined that each military service has a different orientation for culture and different 
personalities.   Builder (1989) suggested the possibility of differences between service 
personalities as potential limitations to the overall effectiveness (p. 3).  The conclusions 
from our three studies add empirical confirmation to Builder’s ideas. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Our research explored a vast problem space.  There are several conclusions we 
can make from the results of all three studies. They are: 
 (1)   The services have differences for cultural orientation and personality 
type.   
 (2)  There are reliable assessment tools available from the business and 
psychological communities that can be used to evaluate culture and personality.  Further, 
training methods are available to assist in limiting the potential negative impact of 
cultural and personality differences on joint team effectiveness.  
 (3)   Implementation of these methodologies positive influences joint team 
performance and information sharing. 
 (4)  Effective modeling of human behavior in a military environment is 
improved using data sets developed from actual human experimentation.  
 (5)  Complex design of human experimentation can be modeled, and in 
simulation, expand the knowledge and understanding of complex experiments. 
 (6)  Incorporating the measures for reliability and validity add to the 





1. Why is This Work Important? 
Our research confirms that the services have different cultural orientations and 
personalities as Builder (1989, p. 3) predicted.  We have maintained that differences are 
not a negative characterization or imply that one service is better than another.  If 
anything, we believe we have made the point that interoperability among the services is a 
mandatory function for success in the asymmetric warfare environment, and that 
improved interoperability will influence the battlespace in two ways.   
First, by limiting the boundaries between the services, an adversary will not easily 
exploit those boundaries.  Second, better interoperability will allow our military to begin 
to exploit the adversary’s boundary and to influence the unlimited ‘will’ of the 
insurgency.  For success, methods must be implemented to properly assess the culture 
and personality of teams formed during asymmetric warfare.  As a first step, we 
investigated the potential boundaries between the services using the business approach.   
2. What Did We Learn? 
Study One evaluated the differences between the services for cultural orientation 
and personality using the Matsumoto Cultural Styles Questionnaire and the 
McCrae/Costa NEO FFI.  We extended the personality evaluation to include examination 
of potential stereotype using the NEO FFI.  We found that the services do have 
significant differences for culture and personality and that stereotypes are indicated.   
(1)   The services have differences for cultural orientation and personality type.   
Conclusion One is supported across three of the four cultural dimensions.  No 
differences were found for status differentiation.  Significant differences were determined 
for emotion regulation, individualism, and mastery.  We further determined that the 
Army, Marines, and Navy were more closely related in scoring than the Air Force was 
for emotion regulation. 
All five of the personality domains indicated significant differences between the 
services.  Extraversion and conscientiousness indicated the greatest separation for scores 
between the services.  The Marines rated themselves more extraverted and higher on 
conscientiousness than the other three services. Neuroticism was determined to be the 
next highest measure of separation, with the Air Force rating themselves more neurotic 
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than the others.  The domain of openness to experience indicated that the Navy and Air 
Force see themselves differently than the Army and Marines.  Agreeableness scores 
showed the Navy rating themselves differently than the other services.  
Results for stereotype revealed that the services rate themselves differently than 
they are rated.  This was especially true for neuroticism. All services rated the other 
services as more neurotic then in the self-ratings.  The Air Force had the highest number 
of significant scores differing from other service’s self-rating.   Explicit evaluation of 
stereotypes is problematic and we propose the development of an implicit measurement 
tool similar to the Implicit Association Test as a method to improve evaluating 
stereotypes.     
(2)  There are assessment tools available from the business and psychological 
communities that can be used to successfully evaluate differences of the individual.  
Further, training methods are available to assist in limiting the potential negative impact 
of these differences on joint team effectiveness.  
Reliable psychometric measurement tools are available in the business 
community.  Our research utilized two instruments available for experimentation such as 
ours.  There are many more available, which indicates the importance that the business 
and psychological domains place on these two cognitive factors.  Time constraints 
limited our ability to implement the training aspect of the instruments we chose.  
Business employees routinely participate in taking surveys for cultural assessments.  
Following the survey, training is made available to limit the impact of cultural differences 
that may interfere with effective team processes.  Our literature review indicated that this 
methodology is an effective means to improve team processes.   
(3)   Implementation of these methodologies positively influence joint team 
performance and information sharing. 
Our research determined that the cueing technique did significantly improve 
performance in the heterogeneous experimental condition.  We conclude from the 
improvement that implementing a business-like model into the military joint team 
environment will significantly improve team information sharing.  This is an inexpensive 
undertaking which may significantly improve heterogeneous team processes within and 
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between the services.  Our reliance on technological advances can be supplemented with 
the methods successfully used in the business community.  We cannot state firmly 
enough our belief that improving these processes will improve information sharing across 
service boundaries and start the development of a less permeable structure for our 
adversaries to exploit.  Further, we can conclude that the examination of these processes 
can be augmented by the modeling and simulation community. 
(4)  Effective modeling of human behavior in a military environment is improved 
using data sets developed from actual human experimentation.  
Coding models with notional human behavior data sets limits interpretation of the 
resulting output.  We demonstrated that programming a model with actual human 
behavior data results in more robust output.  Our models replicated the wargame and the 
results demonstrate the power of coding a model with reliable and valid data.  There were 
two significant findings from our efforts.  First, the experimentation needed to generate 
the data sets for coding is very time consuming and will delay the start of the actual 
coding.  Patience is mandatory.  Second, interpretation of the outputs from simulation are 
more understandable given the input variables are known quantities.   The models we 
developed replicated the human experimentation without any indication of significant 
differences.  Further, our experimental design was very complex and required a large 
population of teams to complete the design matrix.  Our models enabled the evaluation of 
the entire matrix without long term human experimentation.     
(5)  Complex design of human experimentation can be modeled and, in 
simulation, expand the knowledge and understanding of complex experiments. 
The use of actual data effectively extends complex human research designs.  We 
required a large number of teams to participant in our research, which were unavailable 
due to time and mission requirements.  Our models extended the knowledge space for the 
differing team types.  We were not attempting to predict performance but rather examine 
performance across an entire range of possible experimental combinations.  Additionally, 
evaluation of the implementation of the business model for team process was extended.  
We were successful and found that heterogeneous teams do share information more 
  
 167
effectively across all team designs when using the business model.  We discovered that 
the use of these data sets added to model verification and validation. 
(6)  Incorporation of measures for reliability and validity add to the integrity of 
model verification and validation. 
We developed the model based on the wargame experiment.  The verification 
process for the model requires that the model implementation and the associated data 
represent the true environment being examined.  We accomplished both by insuring that 
the data for coding the human behavior was not notional and that the model programming 
was based on the results from the wargame.  Our validation process determined that the 
output results were not statistically different from the actual experimental results.  We 
were able to verify that the data output from the simulations was very similar to the 
human experimental data.   
We believe that this one aspect from the developed models provides researchers 
interested in human behavior representation a means to improve the quality of the coding 
in future models, by use of actual data instead of notional data sets.  We have proposed 
that in data-driven models, the measures for reliability and validity fit very well into the 
verification and validation process from the Defense Modeling and Simulations Office.  
 Executing human experimentation prior to model development required our 
maintaining adherence to the social science requirements, which we have concluded led 
to the successful implementation of the models.  Data-driven models developed for 
simulation of human behavior, or those that will include a simulation of human behavior, 
must begin to move away from the notional data methodology for representing a human 
trait.  Our research is a first step that could lead to the development of a repository of data 
sets available to model developers, which they could use to import into their military 
simulations, resulting in more reliable and valid representations of human behavior.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study was too large for a single dissertation.  We believe that several future 
studies should be organized to demonstrate the implementation of the business model 
within a military joint context. As we have repeated several times, alternative methods 
must be examined to support success in the fight on terror. 
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First, an attempt should be made by DoD to replicate the three studies from our 
research.  Each study should have independent agencies access the military across all 
domains of this research and compare those results.  The belief is that most, if not all of 
the analytical results, will be upheld, but refinement will result. 
Second, follow-on research should include all the dimensions of culture and the 
domains of personality.  The interpretation of our results is limited by our failure to 
examine all the variables from each domain. 
Third, the training centers should take into account the number of respondents 
who suggested joint training and education as a force multiplier.  This would require 
refinement of the Program Of Instructions (POI), which as a former drill sergeant, I am 
aware is never a popular undertaking. Additionally, the cadre responsible for training 
students should be made aware of the potential influence that degrading another service 
may have on student perceptions. 
Fourth, the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office should consider our 
proposed inclusion of social science measures in the verification and validation process.  
It is stated informally, but human behavior cannot be notionally coded and results in data 
output resemblant of actual behavior.  We believe our technique will add robustness to 
the models and simulation  under development  and set a standard similar to those found 
in the social sciences. 
Fifth, the tools being developed to assess cultural orientation and personality 
should be supported across DoD.  The Joint Environment Trust Indicator needs 
refinement and implementation. Our models provide the basic structure for examining 
joint operations.    Research by the Army Research Laboratory and the Air Force 
Research Laboratory is examining the multi-cultural team process.  Their tools under 
development can easily be redesigned for the joint team examination we are proposing. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
One of the unstated contributions of this work centers on the application of the 
methodology developed for experimentation.  We demonstrated the ability to apply a 
logical and systematic process for developing creditable models by combining human 
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behavior research methods, and computer science modeling techniques.  We were able to 
explore, analysis and develop advanced understanding of a complicated problem space.  
Further, we demonstrate that above the tactical, operational and strategic decision making 
levels our method to evaluate a problem space provides added integrity to understanding.  
Our experimentation provides policy makers a framework for more accurate data analysis 
to utilize in their decision making processes.  Additionally, we provide a method to 
improve team processes by using simple survey and cueing techniques currently being 
successfully implemented in the business domain. Improved team processes are critical 
for success in an asymmetric warfare environment. 
The evolving state of asymmetric warfare introduces new complexities across the 
battlespace which limit the effectiveness of problem solving solutions derived by 
mathematically oriented Operation Research (OR) or technology advances for success.  
In a state of war where opponents are matched by will and means, symmetric solutions 
like those proposed by OR and technology, have proven effective to defeat an adversary‘s 
power base and create the atmosphere for peace.  Typically, this peace is welcomed by 
friend and foe alike.  However, in the asymmetric environment, peace sustainment is 
fragile.  Researchers from outside the OR and systems design domains must embrace the 
challenge of developing applications for alternative scientific approaches to sustain the 
fragile balance between war and peace, if success is to be achieved.   
Resources are the keys to success but they are not the only variables needed for 
success.  For several years, the in-fighting between the services for the key resources: 
money, relevance, people, and control was an inconvenience that resembled siblings’ 
struggles.  Today, the lives of the young men and women who serve our country demand 
more from our leadership.  No single service is above another, and a rare opportunity 
presents itself to demonstrate the very principles a democracy tries to demonstrate to 
those living under tyranny: cooperation, equality, and respect for others.  Our research 
indicates that these principles are applicable to joint teams’ effectiveness,  however,  it 
does not approach reducing the barriers between the services.  We do provide a 
fundamental new approach to assist today’s leadership with methods to improve 
cooperation, interoperability, and respect.   
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We understand that resistance to these proposed recommendations will occur.  
Each service has a vested interest in maintaining its service integrity, tradition, and 
relevance.  We do not disagree.  However, if maintaining integrity is solely for the 
purpose of gaining slim quantities of available resources to simply pursue selfish 
agendas, then no progress towards interoperability will be made.  Our adversaries will 
continue to rely on our internal struggles and exploit our differences as easily tomorrow 
as they do today.  History is the only proof needed to verify this fact.  
As a retired command sergeant major, the one question that has continued to 
plague me is how many more soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will lose their lives 
before someone in authority says enough?  Carl Builder (1989) understood this before 
others had the courage, in writing, to even suggest that our differences limit our abilities.  
The idea Builder (1989) expressed was that by better understanding the institutions we 
serve, the better an opportunity for real change is created.  We contend that change can be 
brought about using the techniques already used in other domains.  Our research certainly 
demonstrates that in the joint environment, better interoperability is achievable.  Builder 
concludes his book with an appropriate summation for our work: 
If we can deal with these institutions in the light of their personalities, we 
shall be looking past the masks they have used too long to hide legitimate, 
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To all research study participants: 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Your 
participation will help improve our understanding of human behavior in network-centric operations.  Please 
read the description of the research on the following three pages, and initial and sign where requested.  
 
This is not a test of your skills or abilities.  I want to emphasize that your participation or non-
participation in this study will have no effect on your current or future military status.  Information sharing, 
not the individual participant, is being evaluated.  While there are questions of you pertaining to personality 
and cultural sensitivity/ adaptability, none of this information, nor your participation in this research, will 
be entered into your military record or released to your current command. 
 
Please do not discuss any part of the study with other students or potential participants until the 
study has concluded (around December 2006).  We want all participants to be equally prepared during the 
study, and no one to be "coached" or otherwise prepped beforehand. 
 
During the study, you will answer questions from a personality questionnaire, a cultural survey, 
and a web-based application.  Additionally, some participants will engage in a war-game scenario 
involving information sharing to select one of four possible courses of actions to recommend to a 
commander.  Ask as many questions as you like of the instructors or researchers.  The war-game exercise 
and the exit interview will be video-taped and audio-recorded so there is a release form that we ask you to 
sign so that we may use the recordings.  These standard consent forms are always required in any kind of 
research on people.  I do not believe there is the slightest risk to your health or to your privacy. 
 
Please fill out the enclosed survey.  If you have any questions about the survey, we will answer 
them during the group training session. 
 
Please don't hesitate to ask us any questions you may have at any time during the study.  Thank 





Mr. Steve Burnett 
CSM (R) 






APPENDIX B.   ADDITIONAL BOX PLOTS AND GRAPHS 
Figure 24 provides the box plots for the cultural dimensions: 









































Figure 24.   Box plots for Cultural Orientation Dimensions: Individualism and Mastery. 
















































Figure 25.   Box plots for Personality Domains: Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. 
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APPENDIX C.  ONLINE SURVEY 
1. Purpose 
 
To all research study participants:  
 
You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by researchers 
and students from the Naval Postgraduate School. Your participation will help improve 
our understanding of human behavior in Network-Centric Operations. Please read the 
description of the research on the following pages, and initial where requested.  
 
This is not a test of your skills or abilities. I want to emphasize that your 
participation or non-participation in this study will have no effect on your current or 
future military status. Information sharing, not the individual participant, is being 
evaluated. While there are questions of you pertaining to personality and cultural 
sensitivity/adaptability, none of this information, nor your participation in this research, 
will be entered into your military record or released to your current command. Your 
identity and responses will remain private.  
 
Please do not discuss any part of the study with other students or potential 
participants until the study has concluded (around December 2006). We want all 
participants to be equally prepared during the study, and no one to be "coached" or 
otherwise prepped beforehand. During the study, you will answer questions from a 
personality questionnaire and a cultural survey using a web-based application.   
 
Additionally, there are fill-in-the-blank questions. Please read the standard 
consent forms on the following pages. There is no risk to your health or to your privacy. 
Please do not hesitate to ask any questions you may have. You can email your questions 




Mr. Steve Burnett 
CSM (R) 













2. Informed Consent 
 




You are invited to participate in a study of cultural orientation and personality differences using 
web-based surveys. With information gathered from you and other participants, we hope to discover the 
macro-cognitive influences on information sharing affecting team performance. Please read this form and 
by proceeding you are indicating that you agree to be in the study. If you have any questions, please contact 




Personnel and faculty from the Naval Postgraduate Modeling, Virtual Environments and 
Simulations (MOVES) Institute, the Human System Integration Laboratory (HSIL) and Team Performance 




If you agree to participate in this study, the procedures to complete this survey will be explained as 
you proceed with each section. 
 
4.Risks and Benefits. 
 
This research involves no risk or discomfort other than the slight possibility associated with use of 
a computer. Your participation will contribute to improving the effectiveness of information sharing in a 





No tangible reward will be given. A copy of the results will be available to you at the conclusion 




The records of this study will be kept confidential. Special care will be taken to preserve 
anonymity in all data collection. Written documentation will be identified by participant number only. No 
information which could identify you as a participant will be made accessible to your military unit, your 
supervisors, or to the public. 
 
7.Voluntary Nature of the Study. 
 
If you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice. 
If you desire, a copy of this form will be provided at no cost to you. Simply provide an address for this 
form to be sent to. 
 
8.Points of Contact. 
 
If you have any further questions or comments after the completion of the study, you may contact 
the principal researcher, Rudy Darken, PhD, at (831) 656-7588, DSN: 756-7588, darken@nps.edu or Steve 




9.Statement of Consent. 
 
I have read the above information. If I have questions I understand I can email or call CSM (R) 

















































The following pages contain a series of six surveys totaling 140 questions. You may contact me at 
sburnett@nps.edu or call collect to 831-241-8299. 
 
The first section is a demographics survey followed by a series of surveys. The instructions for each section 
head that page and explain the method to complete that section. Please do not rush. Give your honest opinion for each 
survey item. If you decide to stop taking the survey for any reason, simply exit. Pilot studies indicate that it will take 
between 20 to 40 minutes to complete the entire survey. Thank you again for your participation. 
 
4. Demographics 
Please provide the information requested below. Any item that does not pertain to you can be skipped.   
 
1. What is your current age and at what age did you enter the military or school. 
 
Current Age______ Age When Entered Military______ 
 
2. What military service are you or were you a member of? (Place an X to indicate answer.) 
 
Air Force _____  Army_____ Marine_____ Navy_____ 
 
3. If you have been a member of another service, indicate all that apply. (Place an X to indicate 
answer.) 
 
Air Force _____  Army_____ Marine_____ Navy_____ 
 
4. Were one or both of your parents members of the military while you were growing up? If yes, 
indicate the number of years in the menu item. 
 
  Mother   Father 
Air Force  ______  _______ 
Army  ______  _______ 
Marines  ______  _______ 
Navy  ______  _______ 
Coast Guard ______  _______ 
 
5. Within your branch, what job were you trained for? (Examples: Artillery, Infantry, Aviator,–Fixed-
Wing, Surface Warfare - Communications, etc.) .  Please do not abbreviate your answer with service specific 
acronyms. Spell out your job specialty completely. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. What is your gender? (Place an X to indicate answer.) 
 
Male__________   Female__________ 
 
7. What is/was your rank?____________________ 
 
8. What is or was your total Time in Service (TIS)? 
 
Years (Still Serving)__________  Previous service or Retired TIS__________ 
 
9. If you have been a member of a Joint service team of any type, what other services were 
represented? (Place an X to indicate answer.) 
 









10. If you are an Officer with prior enlisted service, indicate the length of time you were enlisted and 
with what service. 
 
  Years 
Air Force  _____ 
Army  _____ 
Marines  _____ 
Navy  _____ 
 
11.  If you are an officer, how did you receive your commission? 
 
Service Academy  ____  Where___________________________________ 
ROTC   ____  Where___________________________________ 
OCS   ____ 






INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate how IMPORTANT it is for you to do the following when 
interacting with other members of YOUR service.  (Place an X in the column that best indicates your 
answer.) 
 
Matsumoto Individual/Collectivism Inventory 
 
5. 6. Survey Two 
6.  
INSTRUCTIONS: When interacting with members of YOUR service with a HIGHER 
STATUS (rank, social standing, etc), how appropriate do you believe each of the following are? 
 
Matsumoto Status Differentiation Inventory 
 
7. Survey Three 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Using the scale provided, indicate your opinion for each item. 
 
Matsumoto Emotion Regulation Inventory 
 
8. Survey Four 
As with the preceding survey, please indicate your opinion for each item. 
 
Matsumoto Mastery Inventory 
 
9. Fill in the blank 
The next portion of the survey asks you to describe all the military services by providing words 
that indicate positive and negative attributes of each. 
Please think carefully about your experience, what you have heard and what you have read when 












82. Indicate, by an x or check mark, which positive and negative characteristics you believe 




                                   Air Force 
 
     Army Marines Navy 
Aloof     
Anxious     
Calm     
Careless     
Cautious     
Confident     
Demanding     
Efficient     
Enthusiastic     
Excitable     
Friendly     
Imaginative     
Impulsive     
Optimistic     
Suspicious     
Thorough     
Tolerant     
Trusting     
Withdrawn     
Worrier     
 
83. If you believe there are other word descriptors that were not listed in question 82, use 

































Willing Very Willing 
Air Force        
Army        
Marines        
Navy        
 
10. Survey Six 
 
This survey asks you to indicate your belief about the statement. Please answer as you believe the 
typical member of each service would respond. Do not linger on a question if it does not make sense for the 
military. Simply mark “neutral” and move to the next question. Read each statement carefully and indicate 
your opinion. 
 
Neo FFI Inventory   
 
11. Final Survey 
Please complete the last two fill-in-the-blank sections. 
 
144. If you could influence or recommend one change to improve Joint Team Effectiveness, 































145. Use this block for any additional comments. Also you can use this section to revise an 





























You have completed the survey. Your participation will assist in several efforts to 
understand, describe, and improve team effectiveness where teams are composed of members from 
joint, multinational, and inter-agency components. 
Your responses, along with your colleagues’, will help develop profiles of military culture 
and identify potential blockages to information sharing between differing organizations. The 
business community has understood for many years that different cultural orientation and 
personality stereotypes influence marketing and sales in the global economy. The State Department 
and the Department of Defense now realize that the lives of the young men and woman who serve our 
country are more valuable than whether we can sell products more efficiently. 
THIS RESEARCH WILL DIRECTLY INFLUENCE THE LIVES OF THESE YOUNG 
MEN AND WOMEN.  YOUR PARTICIPATION INSURES THAT THE LEADERS AT ALL 
LEVELS WILL HAVE THE SKILLS AND TRAINING NECESSARY TO LEAD THE 
INFORMATION AGE OF WARFARE DEVELOPMENT. 
Lastly, if you would like the results of this research emailed or sent to you at no cost, please 
provide me with your address. As stated in the informed consent, you may contact me at any time if 




Command Sergeant Major (Retired), US Army 
Doctoral Candidate 





APPENDIX D.   INITIAL WARGAME DOCUMENTS  
A.  Consent and Demographics Documents 
Purpose 
 To all research study participants:  
You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by researchers 
and students from the Naval Postgraduate School. Your participation will help improve 
our understanding of human behavior in Network-Centric Operations. Please read the 
description of the research on the following pages, and initial where requested.  
This is not a test of your skills or abilities. I want to emphasize that your 
participation or non-participation in this study will have no effect on your current or 
future military status. Information sharing, not the individual participant, is being 
evaluated. Your identity and responses will remain private.  
Please do not discuss any part of the study with other students or potential 
participants until the study has concluded (around December 2006). We want all 
participants to be equally prepared during the study, and no one to be "coached" or 
otherwise prepped beforehand. 
Please read the standard consent forms on the following pages. There is no risk to 
your health or to your privacy. Please do not hesitate to ask any questions you may have. 
You can email your questions to sburnett@nps.edu. Thank you for your participation. 
Sincerely,  
Mr. Steve Burnett 
CSM (R) 






Please provide the information requested below. Any item that does not 
pertain to you can be skipped.   
1. What is your current age and at what age did you enter the military or 
school. 
Current Age______ Age When Entered Military______ 
2. What military service are you or were you a member of? (Place an X to 
indicate answer.) 
Air Force _____  Army_____ Marine_____ Navy_____ 
3. If you have been a member of another service indicate all that apply. 
(Place an X to indicate answer.) 
Air Force _____  Army_____ Marine_____ Navy_____ 
4. Were one or both of your parents members of the military while you were 
growing up? If yes, indicate the number of years in the menu item. 
  Mother   Father 
Air Force ______  _______ 
Army  ______  _______ 
Marines ______  _______ 
Navy  ______  _______ 
5. Within your branch, what job were you trained for? (Examples: Artillery, 
Infantry, Aviator–Fixed Wing, Surface Warfare - Communications, etc.) .  Please do 
not abbreviate your answer with service specific acronyms. Spell out your job 
specialty completely. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
6. What is your gender? (Place an X to indicate answer) 
Male__________   Female__________ 
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7. What is/was your rank?____________________ 
8. What is or was your total Time in Service (TIS)? 
Years (Still Serving)__________  Previous service or Retired 
TIS__________ 
9. If you have been a member of a Joint service team of any type, what other 
services were represented. (Place an X to indicate answer.) 
Air Force______ Army______  Marines______ Navy______ 
10. If you are an Officer with prior enlisted service, indicate the length of 
time you were enlisted and with what service. 
 Years 
Air Force _____ 
Army  _____ 
Marines _____ 
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Intelligence Information Update 
 
2006 – 24 April – 0200 
 
1.   Commands Intent – South China Sea Mission 
 
 Commanders Intent is to establish China as the single proprietor of the 
South China Sea (SCS), to develop a strategic stronghold over the region and insure 
peaceful coexistence with the countries bordering the SCS.  China has long insisted that 
the SCS was proprietary and now demands international recognition of their legal right to 
ownership. The Commander of Red Cell has binding and legal authority from the 
Chinese Government to use all means possible to insure rapid and complete control of the 
entire region.     
 
2.  Command Options for All Combatant Commanders 
  








3.  Current Operation 
 
 Chinese forces are preparing to deploy to the Spratly Islands located 1280 
KM from Pratas Island.  Carrier group NEWCON has maneuvered to the North Western 
side of Pratas Island and begun occupation of the Island.  Pratas Island is being 
established as a strategic location.  Current plans are to establish a higher headquarters on 
Pratas Island as combat operations unfold.  The primary mission for deploying forces on 
Pratas Island is to establish and secure the island for sea and air logistic operations in 
support of the Spratly, Palawan and South China Sea actions. 
 
 Currently, land forces from the 46th Mechanized  Infantry  Division have 




 The NEWCON Carrier Battle Group has established continuous fighter 
and helicopter  operations in support of the initial landing.  Current flight operations 
extend out to a 250 miles radius from Pratas.  Diesel and Nuclear Submarines are 
currently deployed between Pratas Island and the Chinese coast, between Pratas and 
Spratly Islands and between Taiwan and Pratas Island.   
  
 The landing strip has been secured.  Logistical and security flight 
operations have  commenced.  Of concern to the commander is the report of a blue 
special force unit on the eastern coast of Pratas island. 
  
4.  Force Deployment 
 
 Current force deployments are displayed on the Pratas Overlay 04-01-2A.  
Initial occupations are from the northwestern port and the landing strip along the entire 
western coastline.  Movement to secure the island is to the southeast with small boat 
support around the island and reefs. 
 
5.  Mission For Commander Red Cell 
 
 Develop Pratas Island as the Red Cell operational base for support to 
South Sea Operations.  Secure and defend.  Develop port operations for resupply and 
logistical operations. 
 
6.  Objectives 
 
 Take control of the South China Sea.  Establish the Spratly Islands, 
Palawan and Pratas Island as control points for security and management of the sea lanes.   
 
7.  Logistics 
 
 Current port operations have established logistical supply points to support 
Red Cell forces.  Off-load is complete to support current operations.  Development for 
follow-on operations across the SCS have not begun.  Current supplies of ammunition, 
food, water, repair parts, petroleum, hospital supplies, and barrier equipment are Code 
Green (Logistics Support for next 30 days available at current level of Operations Tempo 
– OPTEMPO). 
  
8.  Staff Preparation 
 
 The current operational planning has been ongoing for many years.  The 
staff is established, each position has a competent person assigned with a replacement 
identified. They are well rehearsed and prepared for many contingency operations.  
Communications between the different staff members include highly sophisticated 
equipment as well as back up measures in the event of EPW attacks.  These measures are 
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tested and effective.  One weakness of the staff is the lack of operation experience during 
















































Intelligence Information Update 
 




1.  China Complete Combat Power and Force Structure 
 
  Personnel 
 
Army       1.5 Million       40 Maneuver Divisions         40 Maneuver 
Brigades 
 
Navy         260,000   60 Surface ships             66 Sub Surface        
      50 Amphibious Ships           2 Carriers 
 
Air Force  400,000   4300 Tactical Fighters          1000 Bombers       
6500 Transports 
 
2.  Air Support 
 
 Multiple aircraft are deployed and protecting the region.  The extent of air 
superiority is unknown.  Current estimates indicate the Chinese force capable of 24 hour 
continuous and undenied air space. Several UAV’s (CH-1, D-4 and ASN-206) are 
deployed and operational. 
Fighter support includes Air Force, Army and Naval aircraft.  Estimates of force 
size are unavailable but believed to be adequate to support current operations around 
Pratas Island.   
 
3.  Reserve Reinforcement Support 
 
(Details of internal composition of the forces are not of value to the current 
operation) 
   
 LAND:  Employability – one week 
 The 28th Army Group  is supporting the Pratas Island Red Cell Operations.   
 
 70th Motorized Infantry Div. 
 71st Infantry Div  
 1 Armored Div (Reserve) 
  
 NAVAL: Employability – 96 hours  
 Southern Fleet Battle Group 
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  Naval Air Force, SSF   8 NAF Div 
  32nd Submarine Flotilla  U/I Destroyer Flotilla 
 
 AIR: Employability – 48 to 72 hours 
 44th Airborne Div   11th Attack Div 




4.  Air Defense Support 
 
 Chinese forces have deployed a partial FT 2000 BN.  Equipment includes 
one battery PLT of FT 2000, surface to air missile commonly referred to as the AWACS 
killer.  Forces are located along the western shoreline of Pratas island. 
 
 The Chinese have at least a battery of HQ 17 deployed.  The HQ 17 SAM 
system is capable of engaging not only aircraft and helicopters, but also RPVs, precision-
guided weapons, and various types of guided missiles. Effective range limits are from 
1500 to 12000 m with target altitude limits being between 10 and 6000 m. 
 
5.  Artillery Support 
 
 Chinese artillery support is missile and convention munitions based.  
Currently there are two battalions on.  One battalion of CSS 6 Short Range Ballistic 
Missiles (SRBM) and two battalions of conventional artillery are established as shore 
batteries.  105mm and 120mm battalions are operational.  
 




  China has a total of 40 frigates, 20 destroyers and an unknown 
number of small vessels deployed in support of the operation.  Located close to Pratas 
Island are 5 frigates, 2 destroyers and at least 50 small vessels serving as patrol boats.  
Ten amphibious landing craft are located in the port close to. 
 
 Sub Surface 
 
  Of the 60 diesel and 6 nuclear boats deployed, 5 diesel boats and 2 
nuclear boats are in the vicinity.  No accurate location is known at this time. 
 
7.  Sensors 
 
 Current Special Operations Forces are deployed on the eastern coast of 




 Satellite imagery is available and being transmitted to Commander Red 
Cell after evaluation by Intelligence staff on Chinese mainland. 
 
 Subsurface sensors are deployed around Pratas Island with plans for 
additional deployments over the next 48 hours. 
 
 Surface sensors aboard surface vessels are operational and tied to all Air 
Defense assets in the area. 
 
 Lack of sensors focused on the Spratly Islands and Palawan are a concern 
for Commander, Red Cell.   
 
8.  Command and Control 
 
 Chinese leaders have developed and established a formidable C2.  All 
agencies are linked to each other and have access.  There is evidence that the linkage is 
weak across certain boundaries due to mistrust and political aspirations, but these 
weaknesses need to be probed to determine their vulnerability.   
  
 Doctrine for all C2 operations includes highly sophisticated 
communication systems, rapid intelligence updates, and operational flexibility due to the 
large force structure.  Breakdowns occur primarily when the OPTEMPO reaches a 
saturation point and the commanders delay decisions pending clarification from higher 

















Intelligence Information Update 
 
2006 – 24 April – 0200 
 
1.  Island Demographics 
 
 Uninhabited due to continued disputes between China, Vietnam and Japan 
as to rightful ownership.  The island is 18.8 km long and 14.8 km wide.  White sand 
beaches surround most of the island with light brush and trees extending approximately 6 
km into the interior where the foliage becomes heavy.  Elevation is sea level to 
approximately 1200 feet above sea level on Mt. Pratas. 
  
 Pratas Island is in the north part of the South China Sea, near the 
Pescadores (Penghu Islands), and is very close to Taiwan. Pratas Island is at the mid-
point between South Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Pearl River estuary.  
 
 The island has a runway 4,921 feet long and two man-made piers which 
are located in the northwestern corner of the island. There is ample room for port 
development. 
 
 Natural Environment  
 
  The Pratas Islands are situated on the Pratas Terrace in the northern part of the South 
China Sea. They are formed from a series of reef flats, and cover an area around 150 km 
long and 30 km wide. The Pratas Islands include three coral atolls. From north to south, 
these are: North Vereker Atoll, South Vereker Atoll and Pratas Atoll. South Vereker 
Atoll and Pratas Atoll are continuous shoals. The reefs are shaped like an ellipse, and are 
submerged beneath the water. Pratas Reef is a typical atoll. Pratas Island is at the west 
end of Pratas Atoll. It is the only island exposed above the sea surface in the Pratas Atoll. 
The Pratas Atoll was recorded on the "Ch'ing Dynasty Unifies China for A Thousand 
Years Map" (printed in 1767) under the name "Nan Awo Chi." 
 
2.  Weather 
 
HONG KONG ADJACENT WATERS: PRATAS ISLAND 
WINDS - EAST FORCE 4 TO 5  
BECOMING SOUTH TO SOUTHEAST FORCE 4 LATER. 
MODERATE TO HEAVY FOG 0100-1000, THUNDERSTORMS ONGOING. 
MODERATE SEAS. 
 
Visibility is degraded over the next 4 days with a weather system moving through 
the area.  Small and medium boat advisories have been issued for China coastal regions.  








  Today  Tomorrow Next day Follow on week 
 Hi 78  79  80  78 - 82 
 Lo 77  78  78  77 - 79 
 FC Rain  T-storms T-storms Moderate to Heavy T-
storms 
 
3.  Daylight  
 Sunrise Approximately  0610 
 Sunset  Approximately 1825 
  
 
4.  Tide Schedule  
  











































































Illumination  Last Quarter moon  25% Illumination  
 
5.  Moral 
 
 Troop moral is high.  Desire to achieve goals is considered high among the 
senior leadership.  Desire to achieve goals among the moderate leadership and troops is 
unknown.  History indicates that the Chinese military responds well when the senior 
leads are present and available.  Breakdown in moral occurs when the senior leaders are 
tied to plans and operations denying them visibility with the troops.  Current conditions 
on Pratas Island are favorable to high moral due to senior leaders’ presence and 
availability. 
 
6.  Communication Effectiveness 
 
 Chinese units are independent in command and control.  Individual unit 
cohesion is high but in joint operations, difficulties have prevented adequate and effective 
initial execution of a mission.  Communication between similar organizations is 
understandable, rapid and effective. Communications between dissimilar organizations 
requires more detailed explanation, has degraded transmission speed, and is not initially 
as effective as the leadership desires.  Command channels have boundaries that are not 
easily crossed. 
 
7.  Unity of Force 
  
 Training commanding officers for joint operations. The military 
educational institutions have intensified their joint operations training. The elementary 
command colleges offer basic courses in joint operations. The intermediate command 
colleges offer courses on service campaigns and combined operations. The advanced 
command university offers courses on strategic studies and joint operations. In order to 
bring up commanding officers for joint operations, PLA units carry out on-duty training 
and regional cooperation training, and acquire knowledge of other services and arms and 
joint operations through assembly training, cross-observation of training activities, 
academic seminars, and joint exercises. 
 
8.  Leadership 
 
 Revolution in Military Doctrine since 1990 is believed to be based on the 
Chinese intent to gain control over the South China Seas once effective military strength 
to neutralize and defeat the United States is established. The leadership may believe that 
with the extended force deployments of the US and its Allies, that this RMA may exist.  
With the strengthening of the strategic and cooperative partnership between China and 
Russia, the two countries have established a senior-level meeting mechanism to exchange 
views on major issues. They have also held consultations on major strategic issues 
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between relevant departments.  Russian involvement in this crisis has not been 
established 
 The leadership is determined to meet the military objective by the means 
and will necessary to achieve that goal.  The Officers at the senior levels are highly 
trained and professional.  The mid-grade leadership is capable but untested.  The lower 





Intelligence Information Update 
 
2006 – 24 April – 0200 
 
1.  Landing capabilities of Blue 
 
 Current Blue capabilities include but are not limited to (not all assets are 
available for the rescue mission): 
 
  Land – 1 Airborne Division 
   1 MEU 
   1 Philippine Infantry Div 
   2 Philippine Airborne Brigades 
   1 Special Operations group 
  Naval - 1 Joint Carrier Assault Group 
   2 Sea Wolf Submarines 
  Air      -25 FA 18 
   54 FA-16 
   28 F -15 
   12 AV 8 
   5 C5A 
   56 C130 
   2 AWACS 
   4 Globehawk 
 
2.  Update Intelligence for Blue  
(estimated by Blue on the known or suspected activities Red is aware of) 
  
 Current intelligence shows a rapid build up of Blue forces in Japan, 
Malaysia and the Philippines.  Taiwan has authorized limited troop, air, and naval force 
deployments in and around the Taiwanese controlled land and waters.  Surveillance 
satellites are over flying the region but weather conditions are limiting the effectiveness 
of that information.  Special Operational Forces have been deployed. 
  
 Submarine activity is anticipated and indications are that several US and 
Japanese subsurface vessels are in the area.  Locations of these forces are unavailable.   
 
 Current Blue Force Air is limited and no engagements have occurred.  
Caution appears to be the operational focus until all forces are deployed.   
 
 US Mainland forces are being deployed and estimates indicate that 50% of 
the force is operational in the area.  Palawan has been occupied by a limited number of 




 Blue Forces have occupied the Spratly islands but no estimate of force 
type or operational status is available.   
 
3.  Deception 
 
 To cover the current operation, media and news items are being distributed 
indicating this operation is strictly a training mission that developed as a Senior 
Leadership Surprise Mission to evaluate the state of Joint Operational capabilities. 
 
4.  Accessibility 
 
 Access to the region is limited.  Chinese forces are well deployed and air 
superiority is assumed.  Forces on Pratas Island are well established on the western coast 
but limited on the Eastern Coast and at higher elevations.  Eastern coast access is limited 
by the reef surrounding the island, but water depth outside the reef allows subsurface ship 
deployment.  Mining operations of the waters are delayed for at least the next 72 hours 
due to weather condition and troop placements. 
 
5.  NBC posture 
 
 China possesses an advanced biotechnology infrastructure as well as the 
requisite munitions production capabilities necessary to develop, produce and weaponize 
biological agents. Although China has consistently claimed that it has never researched or 
produced biological weapons, it is nonetheless believed likely that it retains a biological 
warfare capability begun before acceding to the BWC. China is commonly considered to 
have an active biological warfare program, including dedicated research and development 
activities funded and supported by the government for this purpose. There is essentially 
no open source data on the subject of Chinese BW activities, and many legitimate 
research programs use similar, if not identical equipment and facilities. Chinese doctrine 
has advanced the use of chemical warfare and the extent of available resources is 
unknown.  Chemical gear has been detected in the port area. 
 China has 8000 DF 31 ICBM’s capable of reaching the United States.  
Current capabilities indicate ranges from the all of the West Coast of the US to the 
Rockies. 
 
6.  Rules of Engagement 
 
 Current rules of engagement are to deny the enemy any air, sea, or ground 
location that could result in compromising current operations in the South China Sea.  
Chemical, biological, and nuclear means are not authorized.  Commander, Chinese 
Forces has the only approval authority for these weapons.  All other means of denial are 
authorized. 
 




 The current force has limited experience in actual operation outside the 
mainland.  Most experience is in civil uprising.  The leadership is inexperienced in high 
OPTEMPO operations outside of simulated exercises. 
 
8.  Freedom to act 
 
 Current Chinese doctrine attempts to give commanders in the field, at sea, 
and in the air operation control of their area of responsibility.  Exercise evaluation 










Initial Briefing for Experimental Condition 
Satellite Imagery from the National Reconnaissance Office has detected the continued movement 
SSE of a large Chinese Naval Fleet believed to be headed toward the island of Palawan as an initial force 
attempting to take control of the South China Seas (SCS).  Supporting the Palawan invasion is a Chinese 
Naval Battle Group code named “Red Cell” currently occupying in the Pratas Island Group approximately 
250 miles SSW of the China Coast. 
 
U.S. Seal Team One (ST1) was inserted earlier on Pratas Island.  Their mission, although 
classified at this time, was in support of the coalition forming to oppose the Chinese operation.  The 
coalition code name is  KALAWAN EXPRESS and is ongoing.  ST1 has now missed three consecutive 
radio check-ins (Check- ins are at 12 hour intervals.)  Their location and disposition are undetermined but 
their last known location was in the mountainous region on the eastern coast of Pratas Island.  The team’s 
last report indicated the Island was being occupied by a substantial but undetermined number of Red Cell 
Forces.  Small vessels were patrolling the entire island and reef area.   
 
U.S. Commander, KALAWAN EXPRESS, has directed his staff to begin preparation for a 
possible rescue mission of ST1. Air Force, Army, Marine and Navy forces are preparing for this operation.  
As part of the initial planning, the J2 has been directed to begin developing possible Red Cell responses to 
a rescue attempt. [NOTE - There is one Sea Wolf Submarine currently in the waters approximately 50 
miles from Pratas Island on an information gathering mission.  Exposure of the submarine for a rescue 
attempt would cripple that resource but is available.] 
 
The J2 is currently at the initial commander’s mission brief but will return in the next 30 minutes.  
You represent the J2 staff that will  develop possible Red Cell  responses to an attempted rescue operation 
by the time of his return.  This information will be used to develop the Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield (JIPB). 
 
The notebooks before you contain documents in raw format with information about Red Cell.  
Your team is to use this information to develop potential courses of actions expected by Red Cell in the 
event of a Blue Force rescue attempt. Begin by developing what the possible Red Cell course of action 
response may be and prepare a Decision Matrix to determine the most likely response.  Each of you has 
certain information in the notebook provided to you that  will assist in the development of the decision 
matrix.  [REMEMBER  –  you are acting as the Red Cell staff developing courses of action to a Blue 
rescue mission.] 
 
This is not an exercise in determining the right responses or courses of action.  There is no right or 
wrong answer.  Do the best you can as a team to develop the Decision Matrix by the end of the 30 minute 
time period.  To assist in the measurement of performance, the team’s discussion is being recorded by the 
tape recorder located on the adjoining table and by the surveys you took.  The recording and survey results 
are for the researcher only and will not be made available to anyone in your organization.  Try not to allow 
the taping of your session or any cultural and personality differences between you  interfere with your 











Initial Briefing for Control Condition  
Satellite Imagery from the National Reconnaissance Office has detected the continued movement 
SSE of a large Chinese Naval Fleet believed to be headed toward the island of Palawan as an initial force 
attempting to take control of the South China Seas (SCS).  Supporting the Palawan invasion is a Chinese 
Naval Battle Group code named “Red Cell”  currently occupying in the Pratas Island Group approximately 
250 miles SSW of the China Coast. 
 
U.S. Seal Team One (ST1) was inserted earlier on Pratas Island.  Their mission, although 
classified at this time, was in support of the coalition forming to oppose the Chinese operation.  The 
coalition  code name is  KALAWAN EXPRESS and is ongoing.  ST1 has now missed three consecutive 
radio check-ins (Check-ins are at 12 hour intervals.) Their location and disposition are undetermined but 
their last known location was in the mountainous region on the eastern coast of Pratas Island.  The team’s 
last report indicated the Island was being occupied by a substantial but undetermined number of Red Cell 
Forces.  Small vessels were patrolling the entire island and reef area.   
 
U.S. Commander, KALAWAN EXPRESS, has directed his staff to begin preparation for a 
possible rescue mission of ST1. Air Force, Army, Marine and Navy forces are preparing for this operation.  
As part of the initial planning the J2 has been directed to begin developing possible Red Cell responses to a 
rescue attempt. [NOTE - There is one Sea Wolf submarine currently in the waters approximately 50 miles 
from Pratas Island on an information gathering mission. Exposure of the submarine for a rescue attempt 
would cripple that resource but is available.] 
 
The J2 is currently at the initial commander’s mission brief but will return in the next 30 minutes.  
You represent the J2 staff that will  develop possible Red Cell  responses to an attempted rescue operation 
by the time of his return.  This information will be used to develop the Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield (JIPB). 
 
The notebooks before you contain documents in raw format with information about Red Cell.  
Your team is to use this information to develop potential courses of actions expected by Red Cell in the 
event of a Blue Force rescue attempt. Begin by developing what the possible Red Cell course of action 
response may be and prepare a Decision Matrix to determine the most likely response.  Each of you has 
certain information in the notebook provided to you that  will assist in the development of the decision 
matrix.  [REMEMBER  –  you are acting as the Red Cell staff developing courses of action to a Blue 
rescue mission.] 
 
This is not an exercise in determining the right responses or courses of action.  There is no right or 
wrong answer.  Do the best you can as a team to develop the Decision Matrix by the end of the 30 minute 
time period.  To assist in the measurement of performance, the team’s discussion is being recorded by the 
tape recorder located on the adjoining table and by the surveys you took.  The recording and survey results 
are for the researcher only and will not be made available to anyone in your organization.  Try not to allow 
the taping of your session to interfere with your information sharing.   Your time will begin after your 












Facts  Evaluation document for each Participant 
Please indicate  the level of importance of each of the eight facts you were provided in your 
notebook had on the team’s ability to determine a Red Cell Course of Action.  
 
Fact 1    
Very important Somewhat Important Somewhat Unimportant Unimportant 




Very important Somewhat Important Somewhat Unimportant Unimportant 




Very important Somewhat Important Somewhat Unimportant Unimportant 




Very important Somewhat Important Somewhat Unimportant Unimportant 




Very important Somewhat Important Somewhat Unimportant Unimportant 




Very important Somewhat Important Somewhat Unimportant Unimportant 




Very important Somewhat Important Somewhat Unimportant Unimportant 




Very important Somewhat Important Somewhat Unimportant Unimportant 








1 Please write a short paragraph describing your satisfaction with your group’s effectiveness in 
completing this wargame.   Please list your positive and negative experiences during this 
experiment.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
2 Do you believe having members from other services would have made determining Red Cell 






3 Please explain your answer to question 2. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









Figure 26.   Photo of Pratas Island 
 
 





Figure 28.   Photo of Runway on Pratas Island 
 
     








APPENDIX F.  HOFSTEDE COUNTRY SCORES 
Hofstede Country Scores for Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Individualism/ Collectivism and Masculinity/Femininity. 












Costa Rica 35 
Germany 35 




































West Africa 77 
Ecuador 78 
Indonesia 78 




























Hong Kong 29 
Sweden 29 
Ireland 35 





United States 46 
Canada 48 
Indonesia 48 
New Zealand 49 
South Africa 49 
Norway 50 
Australia 51 
East Africa** 52 
Netherlands 53 


























































Costa Rica 15 
Peru 16 
Taiwan 17 
South Korea 18 




West Africa 20 
Chile 23 
Hong Kong 25 
Malaysia 26 

































New Zealand 79 
Canada 80 
Netherlands 80 
United Kingdom 89 
Australia 90 


































South Korea 39 
El Salvador 40 






















Czech Republic* 57 
Greece 57 
Hong Kong 57 
New Zealand 58 
Australia 61 
United States 62 
Ecuador 63 






















APPENDIX G.  CONTACT INFORMATION FOR ASSESSMENT 
TOOLS USED IN THIS RESEARCH 
 
McCrae and Costa NEO FFI 
Psychological Assessment Resources, INC 
16204 N. Florida Avenue 




Matsumoto Cultural Styles Questionnaire 
 
Department of Psychology  (415) 338-1114 Voice   
San Francisco State University  (603) 737-7140 Fax   
1600 Holloway Avenue   dm@sfsu.edu Email   
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APPENDIX H.  LINGUISTIC INQUIRY  WORD COUNT (LIWC) - 
LIWC VARIABLE OUTPUT INFORMATION 
Table 34.   LIWC2001 Output Variable Information 
 
Dimension Abbrev Examples 
I. STANDARD LINGUISTIC   
Word Count we  
Words per sentence WPS  
Sentences ending with? Qmarks  
Unique words (type/token ratio) Unique  
% words captured, dictionary word Die  
% words longer than 6 letters Sixltr  
Total pronouns Pronoun 1, our, they, you're 
1" person singular I I, my, me 
1" person plural We we, our, us 
Total first person Self I, we, me 
Total second person You you, you'll 
Total third person Other she, their, them 
Negations Negate no, never, not 
Assents Assent yes, OK, mmhmm 
Articles Article a, an, the 
Prepositions Preps on, to, from 
Numbers Number one, thirty, million 
Affective or Emotional Processes Affect happy, ugly, bitter 
Positive Emotions Posemo happy, pretty, good 
Positive feelings Posfee) happy, joy, love 
Optimism and energy Optim certainty, pride, win 
Negative Emotions Negemo hate, worthless, enemy 
Anxiety or fear Anx nervous, afraid, tense 
Anger Anger hate, kill, pissed 
Sadness or depression Sad grief, cry, sad 
Cognitive Processes Cogmech cause, know, ought 
Causation Cause because, effect, hence 
Insight Insight think, know, consider 
Discrepancy Discrep should, would, could 
Inhibition Inhib block, constrain 
Tentative Tentat maybe, perhaps, guess 
Certainty Certain always, never 
Sensory and Perceptual Processes Senses see, touch, listen 
Seeing See view, saw, look 
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Hearing Hear heard, listen, sound
Feeling Feel touch, hold, felt 
Social Processes Social talk, us, friend 
Communication Comm talk, share, converse 
Other references to people Othref 1pl,2nd,3rd person pronoun
Friends Friends pal, buddy, coworker 
Family Family mom, brother, cousin 
Humans Humans boy, woman, group 
Time Time hour, day, o'clock 
Past tense verb Past walked, were, had 
Present tense verb Present walk, is, be 
Future tense verb Future will, might, shall 
Space Space around, over, up 
Up Up up, above, over 
Down Down down, below, under 
Inclusive Incl with, and, include 
Exclusive Excl but, except, without 
Motion Motion walk, move, go 
Occupation Occup work, class, boss 
School School class, student, college 
Job or work Job employ, boss, career 
Achievement Achieve try, goal, win 
Leisure activity Leisure house, TV, music 
Home Home house, kitchen, lawn 
Sports Sports football, game, play 
Television and movies TV TV, sitcom, cinema 
Music Music tunes, song, cd 
Money and financial issues Money cash, taxes, income 
Metaphysical self Metaph God, heaven, coffin 
Religion Relig God, church, rabbi 
Death and dying Death dead, burial, coffin 
Physical states and functions Physical ache, breast, sleep 
Body states, symptoms Body Ache, heart, cough 
Eating, drinking, dieting Eating eat, swallow, taste 
Sleeping, dreaming Sleep asleep, bed, dreams 
Grooming Groom wash, bath, clean 
Swear words Swear damn,, piss 
Nonfluencies Nonfl uh,rr* 
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